



# **Greater Horn of Africa Peace Building Project**

## **Assessment and Programmatic Recommendations: Addressing Pastoralist Conflict in the Karamoja Cluster of Kenya, Uganda And Sudan**

*“Erae ekisil: akinapakina, apturi, alaru ka akiyar”*

*“Peace is a good place to stay, multiplying riches and life”*

**Karamajong signboard for  
Karamoja Initiative for Sustainable Peace  
Moroto, Uganda**

**Written for the S.O. 6 Conflict Strategy Team  
USAID/REDSO**

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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## A. Background

The term “Karamoja Cluster” is in common use and has been employed for many years to describe the pastoral and agro-pastoral ethnic groups, most of whom share a common language, culture, and land area encompassing northeastern Uganda, northwestern Kenya, southeastern Sudan and southwestern Ethiopia. Many of these ethnic groups live in what was the old Karamoja District in northeastern Uganda, and the people of the area are thus popularly referred to as “Karamojong”, in both Kenya and Uganda.

The drylands of the Karamoja Cluster, like many arid to semi-arid lands of Africa, have a diversity of ecosystems tuned to a seasonal but highly variable pattern of rainfall. Access to resources, primarily pasture for livestock and water human and animal consumption, is closely linked to the annual dry and rainy seasons. The predominant mode of food production of KC groups is an occupational continuum with those groups inhabiting drier climates relying primarily on livestock, to those in wetter climates relying primarily on cultivation, although all groups keep some livestock and all groups at various times plant crops. Over the centuries, pastoral, agropastoral, and agricultural societies in the cluster acquired and defended territory, in which they lived, farmed, and raised livestock. Systems of natural resource management (NRM) evolved generally based on common tenancy of land organized for the efficient utilization of available resources, primarily for livestock herding.

Boundaries between different ethnic communities have never been static and rigid but are fluid, given the variable pattern of rainfall distribution. As a result, negotiation of livestock movement is a constant. Survival is dependent on a web of good relationships that provide for sharing and collaboration. Finely honed strategies of herd splitting, opportunism, defensive capability and raiding to enlarge one’s herd all have relevance as adaptive strategies for survival. Critical to the success of these strategies are the two major concerns of having an adequate dry season pasture paired with nearby sources of sufficient water, and mobility. Movement is always negotiated between groups. Reciprocal relations were established with other pastoral and agro-pastoral groups, and when possible with agricultural groups, allowing access to pasture and water in dry seasons, particularly in times of drought. In periods of stress, elders would negotiate access to grazing rights. When negotiation failed to secure agreement, action by force was not ruled out.

Present day conflict in the KC revolves around many issues. Traditional pastoralism over the last century and a half has received a series of blows from which it is still attempting to adjust. Violent cattle raids, perhaps the most well known and obvious form of conflict, are one symptom of much deeper conflicts and fractures. Colonialism; disease and famine; the emerging post-independence state; the introduction of new systems of religion, business and private property; the struggle for political control in the face of changing regimes and distant powers not inclined to invest in marginally productive land, all stand behind cattle rustling, restricted pastoralist mobility and declining cattle per capita.

For centuries, raiding other groups for livestock has been a traditional method of replenishing herds in the wake of drought and disease. In some respects, this raiding can be seen as a quasi-legitimate sharing of resources, permitting groups on the verge of economic ruin and even starvation to reestablish their systems of food production and natural resources management. The proliferation of automatic weapons has, however, greatly exacerbated the consequences of the cattle rustling. Thus members of the Cluster now distinguish between stealing livestock from raiding for livestock. The individuals involved in stealing may be acting on their own, without permission from group elders. Raiding is considered a very different and far more legitimate activity. It is not considered theft but is described as a taking by force.

One newer phenomenon in the KC is roadside banditry, which is often blamed on young men living in the towns and centers. They are part of a growing reservoir of impoverished and uneducated young men, many of whose families have been forced out of pastoralism by circumstances beyond their control or who have dropped out of the pastoralist way of life while their families struggle on. All these young men have limited opportunities to earn income so they end up preying on their fellow citizens.

One important team finding is that while conflict in the KC is frequent, it is also unpredictable and intermittent. It is not steady and unrelenting. Instead, peaks and valleys characterize it, by periods of relative calm and then sudden outbreaks of violence. The periods of peaceful relations may be punctuated by small episodes of cattle raiding, and after a series of such raids, one group may mount a major response and violence will escalate. In some cases, there is no escalation. For these reasons, conflict between groups, can be described as recurrent rather than continuous. Intergroup relationships are characterized by ever-shifting alliances. For all of these reasons, conflict in the Cluster is very difficult to pin down and even more difficult to predict. The “hot spots” of today may be peaceful tomorrow. Monitoring is needed to determine whether small tensions are emerging and could under certain conditions add rise violence.

Groups in the KC Cluster, also have conflicts with groups outside the Cluster. There is a perception that the three national governments and the majority of the populations of the three countries are much more concerned about the impact of conflict on groups outside the Cluster than the effects on groups within the KC.

Conflict inside the Cluster and with neighboring groups has had many negative consequences. It has worsened the condition of an already impoverished people. Many informants reported to the decline in cattle per capita, one clear sign of poverty. Many people have been killed or maimed in conflicts, and even more have been rendered destitute. The number of people impoverished by conflict is large; evidence of this can be readily seen in settlements near towns, trading centers and mission posts. Many have lost their ability to be self-provisioning. They desperately need assistance to survive and become economically active again. In many cases, they have very little or no access to social services.

The existence of widespread conflict is a major hindrance to effective development. It interferes with normal trade and local development efforts, and greatly reduces the willingness of Government officials and NGO staff to work in the areas. The climate of insecurity is a serious impediment to improving economic and social conditions, which are essential to effective, long-

term reduction of poverty. Large areas of the Cluster have become abandoned because of conflict.

Not only has there been a significant increase in violent conflict in the Karamoja Cluster and adjoining areas over the past 20 years, the nature of the violence has also changed during that time. The traditional rules that governed raiding and warfare in the Cluster and surrounding areas have loosened and have been at least partially replaced by more random violence. The increase in violence has also led to increased animosity and hatred, and a strong desire for revenge. These factors further inflame the situation, leading to further violence. Many believe that the enormous increase in modern weapons has played a key role in both the increased levels and the changed nature of violence.

These changes in the scale and nature of conflict in the region have led some to conclude that traditional methods of conflict resolution alone cannot effectively deal with current conditions. While there is debate on this point, it is important to recognize that what is needed is an appropriate combination of “traditional” and “modern” methods of conflict resolution and peacebuilding.

## **B. The Conflict Assessment**

The conflict assessment was carried out in November and December 2001. The team was comprised of six individuals. The basic goals of the conflict assessment were to produce: 1) highly contextualized but systematic and ordered accounts of Causes of Conflict as well as Causes of Peace in the areas in which they conduct field work; 2) a summary characterization of the kinds of existing USAID and other donor activities that are already going on in the area of the conflict, with some assessment of whether, to what extent, and how effectively, they address the cause of conflict or capacities of peace; 3) a set of recommendations that suggest programming options that USAID can pursue to reduce the likelihood of violent conflict; and 4) baseline data for key S.O. performance indicators for REDSO and USAID/Uganda.

## **C. Analytical Framework and Methodology**

Because conflicts are numerous and various in the KC, the assessment team noted in its initial meetings that there was a need to more clearly define and identify exactly what types of conflicts were of interest. The USAID/REDSO scope of work identified the conflicts of interest as being typified by significant persistent violence. The assessment team as a whole agreed that the term persistent was not entirely accurate in so far as it implies that the same groups are fighting throughout time. In the pastoral environments of the KC, violence seems to be recurrent but sometimes intermittent and it follows broad patterns.

In order to identify significant recurrent violence, the team applied a set of rough conflict magnitude/intensity criteria that looks at the intensity of conflict in a number of different dimensions. In order for a conflict to be considered “significant and persistent” for the purposes of this study, it would have to cross the threshold on most of the dimensions we identified. In point of fact, all of the conflicts that the team identified for inclusion and deeper analysis in this report crossed the basic threshold on all or almost all of the dimensions of interest. These were:

deaths, displaced people, destruction of property, theft of property, interruption of economic activity, and interruption of administrative activity.

The framework of conflict causes and peace capacities that served as a generic starting point for the team is summarized in the Conflict Assessment protocol that follows. The theory of conflict that this protocol assumes is that conflicts involve a perceived clash of interests, which can be pursued either violently and destructively or constructively. Violent international and intra-national conflicts (dependent variable) in the GHA can be thought of as emerging from various combinations of three types of interacting sources (independent variables) or Causes of Conflict. In the case of the KC, the clashes of interest are those relating to access to resources.

Because the eruption and continuance of violent conflicts usually depends on the accumulation of several factors, it is important to look at all these possible levels in the chain of causation. It should be noted that the conflict sources at each level above may originate both from within the arena of the conflict studied and from outside that arena (such as, for example, the support of insurgencies by neighboring states or structural adjustment policies by the IMF). Thus, they may be local, regional-sub-national, national, or regional-supra-national.

In addition, there usually will be some peace capacities or “causes of peace” present that are functioning to some degree to offset the pressures that are driving violent conflict, by preventing, mitigating or peacefully channeling them into constructive forms of (non-violent) conflict. The value of deliberately looking for and describing these ameliorative factors as an integral part of the diagnosis of the conflict situation is that such trends and capacities within the arena of the conflict might suggest amenable entry points for external actors to reinforce. These Causes of Peace mirror the Causes of Conflict in that they can be organized around the same three overall categories. These capacities may exist traditionally in a given community. They may also be developed, with assistance from outside the community, through development efforts and activities.

The methodology of this Conflict Assessment was guided primarily by the document “USAID REDSO/GHA Conflict Assessment Protocol: Pastoralist Conflicts”. The Protocol outlines a theory of conflict causes and peace capacities that are thought to be operative in most conflicts considered in the assessment, and helpful in constructing successful conflict responses. This protocol served to guide the team in designing the field-work, choosing methods of information gathering, insuring comparability between the two branches of the team, and largely serves as the analytical framework of this report. That said, as with any good research protocol, it proved to be flexible enough to allow modification in the field as the evolving circumstances on the ground and findings of the team informed the ongoing research. This framework suggested a methodology that guided the team in identifying structural, proximate and immediate conflict causes and linking these conflict causes to a set of peace capacities.

Data collection techniques included reading extensive reports as well as current academic writing on pastoral development and conflict in the areas of study. In addition to this documentary research, the team employed a combination of field research methods to gather data. The primary data source was key informant interviews with USAID partners, international, national and local NGOS, government representatives, political figures, church leaders, CSOs, donors, and local people in the KC. When in villages and towns outside the major cities, many team members utilized group interview techniques

as well. Participant observation of conflict conferences and workshops was also employed. Finally, the team commissioned two activities, a workshop and a meeting, organized by OAU/IBAR, which for the past three years has carried out a Pastoral Communities Harmonization Initiative in the Karamoja Cluster.

## **D. Conflict Causes**

Section IV. of the report provides a more detailed discussion of the causes of conflict in the Karamoja Cluster and neighboring areas divided according to the research protocol's categories of structural or root causes, proximate causes and "triggers." The section closes with a brief discussion regarding the possibilities of predicting and locating future conflict. Structural causes of conflict in the Cluster include competition for scarce resources, traditional pastoral cultural values, increasing frequency of drought since about 1980, and the general poverty of the cluster.

Proximate causes of conflict in the KC include systematic neglect by governments of pastoral areas, politicization of conflict, the enormous increase in modern weapons, inappropriate government responses to conflict, provision of food aid without developing suitable livelihood opportunities for the recipients, interference by political leaders, weakened traditional authority systems, increased levels and non-traditional nature of violence, inflammatory media, and the introduction of commercial raiding. Most of the causes are external to the Cluster, or are the result of external influences. In several cases, the proximate causes listed above are also effects of violence, creating a vicious circle of influence.

Several factors can trigger immediate violent conflict between groups in the Cluster and surrounding areas, including a specific violent incident, a series of livestock thefts, a raid, a government operation, traditional taunting by girls and women, a seer's prophecy, an inflammatory media article or a politician's speech.

In the Karamoja Cluster, it is very difficult for those involved in conflict reduction activities to predict, locate, and identify and quickly respond to triggers of conflict. It is even more difficult to accurately predict the location and timing of future outbreaks of conflict even though one might be able to forecast that retaliation will occur. Communities residing nearest to opposing groups are often targeted for retaliatory raids. Pastoralists may wait long periods of time before responding to specific triggers with a large-scale raid or attack. They usually plan their raids and attacks carefully in an effort to achieve surprise, and they use traditional methods of surveillance of the other group's territory to identify their targets. The specific sites of conflict can vary, which makes the identification of "hot spots" particularly difficult. The possibility that new, temporary alliances can be established between groups, even between traditional enemies, further complicates an already complex situation.

## **E. Peace Capacities**

Section V. of the report provides a more detailed discussion of the causes of peace in the Karamoja Cluster and neighboring areas, where there are a host of existing and potential peace capacities that can be leveraged in the broad category of activities that fall under the umbrella of CPMR. By strategically matching conflict sources/causes with peace capacities, the conflict



sources may prove more amenable to solutions. The nature of conflict response, however, will not always entail activities that fall clearly under a CMPR rubric. Because structural and proximate conditions shape the conflict environment in fundamental ways, CMPR activities must engage with and be integrated carefully into broad development strategies for conflict response to be more than palliative. Without attention to this point, CMPR could serve to promote or perpetuate unjust or inequalitarian outcomes and circumstances which may result in greater levels of conflict in the long-run, even if successful in stemming particular conflicts in the short-run. Thus CMPR activities should not only aim at the reduction, solution, mediation or prevention of conflict, but more importantly to the improvement of structural factors that give rise to conflict situations.

This section examines CMPR activities in the Cluster (both extant and potential) using the framework introduced in Section I above and followed in Section IV of Conflict Causes. For each of the three levels of analysis, the report draws distinctions between and explores the utility of the dualities of traditional and modern CMPR. The report also considers the role of women, faith-based leadership, and the media in CMPR activities as well as the use of problem solving dialogues. The report notes the important role of regional organizations and the promotion of inter-state activities, and includes a summary of the team's impressions of particular CMPR activities as a result of our observations.

The team was not engaged in formal evaluation and thus it is vital for the reader to view the judgments made in this regard as tentative and impressionistic. To provide a more systematic means of making judgments, the team adopted the following broad criteria in regards to CMPR activities. The team noted the degree to which activities: 1) are consistent with stated objectives, 2) produced tangible results that can be cited, and or explained convincingly, and 3) made contributions or were successful.

The nature of structural capacities is such that the capacities change slowly over time. Patterns of behavior, cultural practice, levels of economic development, and environmental factors are difficult to influence except when one takes a long-term view. Thus structural peace capacity development will require long-term commitment. Quick fixes are not likely to result in lasting change, and could even prove to have a negative impact on conflict if not well grounded in solid strategy. Structural peace capacities are those which address competition for scarce resources and patterns of resource sharing, traditional pastoral cultural values (including changing structures, the roles of women, the role of elders, and the roles, of warriors), and poverty.

Proximate/channeling peace capacities are those which address the role of government and civil society (including the roles of national government, local government, donors and civil society, and the media), the relationship between development and conflict, indigenous responses to violence, and changed incentives for peace.

While it is not possible to predict exactly when and where the next cattle raid will occur or when one will spiral out of control, there are a number of conflict response techniques that could serve to suppress triggers and reduce the probability, frequency, and severity of such events, including immediate responses to raids, the rule of law and public security, and the media as a tool for "cooling the earth".

The report recognizes that any effective strategy on the part of USAID will entail partnering with a host of organizations, careful coordination, and mutually complimentary strategies.

## **F. Recommendations for Programmatic Approaches**

The issues related to conflict within and adjacent to the Karamoja Cluster are very complex, emotionally charged and politically sensitive. Designing and implementing an effective conflict reduction strategy requires considerable knowledge and constant monitoring of pastoral cultures and systems of natural resource management, the ethnic groups involved, the sometimes shifting relationships of the groups to one another, the political and administrative contexts, the external factors that have changed the nature of conflict, and the capacity of the peacebuilding and development organizations concerned. It is critical to note the dynamic nature of the situation on the ground, and to keep in mind accurately predicting incidents of violent conflict in this area is particularly difficult. The report recommends that REDSO commit itself to working directly with and supporting the activities of organizations already on the ground that have a firm understanding of local conditions, pastoral culture, and are engaged in innovative and promising CMPR activities.

The reports consider the set of constraints that necessitate a thorough rethinking of the recommended strategy and that guide the current approach. Section VI. aims to provide three strategy options which emerge from the substantive findings of the report and which the REDSO Mission can use to guide programming decisions in the near and medium term. The section ends with a set of broader recommendations that could serve long-term assistance strategy development and may be able to guide not only REDSO, but other stakeholders as well.

The first strategy option would focus on a regional issue or set of related issues that would not be conflict specific but rather issue driven. The logic here is that because there are multiplicities of conflicts and given the adaptive and unpredictable nature of pastoral conflicts in this area, working at a level slightly higher than particular conflicts is a useful and needed contribution. Further, the report suggests that a focus on linking development and conflict response is vital. Thus, possible issues that REDSO could use as foci for grant making decisions that are highly relevant to conflict drivers explored by the assessment team include: cattle health, cattle rustling prevention strategies, negotiated inter-group bride price controls, peace radio infrastructure and content, disarmament efforts, advocacy on behalf of pastoralist issues and concerns, and cross-border resource access.

The second strategy option would involve the dissemination of successful models. The report cites the one highly successful cluster of CMPR activities that have been employed in an area similar in many regards to the KC. The Wajir model (and other successful measures) could become a strategic focus for REDSO. USAID resources could focus on trying to transplant key aspects of the Wajir model to the KC. In addition to Wajir, there are a number of other successful models and approaches that recommend themselves and that have been developed in the KC itself.

The third (and least preferred) strategy recommendation would be a focus on one or at the most two specific conflict relationships. This would allow REDSO to concentrate resources on a narrower geographic focus (still bearing in mind REDSO's regional mandate) and try to "bulk"

activities in that area. This strategy might be successfully pursued by focusing on a small number of pilot activities and then expand out from that geographic base as methods are tested and found to work. One approach to a narrower geographic focus would be to choose a set of conflict relationships. REDSO could then sponsor work on improving those relationships, trying again to establish models that can be replicated throughout the cluster over time.

Finally, the report summarizes a number of recommendations that should be taken account of as REDSO or other donors embark on long range strategy formation and in planning with other donors and stakeholders in the KC. These points have informed our three strategy options presented above and should be further integrated into future planning. They include the following: 1) the need to integrate conflict resolution with socioeconomic development; 2) address the question of whether or not pastoralism should be abandoned by the peoples of the Karamoja Cluster; 3) the need for effective inter-state and regional conflict reduction mechanisms; 4) the need for adequate coordination; 5) the need to promote exchanges of experiences; 6) the need to integrate customary peacebuilding approaches into formal conflict reduction mechanisms and approaches; and 7) the need to promote the involvement of women in CPMR activities.

# **I. METHODOLOGY**

## **A. Conflict Assessment Protocol**

The methodology of this Conflict Assessment was guided primarily by the document “USAID REDSO/GHA Conflict Assessment Protocol: Pastoralist Conflicts” which was prepared by Lynn Carter, Michael Lund, and Zeric Smith of Management Systems International, with additional input from Michael Halderman and Hadley Jenner (included as Annex A of this report). The Protocol outlines a theory of conflict causes and peace capacities that are thought to be operative in most conflicts considered in the assessment, and helpful in constructing successful conflict responses. This protocol served to guide the team in designing the field-work, choosing methods of information gathering, insuring comparability between the two branches of the team, and largely serves as the analytical framework of this report. That said, as with any good research protocol, it proved to be flexible enough to allow modification in the field as the evolving circumstances on the ground and findings of the team informed the ongoing research.

In the field, the assessment team established a common set of standards articulated in the interview protocol (included as Annex B of this report) and a common reporting framework to capture the basic facts of particular conflicts (included as Annex C of this report). By design, not all interviewees were asked all questions in the interview protocol. The use of the interview protocol did not imply that interviews were artificially constrained or constricted such that important specific information was lost or not pursued. Instead, the set of common questions allowed the team to target the most relevant sub-set of questions to particular informants. In this way, the universe of questions and issues addressed in the assessment and interview protocols were strategically matched and efficiently targeted to informants in the field.

## **B. Team Field Work**

The team began its work in Washington, DC at a day-long Team Planning Meeting convened at MSI head quarters on 9 November. The TPM covered a host of logistical issues but concentrated on elaborating the team’s understanding of the USAID/REDSO Scope of Work and the Conflict Assessment Protocol. After travel to Nairobi, the full team (including USAID/REDSO’s CTO Steve Smith, USAID/REDSO’s conflict specialist Njeri Karuru) and Kenya-based MSI consultant Milcah Ong’ayo) continued meetings to further refine the team’s approach and clarify the expectations of the mission. Interviews with USAID partners, donors, NGOS, and GOK representatives commenced in Nairobi over the following days, and on November 14, the Uganda wing of the team departed for Kampala. Both the Kenya wing and the Uganda wing continued interviews in both capitals and then continued on to the field before meeting back in Nairobi on November 25. The team presented two mid-term briefings on two subsequent days, the first to USAID/REDSO and the second to the USAID-sponsored Pastoralist workshop. Both country teams worked throughout the week of Nov. 25-30 to synthesize findings and the Uganda team members departed the field on Nov. 27 and 30 respectively. The Kenya wing conducted further field interviews, and participated in two OAU/IBAR conducted workshops in Turkana

District (Lokichar and Lokichokio) the week of Dec. 2-8, with the following and final week (Dec. 9-13) devoted to preparation of an exit briefing, final interviews, and report outline preparations.

The basic goals of the conflict assessment protocol were to provide a means by which the team would be able to produce:

- 1) highly contextualized but systematic and ordered accounts of Causes of Conflict as well as Causes of Peace in the areas in which they conduct field work;
- 2) a summary characterization of the kinds of existing USAID and other donor activities that are already going on in the area of the conflict, with some assessment of whether, to what extent, and how effectively, they address the cause of conflict or capacities of peace;
- 3) a set of recommendations that suggest programming options that USAID can pursue to reduce the likelihood of violent conflict; and
- 4) baseline data for key S.O. performance indicators for REDSO and USAID/Uganda.<sup>1</sup>

This framework suggested a methodology that guided the team in identifying structural, proximate and immediate conflict causes and linking these conflict causes to a set of peace capacities. To accomplish this, the team read extensive reports as well as current academic writing on pastoral development and conflict in the areas of study. In addition to this documentary research, the team employed a combination of field research methods to gather data.

Perhaps the primary data source was *key informant interviews* in which one or more team members spoke at length with USAID partners, international, national and local NGOs, government representatives, political figures, church leaders, CSOs, donors, and local people in the KC. These interviews provided a great deal of data as well as contextual insight. Directed by the assessment team members, they typically served as an efficient means of getting both a general sense for the respondent's views on conflict in the KC generally as well as allowing the team members to ask specific points of enquiry.

When in villages and towns outside the major cities, many team members found *group interview* techniques to be fruitful as well. By bringing together people with common shared experience of conflict as either victims, perpetrators, or with other first hand knowledge and experience of conflict, the team was able to engage at a deeper level than they may otherwise have been able to do. By creating synergy between small groups, many ideas and experiences were shared and recorded to enrich the research process. The Uganda team, for example, used this method in two meetings with Parliamentarians from Karamoja and Teso. The Kenya wing also conducted group interviews, for example, with the NCKK in Eldoret, the West Pokot District Peace and Reconciliation Committee in Kitale, and MAPO in Tot (Marakwet District). MAPO is the acronym for this Marakwet-Pokot peacebuilding group.

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<sup>1</sup> It was understood that the baseline data would require further tailoring once USAID decided on a programmatic response.

*Participant observation* of conflict conferences and workshops also informed the reporting process. The Uganda wing was present at a workshop in Moroto and another conference at Makerere University. Each event served to provide greater airing of and broader comment on the conflict issues that seem most salient in the Karamoja Cluster (KC). Though the information was not produced as a direct response to the protocol, it adds a depth and breadth to the information presented in the assessment report.

Finally, the team commissioned two activities organized by OAU/IBAR, which for the past three years has carried out a Pastoral Communities Harmonization Initiative in the Karamoja Cluster. The OAU/IBAR organized: (1) a workshop held in Lokichar, Kenya, attended by Pokot of Kenya (West Pokot and Baringo districts) and Uganda, Turkana of Kenya, and Matheniko and Tepeth of Uganda; (2) a large meeting in Lokichokio attended by Turkana of Kenya and Toposa of Sudan. The workshop and meeting were facilitated by individuals involved in conflict reduction work from four organizations active in the district: OAU/IBAR, POKATUSA, ITDG, and SNV.<sup>2</sup> By observing the workshop and meeting, the team learned a great deal about issues concerning causes and effects of conflict in the Cluster. By observing the interaction of the participants and facilitators, the team was better able to understand issues related to current CPMR approaches and activities, and to gain ideas regarding activities that could be supported by USAID and other donors. The workshop provided the team with an extraordinary opportunity to meet, observe and interact with pastoralists, women as well as men, from the Karamoja Cluster who were playing key roles in efforts to reduce conflict. The experience also provided the team members with ideas that could be used to adapt and apply the research protocol used in the present assessment. The support to OAU/IBAR to allow it to organize the workshop and meeting was not only of benefit to the assessment team, but it allowed OAU/IBAR to maintain its momentum in its peacebuilding activities in the cluster.

The team worked with a number of other organizations and benefited from the on-the-ground expertise of many groups and individuals. This included important assistance in logistics and information gathering from PACT/MWENGO in Nairobi, MSI's Strengthening Decentralization in Uganda activity in Kampala; OAU/IBAR in Nairobi, Lokichar, Lokichokio, Moroto and Kotido; Lutheran World Relief in Moroto; National Council of the Churches of Kenya (NCCK) in Eldoret and Marakwet; ITDG in Nairobi and Turkana, POKATUSA in several locations; USAID/REDSO; USAID/Uganda; and the many other groups and individuals with whom we met (some on more than one occasion) over the course of the assessment. The generous assistance of these organizations aided the team in coming to a greater contextual understanding of the current conflicts than they would have otherwise been able to gain. The team also wishes to thank team leader Ned Greeley and members of the REDSO/ESA Regional Conflict Prevention Team for their input and support.

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<sup>2</sup> SNV: Stichting Nederlandse Vrijwilligers (Netherlands Development Organization); ITDG Intermediate Technology Development Group - Eastern Africa; POKATUSA - a peacebuilding project implemented by World Vision which is trying to reduce the conflict between four ethnic groups, and the first two letters of the names of the four groups spell POKATUSA. The four groups are the Pokot, Karamojong, Turkana and Sabiny.

## C. Conflict Magnitude/Intensity Criteria

Because conflicts are numerous and various in the KC, the assessment team noted in its initial meetings that there was a need to more clearly define and identify exactly what types of conflicts were of interest. The USAID/REDSO scope of work identified the conflicts of interest as being typified by significant persistent violence. The assessment team as a whole agreed that the term persistent was not entirely accurate in so far as it implies that the same groups are fighting throughout time. In the pastoral environments of the KC, violence seems to be recurrent but sometimes intermittent and it follows broad patterns.

In order to identify significant recurrent violence, the team applied a set of rough *conflict magnitude/intensity criteria* that looks at the intensity of conflict in a number of different dimensions. In order for a conflict to be considered “significant and persistent” for the purposes of this study, it would have to cross the threshold on most of the dimensions we identified. In point of fact, all of the conflicts that the team identified for inclusion and deeper analysis in this report (see Annex D for a more detailed description of 7 sets of conflict relationships) crossed the basic threshold on all or almost all of the following dimensions:

### Intensity or Magnitude dimensions:

- Deaths
- Displaced people
- Destruction of property (public and private)
- Theft of property, livestock
- Interruption of economic activity
  - Communication
  - Markets/trade
  - Travel (including tourism)
  - Agriculture and Livestock Raising
- Interruption of administrative activity
  - Service delivery
  - Administrative supervision
  - Revenue collection

These dimensions could be further refined, and a scale for each dimension could be articulated, if needed, but the team judges that as a rough measuring device, the simple threshold test was sufficient to allow us to differentiate minor sporadic cattle raids from more sustained and damaging violence.

## D. Conflict Causes and Peace Capacities

The framework of conflict causes and peace capacities that served as a generic starting point for the team is summarized in the Conflict Assessment protocol that follows.

Sources of Violent Conflicts: The theory of conflict that this protocol assumes is that conflicts involve a perceived clash of interests, which can be pursued either violently and destructively or constructively. *Violent* international and intra-national conflicts (dependent variable) in the GHAs can be thought of as emerging from various combinations of three types of interacting sources (independent variables) or Causes of Conflict. In the case of the KC, the clashes of interest are those relating to access to resources. The Causes of Conflict (meaning violent conflict) are outlined in Table 1 below.

<b>Table 1: Causes of (Violent) Conflict</b>
<p><b>Structural/Conducive Factors:</b> These are underlying, pervasive, socio-economic and historical conditions that predispose communities to conflict (often called “root” causes), although they cannot by themselves cause violence. They normally change slowly over time and thus require long-term efforts to remedy. We can think of three general categories of structural problems: 1) competition over scarce and valued socio-economic resources; 2) the structure of communal identities and history and status of inter-communal attitudes and relations; and 3) macro-economic or environmental trends. Examples of structural factors include unemployment and economic stagnation, gross inequality, general poverty and physical need, a strong sense of ethnic or religious identity, degradation of the natural resource base, historic memories of inter-state tension or violence, etc.</p>
<p><b>Proximate/Enabling Factors:</b> These are the proximate, intermediating sources of conflict. They include institutional and political processes and organizations that define and aggregate the interests of people and mobilize and channel political and social activity in pursuit of those interests. These can be more amenable to change in the medium or short term though they may require significant effort to address. They can be divided roughly into four categories: 1) identity group mobilization; 2) official political/governing institutions and processes and the role they play in dividing or pitting interests against one another, such as by neglect, capture of assets by one side or another, or division of assets between groups; 3) non-governmental institutions and organized social processes such as trade in weapons, media, and civil society activities; and 4) interaction of middle-level elites. Examples of proximate factors include discriminatory government policies, inflammatory media, systematic governmental neglect of particular geographic areas, ethnically divided civil society groups, specific laws and policies determining land or resource allocation and access, access to arms, organized political challengers to central government, etc.</p>
<p><b>Immediate/Triggering Factors:</b> These are the particular immediate actions, events, or circumstances that directly provoke specific time-bound instances of violent or coercive behavior. Examples include incendiary public speeches, violent acts themselves such as bombings or the assassination of prominent leaders, precipitous price drops, sudden weather changes, sudden death of herds through an epidemic, egregious human rights abuses, leadership succession decisions, etc. To some extent, triggers overlap with the other two categories, but it is useful to distinguish the precipitating factors in violence. For example, the decline in water availability due to sustained drought may be a factor that predisposes neighbors to violence but the sudden involvement by government in developing new sources of water may draw a reaction from those who believe that the resource is not being fairly shared.</p>

Because the eruption and continuance of violent conflicts usually depends on the accumulation of several factors (and thus is multi-causal as well as contingent, not inevitable), it is important to look at all these possible levels in the chain of causation. It should be noted that the conflict sources at each level above may originate both from within the arena of the conflict studied and from outside that arena (such as, for example, the support of insurgencies by neighboring states or structural adjustment policies by the IMF). Thus, they may be local, regional-sub-national, national, or regional-supra-national).

Peace Capacities In addition, there usually will be present some peace capacities or “causes of peace” that are functioning to some degree to offset the pressures that are driving violent conflict, by preventing, mitigating or peacefully channeling them into constructive forms of



(non-violent) conflict. For example, in the Karamoja area, there is a traditional practice of women getting together and complaining in song and verse when they are disgusted by the behavior of men in the community. This practice has been effective in embarrassing men into taking action they might not otherwise have taken. It is now being used as a peacebuilding tool in the area. OAU/IBAR has funded “women’s crusades” to help women apply pressure in this culturally powerful form against raiding.

The value of deliberately looking for and describing these ameliorative factors as an integral part of the diagnosis of the conflict situation is that such trends and capacities within the arena of the conflict might suggest amenable entry points for external actors to reinforce. These Causes of Peace mirror the Causes of Conflict in that they can be organized around the same three overall categories.

These capacities may exist traditionally in a given community. They may also be developed, with assistance from outside the community, through development efforts and activities. Table 2 below summarizes illustrative examples under each variable.

<b>Table 2: Causes of Peace (Capacities for Peaceful Management of Conflicts)</b>
<p><b>Structural/Alleviating:</b> This category captures social, cultural, and economic factors that offset the following three categories: 1) competition over scarce socio-economic resources; 2) communal identity and structure and inter-communal attitudes and relations; and 3) macro-economic or environmental trends. Examples include a common historical experience, commercial relations and economic interdependency, and effective international, national, or local efforts targeted at economic growth and equity;</p>
<p><b>Proximate/Channeling:</b> This category captures institutions, process and policies that counteract the corresponding causes of conflicts: 1) institutions and channels that cross-cut “separate identity groups” cohesiveness; 2) political/governing institutions and processes that play conciliatory and accommodating roles; 3) inclusive non-governmental institutions such as media and religious groups; and 3) the negotiations and other interactions of elites that bridge social cleavages. Examples include activities that provide alternate peaceful channels for representing interests, cross-cutting interest groups (e.g., women across tribal boundaries organizing to press the government for more attention to resource problems that cause conflicts among men), changes in institutional rules that might move identity-oriented practice toward interest-based politics and increase the strength of cross-tribal groups promoting peace, mobilization and channeling political and social activity for advocacy on broad public issues, restrictions on ethnic-based or religion-based political parties, establishment of broad-based mechanisms for voice and accountability vis a vis local and national entities, effective and fair policing, promotion of fora for elites from different groups to talk in a neutral setting; systems for negotiating acceptable solutions to boundary disputes; efforts designed to enhance the natural resources base, education efforts to change ethnic prejudices, involvement by religious leaders in promoting tolerance, etc.</p>
<p><b>Immediate/Suppressing:</b> It is difficult to prevent specific violence-provoking events. But the probability and frequency of such events can be reduced, through effective deterrence and suppression by security forces, and their escalatory consequences can be contained through responsive actions such as crisis management actions and decisions that address sudden stress. What is also possible here is to establish early warning and response systems that provide timely information on flashpoints, organize quick and appropriate reactions to dampen the effect of a trigger, increase the protection of vulnerable groups, and provide steady micro-economic management.</p>

The inclusion of both of these two tables reveals that while this approach recognizes the important role of the low level of socioeconomic development, or so-called “roots” of conflict, as a cause, it is important not to unconsciously adopt the “boiling pot” model of conflict that often lies behind many current early warning reports. This “boiling pot” paradigm assumes that a growing laundry list of socio-economic distresses will mount up to produce violent conflicts, by

themselves -- such as through mass violence erupting spontaneously, or general frustration being tapped by extremists. The cataloguing of a number of social and economic distresses is sometimes used automatically to predict the outbreak of conflict, as if social maladies inevitably produce violence. Yet these analyses are often not specific about the locus, scale or timetable of the conflicts they warn about. All poor communities, for example, do not erupt into violent conflict.

## II. BACKGROUND

This section defines and locates the Karamoja Cluster, discusses the people who are part of the cluster, and summarizes the ecology of the region and how people have adapted to it. In addition, this section presents an overview of history from the colonial era to the present, summarizing interactions of colonial regime and indigenous government with the people of the cluster.

### A. “Karamoja Cluster:” Definition and Location

The term “Karamoja Cluster” is in common use and has been employed for many years to describe the pastoral and agro-pastoral ethnic groups, most of whom share a common language, culture, and land area encompassing northeastern Uganda, northwestern Kenya, southeastern Sudan and southwestern Ethiopia. Many of these ethnic groups live in what was the old Karamoja District in northeastern Uganda, and they are often referred to as “Karamojong.”<sup>3</sup> This collective term is popularly (and somewhat incorrectly) used in both Kenya and Uganda for the people of this area. Properly speaking, however, the Karamojong include nine separate groups, only three of which are prominent and are included in this assessment: the Bokora, Matheniko and Pian. Another term used by anthropologists and others to refer to these Nilotic-related peoples with shared linguistic and cultural traditions is “Ateker”<sup>4</sup> The languages of the Ateker peoples are mutually intelligible.

Because of the geographic intermingling of populations, there is little precise agreement on which ethnic communities belong to the “Karamoja Cluster” and which do not. One definition will include ethnic groups or sub-groups that another definition does not. Boundaries may be drawn according to language, culture, degree of pastoralism, place of residence or the like. After considerable interviewing and discussion, the team chose to include all the groups that are part of the OAU/IBAR’s definition of the peoples of the Karamoja cluster This definition includes 13 separate groups,<sup>5</sup> some of which could be further sub-divided depending on how refined analysts wanted to be about differences between groups. These 14 groups include 11 of which have historically have spoken the Karamojong language and shared its culture as well as 2 others which have assimilated aspects of that culture, due to proximity. We have also added a 14<sup>th</sup> group, the Labwor, because the Labwor reside within Cluster boundaries and are swept up in Karamojong conflict.

Population data for the 14 groups are difficult to find but crude estimates suggest that the total population of KC groups may be between 1.2 and 1.4 million people. This does not include

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<sup>3</sup> There are several different spellings of this name. The spelling used in this report is often used in East Africa.

<sup>4</sup> Gray, S.J., 2000, “A Memory of Loss: Ecological Politics, Local History, and the Evolution of Karimojong Violence,” *Human Organizations*, 59(4): 401 – 418.

<sup>5</sup> OAU/IBAR counts 14 groups, because it counts the Pokot in Uganda separately from the Pokot in Kenya. Since these are one neighboring group, we have counted the Pokot only once. The Jie or Jiye have been counted as two groups since they are separated geographically by a wide stretch of territory and function as separate groups.

groups on the outer fringe of the KC, with which KC groups are often in conflict. The 14 core KC groups are identified in the table below.

**Table 1 Ethnic groups of the Karamoja Cluster**

Group Name	Country(ies)	District(s)	Language	Predominant Mode of Food Production
Pian	Uganda	Moroto	Karamojong	Pastoral
Matheniko	Uganda	Moroto	Karamojong	Pastoral
Bokora	Uganda	Moroto	Karamojong	Pastoral
Jie	Uganda	Kotido	Karamojong	Pastoral
Tepeth	Uganda, Kenya	Moroto, Turkana	Karamojong	Pastoral, agro-pastoral and foraging
Dodoth	Uganda	Kotido	Karamojong	Pastoral
Pokot (called Upe in Uganda)	Uganda, Kenya	Nakapiririt, West Pokot and Baringo	Pokot (Kalenjin)	Pastoral, agro-pastoral & settled agriculture, depending on location
Labwor	Uganda	Moroto	Neither Karamojong nor Acholi	Settled agriculture
Jiye	Sudan	Eastern Equatoria	Karamojong	Pastoral
Toposa	Sudan	Eastern Equatoria	Karamojong	Pastoral and agro-pastoral
Nyangatom	Sudan, Kenya and Ethiopia	Eastern Equatoria	Karamojong	Pastoral, & agro-pastoral
Didinga	Sudan	Eastern Equatoria	Didinga (related to Kalenjin)	Pastoral & agro-pastoral
Merille	Ethiopia and Kenya	Gama Gofa, Marsabit	Karamojong	Pastoral
Turkana	Kenya	Turkana	Karamojong	Pastoral

**Uganda:** The original Karamoja District in Uganda was subsequently divided into the Moroto, Kotido, and Nakapiririt districts. Moroto District is occupied by three groups who are often referred to as the “*Karamojong proper*,” the Pian, Matheniko and Bokora. A number of Tepeth, a group with their own separate language and culture but who have assimilated the language and culture of their Karamojong neighbors, also live in Moroto District. The Jie and Dodoth occupy Kotido District in northeast Uganda. The Pokot occupy Nakapiririt District in Uganda, and for many years were known as the “Karapokot.” They are still called “Upe” in Uganda, the Karamojong name for Pokot. The Labwor are the remaining group that resides in Uganda. While the team included them as part of the Cluster, others do not. While administratively part of the KC, culturally they are not. They are neither Acholi nor Karamojong. They live in the highland border area between Karamojong groups and Acholi and are farmers. They have been included in the study not only because they live within KC boundaries but also because they are victims of KC raids and Acholi counter-raids.

**Sudan:** There is also a splinter group of Jie (also known as Jiye) residing in southeastern Sudan, at quite a distance from their Jie kin of Kotido District. The Toposa, a large group in the cluster, also live primarily in southeastern Sudan near Torit and Kapoeta. They sometimes range into Kenya. The Nyangatom (or Dongiro) live primarily in the Sudan to the north and east of the Toposa but range into Kenyan administered territory north of Lokitaung and into Ethiopia. The Didinga, another group residing primarily in the Didinga Hills to the south of Kapoeta are not

conventionally considered members of the Karamoja Cluster. They are said to speak a language related to Kalenjin. However, they are pastoralists and agro-pastoralists that have adopted cultural values of the Karamojong and so they are included in the KC for the purposes of this study.

**Ethiopia:** The Merille (also known as Dessenetch or Geleb) is the only Karamoja Cluster group primarily based in the southwestern part of Ethiopia, although they range into Kenya on both sides of Lake Turkana in the north. Some Merille (the Dessenetch section) live in Kenya on the east side of Lake Turkana in Marsabit district. Both the Nyangatom and Turkana move into Ethiopia occasionally in search of water and pasture.

**Kenya:** Some Tepeth live on the Kenya side of the border, across from their kin in Moroto, Uganda. The Turkana occupy the largest district in Kenya, Turkana District, lying to the east of what was formerly Karamoja District in Uganda. The Turkana are one of the largest of the Karamojong groups. In Kenya, to the south of the Turkana, the Pokot occupy West Pokot District and the northern part of Baringo District. The Pokot are not part of the Ateker group of peoples, and they are not conventionally considered members of the Karamoja Cluster. They speak a Kalenjin language and are related to the Marakwet, Keiyo, Tuken, Sebei, Nandi, Kipsigis and other Kalenjin peoples. However, many Pokot are pastoralists and they live on the plains. Over time, they have assimilated many of the cultural practices of their Turkana and Karamojong neighbors, and so are counted here as part of the cluster. The Pokot who live in the highlands are primarily settled agriculturalists with cultural practices similar to other Kalenjin groups. The Nyangatom, based primarily in Sudan, range into Kenya.

The maps below show the administrative boundaries and towns as well as the position of these groups.

**Map 1: Karamoja Cluster Administrative Districts and Major Towns**



**Map 2. Karamoja Cluster Ethnic Groups and Selected Neighboring Ethnic Groups**



## B. The Drylands and Pastoralism

The drylands of the Karamoja Cluster, like many arid to semi-arid lands of Africa, have a diversity of ecosystems tuned to a seasonal but highly time-variable and place-erratic pattern of rainfall. Since rainfall is required for seasonal blooms of vegetation used as pastoral forage as well as for water for both human and animal consumption, access to resources is tied to a yearly seasonality of one or two rainy seasons and longer periods of dry conditions. When one or more seasonally expected rains do not occur, an extended dry spell can lengthen into drought and can place greater pressure on available water and grazing land. However, droughts are not in and of themselves catastrophic. They are an expected part of the dryland environment that ecologists have come to identify as “non-equilibrium.”<sup>6</sup>

Depending on elevation, the climate in the KC can range from highly evaporative (where evaporation exceeds rainfall, such as the Suguta Valley south of Lake Turkana) to cool and moist (the cloud forests of the Loima Hills and other higher elevation locations). The predominant mode of food production of KC groups is an occupational continuum with those groups inhabiting drier climates relying more on livestock than cultivation, though all groups at various times plant crops, some more opportunistically than others. Even the Turkana in the driest part of the Cluster will sow millet if conditions are favorable. The Karamojong all cultivate millet, but both Karamojong and Turkana are predominantly pastoralists.

The definitions generally utilized by pastoral development workers concerned with the classification of livelihoods is that those groups that obtain more than 50% of their food directly from animals or indirectly through livestock sales are *pastoral*. Those groups that primarily rely on cultivated crops, with livestock as a significant secondary source of milk, food, traction and other household needs like fat, skins and hides are *agro-pastoral*. Groups that are sedentary and rely on cultivation for most of their nutritional needs except for milk from a cow or two and perhaps some small livestock are *farmers*. Apart from these distinctions is food acquisition via foraging, an adaptation of the hill people like the Tepeth. Foraging involves the systematic harvest of wild foods (both plant and animal) supplemented by domestic livestock. A signature feature of the Tepeth and other foragers is beekeeping and the harvest of bee products. It is important to note that groups will adjust their food production strategies over time and that there is often within group variation. Table 1 should be read only as a general guide to the different groups.

Another way to think of these occupational distinctions is the degree of movement associated with the food production system. *Nomadic pastoralists* (e.g., some Turkana) are those living in the driest parts of the KC. They typically own camels as well as some cattle and goats. They have no permanent settlement and move throughout the year in search of pasture and water. *Transhumant pastoralists* (or those regarded as semi-nomadic) generally have a settled household or households in one location, though movement of entire households is sometimes made after a time. They tend to make seasonal movements during dry seasons to obtain pasture

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<sup>6</sup> Scoones, 1995



for their cattle, goats and sheep (e.g., the Jie). *Agro-pastoralists* are concerned with their crop cultivation and tend to be permanently settled with livestock that rotate through pastures in an area near the household (e.g., some Pokot of West Pokot District). Finally, farmers are permanently settled tending their crops.

In this environment, the pastoralist is concerned primarily with the management of herd demographics to maximize milk production for household use. Yet this management presents continual challenges. Complex calculations are required involving forage availability paired to water access and the necessity for herd and flock movement to capture maximum potential given the “patchiness” of resources and the diversity of environments, while being constantly vigilant against the possibility of livestock theft.

Over the centuries, pastoral societies in the cluster acquired and defended territory, in which they lived and raised livestock. Some groups hunted wild animals, gathered wild foods and sowed crops in favorable locations. Over time, they evolved systems of natural resource management (NRM) based generally on common tenancy land tenure systems<sup>7</sup> primarily organized for the livestock harvest of available resources.

Boundaries between different ethnic communities have never been static and rigid but are fluid, given the hit-and-miss pattern of rainfall distribution. As a result, negotiation of livestock movement is a constant. Survival is dependent on a web of good relationships that provide for sharing and collaboration. Finely honed strategies of herd splitting, opportunism, defensive capability and raiding to enlarge one’s herd all have relevance as adaptive strategies for survival. Critical to the success of these strategies are two major concerns: (1) areas of adequate dry season forage paired with nearby sources of sufficient water, and (2) mobility. This is particularly the case when drought is severe and/or protracted. When drought strikes, pastoral systems of NRM require adequate drought reserve areas (some dry season grazing areas serve this purpose, while others do not). Thus, the movement of livestock in response to fluctuating environmental and climatic conditions is essential. Movement is always negotiated between groups. When negotiation fails to secure agreement for temporary grazing rights, action by force is not ruled out. Changes in environmental conditions, even from one microclimate to the next, account for the ephemeral nature of relations between groups. In the late 1980s, when the rains improved, the frequently antagonistic Turkana and Pokot were found peacefully grazing cattle side by side in the same pasture.

Action by force was traditionally the province of unmarried young men, or warriors, organized into age sets in some ethnic groups, but not in others. Elders, usually in conversation with the warriors where force was felt to be needed, took decisions regarding natural resource management primarily at the local level. Physical fitness, endurance, bravery in the face of danger, and fighting skills were important and highly respected, and this remains the situation today among the more traditional elements and groups. Leadership skills including intelligence, judgement, persuasiveness and oratorical ability were even more highly regarded, especially

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<sup>7</sup> Such systems allowed for coordinated household access to resources regulated by cultural rights and responsibilities. Such egalitarian systems did not exclude private tenure, such as the immediate area around household locations and the private rights to certain trees (such as the Turkana “eckwar” system).

among the elders. But until very recently final decision-making on the use of force was the elders' responsibility and prerogative (more on that below).

Reciprocal relations were established with other pastoral and agro-pastoral groups, and when possible with agricultural groups, allowing access to pasture and water in dry seasons, particularly in times of drought. In periods of stress, elders would negotiate access. In many cases, little negotiation was required as the reciprocal relations were well established. In difficult times, if there were no reciprocal relations with a particular group, and if movement into a particular territory was considered necessary for the survival of the livestock (and therefore also necessary for the survival of the pastoralists themselves), pastoral groups would occupy territory by force if they were able to do so. The oral histories of pastoral societies are filled with stories relating to the issues described in this paragraph.

## **C. The Effects on Pastoralists of the Imposition of Modern Boundaries**

The pre-colonial structure of social and political organization in the KC area is important to note. The pastoralists in this area demonstrate an almost prototypical pattern of state-less political organization. Namely they were highly decentralized and localized. They were never organized on the basis of centralized state structures, had no tradition of administrative or political loyalty to central governing figures, and in the immediate pre-colonial period operated a political system of decentralized self-government based on territorial units. Under these circumstances, colonial control may have differed on either side of the Uganda/Kenya border but on both sides, it seems to have had severe impact on the pastoralists. As one expert points out, "in stateless communities, colonial imposition could not resonate with any aspect of tradition." The result was that often "tribes" were "created" on the basis of territorial contiguity to allow their administration by horizontal and geography-based authority structures.<sup>8</sup>

The old Karamoja District of Uganda first came under direct colonial control through military administration beginning in 1911 under the King's Africa Rifles (KAR). It was in these earliest years that the military was responsible for the protection of Karamoja from Turkana raiders to the east and "Abyssinian" ivory poachers and arms traders to the northeast. What weapons were encountered were destroyed by force. After a decade of military control, inter-ethnic raiding in Karamoja was considered virtually eliminated but an international struggle between Ethiopians, the Turkana (not under any direct administration), and the British for control of the border areas still was an issue. As a result, outposts of the KAR remained along the passes on the border areas until 1937 specifically to guard against Turkana raids.<sup>9</sup>

External factors have long had a harmful impact on stability and security in the region. The Turkana were brutally "pacified" by British colonial authorities in military expeditions that continued into the 1920s. In the view of some pastoralists today, the rationale for these harsh actions included the perception that Turkana leaders supported Ethiopia's expansion efforts in

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<sup>8</sup> Mamdani, 41.

<sup>9</sup> Barber, 1968.

the early decades of the Twentieth Century and the Turkana people were therefore perceived as enemies of the British. A number of Turkana obtained modern firearms from Ethiopia at that time, which gave them a tremendous advantage when raiding neighbors who had no access to modern weapons. The firearms also helped them fight the British. The Turkana lost very large numbers of livestock in these punitive expeditions, significantly weakening their pastoral production systems. On the other hand, some Pokot benefited from the pacification of the Turkana because they took part in the campaigns on the side of the British and were rewarded with captured livestock. These factors increased the animosity of Turkana towards Pokot. There is a view that even today the Turkana people have not fully recovered from the colonial pacification campaigns. On the other hand, some Turkana explained to the assessment team that the colonial period was, compared to the past few years, almost a “golden era” of peace. They argued that the strong actions of the colonial government to prevent cattle raiding and inter-ethnic warfare had been necessary and effective.

The imposition of political and administrative control by the colonial powers led to the establishment of boundaries between districts, provinces and what are today independent countries. The colonial authorities attempted, to some degree, to contain the movement of pastoralists and in particular to control raiding and arms trading. Since the British by the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century claimed political authority over the Sudan, Kenya and Uganda, boundary adjustments were made inter alia to ease administration. Some of Sudan was ceded to Uganda, while much more of Uganda went to Sudan and Kenya. The colonial boundaries of Turkana District changed dramatically between 1902 and about 1930. Well over half of what became Turkana District was transferred from Uganda to Kenya in 1926. Even a brief look at a relief map of this area immediately reveals one source of the problems related to conflict over natural resources in the KC: the international boundary between Uganda and Kenya quite closely follows the natural division between the drier plains to the east (Turkana District) and the wetter higher elevation areas to the west in what was then Karamoja District. In general, the movement of livestock to the plains in the wet seasons when there is sufficient surface water in this drier region, and then to the areas of higher elevation in the dry seasons characterizes pastoral systems of NRM in Eastern Africa.

At times the colonial authorities did attempt to include within country boundaries the customary grazing areas of particular pastoral groups. This is said to be the case for the Ilemi Triangle, an area of the Sudan that was administered as part of Kenya’s Turkana District during the colonial periods. The area enclosed by the Ilemi Triangle was reportedly intended to include the northern grazing areas of the Turkana people. In more recent years, an enlarged version of the original Ilemi Triangle has in effect become part of Kenya.

In many cases, pastoral people overlap the district, provincial and international boundaries that were established during the colonial period. The efforts of the authorities to limit the expansion of the Turkana from their resource poor district were unable to prevent Turkana from moving southeast into Samburu and Isiolo districts in Kenya. For many years, Turkana pastoralists have made up a large proportion of the population in the northwestern portion of Samburu district near Baragoi. This situation has led to tensions and considerable conflict in this area.

One of the most serious and troubling consequences of colonialism for pastoral societies in the Eastern African region as a whole is that they lost access to many of their most valuable dry season and drought reserve grazing areas. Many of these areas were forfeited during the colonial period, as land was taken for game parks and game reserves, and for commercial ranches and farms. In the area of the KC, the colonial government alienated a large area of northeastern Uganda when it established Kidepo National Park. Since independence, a major reason for pastoralists' loss of dry season grazing areas has been the movement of settled agriculturalists into pastoral areas. Another reason has been the alienation of land for irrigation schemes. For example, over 25% of the land in Karamoja was set aside as forest or game reserves from the 1940s, restricting access to pastures.<sup>10</sup>

The Pokot provide another good example of the situation in the study area. The area occupied by the Pokot people includes the newly formed Nakapiririt District in Uganda, West Pokot District in Kenya, and the northern part of Baringo District (formerly known as "East Pokot") in Kenya. Colonial authorities in the 1920s reportedly permitted the Pokot to move into and live in Upe County in Uganda in compensation for the loss to European settlers of some of their best dry season grazing areas in the Trans Nzoia District of Kenya. The present conflict between Pokot and Karamojong (Pian, Matheniko and Bokora) is primarily over the control of dry season pasture and water areas in what is today Uganda. From the Pokot perspective, not only did they lose valuable areas to European settlers, but they also lost land to Turkana pastoralists.

In *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*, Mamdani lays out the three-fold colonial impact on the Karamojong (Pian, Matheniko, Bokora) of Uganda, as follows:

- 1) Between 1920 and 1940, herders in Karamoja lost 15% of grazing land to fellow pastoralists in Kenya whose more fertile pastures had been transferred to white settlers.
- 2) Internal administrative boundaries were also redrawn that effectively transferred dry-season pasture to agricultural Teso and Lango communities while at the same time making a clear separation between counties inside Karamoja. Border areas between the counties were declared no-go zones and each "tribe" was allocated a county and required to stay put.
- 3) The resettled pastoralists (in the interest of "law and order" and to assure the efficient collection of taxes) were subject to a new set of laws while state-appointed "warrant" chiefs (civil servants) were charged with implementing policy. "By 1919, these chiefs had managed to press into forced labor 40% of the adult male population of the district."<sup>11</sup>

In sum, while the impact of colonialism on the various ethnic groups in the KC may have differed, it was almost never positive and was harmful in the extreme for some.

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<sup>10</sup> Inselman, 2000.

<sup>11</sup> Mamdani, 167.

After an almost fifty year hiatus, inter-ethnic raiding in Uganda again renewed in the 1950's due to an increasing population with diminished access to dryland and drought reserves.<sup>12</sup> With the borders sealed by military force, competition for the patchiness of dryland resources intensified. Moreover, during the preceding thirty years, conflicts had been forcefully suppressed so there was a clear sense that the authorities would punish perpetrators. As conflicts rose in the waning days of colonial rule, the authorities were too distracted to respond. This lack of response was a factor in increasing the level of raiding and violence (as was cited in the Karamoja Security Committee in a 1961 report to the Ugandan government).<sup>13</sup>

In more recent decades, forceful central government response to issues and raids in Karamoja has returned. Occasionally brutal measures have been imposed by the central government to promote efforts at development and to stop raiding.<sup>14</sup> This has not necessarily improved the situation and may at times have left some groups more vulnerable to raiding by others.

It has been in this broad historical context that land alienation that disrupted flexible pastoral survival strategies, at times brutal actions by the state, increased supplies of more powerful arms, and the weakening of traditional social structures that put some limits on raiding (discussed in the next section) have played key roles in increasing the level of violence in the KC.

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<sup>12</sup> Gartrell, 1981.

<sup>13</sup> Barber, 1968.

<sup>14</sup> In 1973 in Kotido, President Idi Amin separated local people into two groups - those who wanted development and those who liked their traditions. The latter group numbering in the hundreds were shot dead on the spot by Presidential order for not being "civilized." In 1983 – 1984, the Obote II regime killed hundreds in an attempt to stop raiding. In 1986 – 1987 the government under President Museveni removes thousands of cows from Karamoja. The following year guns are given to the Vigilante Committees in Karamoja to protect themselves from raiders. In 2000, the proposal is made to disarm the Karamajong and weapons given to neighboring communities to protect themselves (Inselman, 2000; Karamoja Parliamentary Group, 2001).

### **III. THE NATURE OF PASTORALIST CONFLICT IN THE CLUSTER**

This section presents a broad overview of the nature of conflict between groups in the Karamoja Cluster as well as between groups in the cluster and those outside it. It examines how the nature of conflict in the area has evolved in more recent decades. Several issues are introduced in this section and then pursued in more detail in subsequent ones. The causes of conflict are dealt with more specifically in Section IV, while traditional and contemporary peace capacities are assessed in Section V. It is significant that much of the conflict discussed in this section occurs across the international borders between Uganda, Kenya, Sudan and Ethiopia.

#### **A. Conflict within the Cluster**

Conflict in the KC revolves around many issues. Traditional pastoralism over the last century and a half has received a series of blows from which it is still attempting to adjust. Violent cattle raids, perhaps the most well known and obvious form of conflict, are one symptom of much deeper conflicts and fractures. Colonialism; disease and famine; the emerging post-independence state; the introduction of new systems of religion, business and property; the struggle for political control in the face of changing regimes and distant powers not inclined to invest in marginally productive land all stand behind cattle rustling, restricted pastoralist mobility and declining cattle per capita. For centuries, raiding other groups for livestock has been a traditional method of replenishing herds in the wake of drought and disease. In some respects, this raiding can be seen as a quasi-legitimate sharing of resources, permitting groups on the verge of economic ruin and even starvation to reestablish their systems of food production and natural resources management. The proliferation of automatic weapons has, however, greatly exacerbated the consequences of the cattle rustling.

Members of the Cluster customarily distinguish (a) stealing livestock from (b) raiding for livestock. When stealing, only a few (2-5) individuals are involved and the theft is usually committed at night. The individuals involved may be acting on their own, without permission from group elders. Raiding is considered a very different and far more legitimate activity. Larger numbers of individuals (and livestock) are involved (ranging from 20 to 500 young men or more). It is not considered theft but is described as a taking by force. Young men from the pastoral and agro-pastoral groups carry out both theft and raids. Some in the Cluster (such as the Turkana) claim that members of rival groups are merely livestock thieves, whereas they themselves are the more highly respected and skilled livestock raiders.

One newer phenomenon in the KC is roadside banditry. This is considered much less acceptable than theft but unfortunately it has now become common in parts of the Cluster. This banditry is often blamed on young men living in the towns and centers. They are part of a growing reservoir of impoverished and uneducated young men, many of whose families have been forced out of pastoralism by circumstances beyond their control (drought, livestock raids, livestock disease epidemic). In some cases, the young men have dropped out of the pastoralist way of life while

their families struggle on. All these young men have limited opportunities to earn income to they end up preying on their fellow citizens

One important team finding is that while conflict in the KC is frequent, it is also unpredictable and intermittent. It is not steady and unrelenting. Instead, peaks and valleys characterize it, by periods of relative calm and then sudden outbreaks of violence. The periods of peaceful relations may be punctuated by small episodes of cattle raiding, and after a series of such raids, one group may mount a major response and violence will escalate. In some cases, there is no escalation. For these reasons, conflict between groups, can be described as recurrent rather than continuous.

Conflict springs particularly from the necessity for groups to share access to sparse and patchy dryland resources. Maintaining the pastoralist way of life requires constant negotiation as groups move around to try to ensure adequate pasturage and water. The common property tenure systems for access requires a high degree of inter-group cooperation, which will at times be extended to external groups. When such cooperation is not extended, the group trying to gain access may use force, but even then, both sides will remain open to negotiation in the future. At some point, the group trying to prevent access is likely to need access to the resources that the other group “controls.” This negotiation process and the recognition that tomorrow you might need the cooperation of those who need help from you today are at least partly responsible for the episodic quality of the violence.

Ethnic groups in the cluster are heterogeneous and internal conflicts do arise. Fighting between Turkana clans for example is not uncommon.<sup>15</sup> Some elements in an ethnic group may benefit from conflict at the expense of more marginalized elements. Groups in the Cluster will also have both positive and conflictual relationships with groups inside and outside the cluster. Some of the alliances and positive relationships are long standing, even of many years duration, while others last for only a short period of time. Territorial and political affiliations have long been fluid in this region.<sup>16</sup> This is an understandable response to perpetual scarcity and periodic drought. Alliances are political and expedient rather than deeply rooted in a singular cultural or ethnic tradition.<sup>17</sup> This fluidity serves a vital economic function, because it allows pastoralists to avoid the harshest impacts of unpredictable weather patterns and accelerates recovery from “catastrophic livestock losses” by reducing uncertainty.<sup>18</sup>

Alliances of convenience may be established when members of two or more groups combine forces to raid yet another group. Some observers describe the situation as characterized by “constantly shifting” alliances, although the term “frequently shifting” seems more accurate. For all of these reasons, **conflict in the Cluster is very difficult to pin down (because it shifts around) and even more difficult to predict.** The “hot spots” of today may be peaceful tomorrow. Monitoring is needed to determine whether small tensions are emerging and could under certain conditions give rise violence.

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<sup>15</sup> Personal email communication, Jeremy Lind to Ned Greeley, 4/8/02.

<sup>16</sup> Galaty 1993; Lamphear 1993; Schlee 1998; Sobania 1988, 1991.

<sup>17</sup> Grey 2000, 405.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid. 405-406.

As a tool to help the team better understand conflict in the KC, team members mapped three sets of conflict and peace relationships, one centered around the Pokot (Diagram 1), one around the Turkana (Diagram 2), and the final one diagramming the relations between 10 groups (Diagram 3 and 4). The first two maps describe the relationships *at the time the fieldwork was done*. The third and fourth show the evolution of relationships between 10 groups over a 3 month period. The improvements in relationships shown in Diagram 4 demonstrate the results that POKATUSA, a peacebuilding group in the KC, believes it has achieved. It is particularly interesting to note the improvement in relations between the Bokora and the Matheniko. The latter carried out vicious raids against the former circa 1998/9 and the enmity between the two was really quite strong.

It is important for readers to note that were a research team to go out to do conflict mapping a year from now, the diagrams could look different. Groups now in opposition could be allies and vice versa.

The diagrams are evidence of the high degree of conflict within the Karamoja Cluster, and between the cluster and outside groups. The Turkana, for example, are shown to be in conflict with six groups, five of them members of the Cluster.<sup>19</sup> The diagram identifies peaceful relations with two groups. The groups that surround them sometimes have conflictual relationships with each other.

In the Pokot diagram, the Pokot are shown to be in conflict with seven groups, with the Pian, Matheniko and Bokora counted as separate groups because they sometimes combine to raid the Pokot and at other times do so independently. They have positive relationships with four groups. There appears to be less conflict at the current time between the groups surrounding the Pokot than between those surrounding the Turkana.

The Pokot today distinguish between different categories of conflict relations, and this may well be the case with other members of the Cluster. They divide their conflicts as follows (please see the diagram):

- conflicts with traditional enemies (Turkana, Pian, Matheniko, Bokora) with whom they consider themselves, in effect, at war;
- cattle raiding from neighboring groups sharing a similar Kalenjin language (the Sebei and Marakwet); and
- clashes with the residents of certain parts of Trans Nzoia District over conflicting land claims.

While they distinguish between conflicts with Karamajong speaking peoples and those with Kalenjin speaking peoples, it is appropriate to note that the current enmity with the Marakwet is very strong.

A series of events that took place circa 1979-1982 sheds light on the complexity of relationships in the Cluster. Prior to 1979, there was peace, and some Turkana moved into Pokot areas and

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<sup>19</sup> The Samburu are pastoralists but not members of the KC.




even sold modern firearms to Pokot. In 1979, drought struck. A number of Pokot and Turkana formed an alliance and carried out a large raid on the Karamojong in 1979 (e.g., the Pian, Matheniko and/or Bokora). The Turkana and Pokot obtained a very large number of livestock in this raid, reportedly decimating the herds of Karamojong. The Turkana involved in the raid continued to live in Pokot territory. They kept most of the stolen livestock because they had provided more of the firearms and had formed the front line in the raiding party.

After a time, some Karamojong induced Turkana to move into their territory and marry their girls. Some Karamojong then formed an alliance with the Turkana and carried out a massive raid on their old ally, the Pokot. Three years of heavy raiding ensued, thanks in part to the very large number of arms seized by the Karamojong in a raid on an armory in Moroto. The Pokot became so destitute that they required famine relief. There were also reported during this period to have been alliances between the Karamojong and Pokot who raided deep into Turkana District, taking huge numbers of livestock. Until the raid on the Uganda government armory, the Turkana had been better armed than the Karamojong. Many Turkana were forced out of pastoralism as a result.

There can be periods of peace and good relations between competing groups. For example, the peace between the Turkana and Matheniko, shown on Diagram 2, has endured since 1973. In that year, a ceremony of the “peace of the sacrificial bull” was performed. This action followed a long dialogue between the two communities. It would be useful to explore further why the peace pact between these two groups has lasted so many years, particularly in view of the conflicts between so many other groups in the Cluster. During the fieldwork in Turkana District, the team was told that the main reason for the long enduring peace was the symbiotic relationship that emerged. Both groups benefited considerably from the peace and recognized that fact. The Turkana desperately need the dry season grazing available in Matheniko land, and the Matheniko desire the protection against their own enemies provided by the

**Diagram 1**  
**Map of Pokot Relationships**  
**November 2001**




Legend:


↔ Conflict

↕ Positive

**Diagram 2**  
**Map of Turkana Relationships**  
**November 2001**



Legend:



Turkana. According to press reports, however, in November 2001 all of the large number of Turkana left Matheniko County in northeastern Uganda. They drove 60,000 head of cattle back to their own district in Kenya rather than surrender their firearms under the Disarmament program launched by the Government of Uganda. This may have a harmful effect on resource availability on the Kenya side of the border if the disarmament threat GOEs on for long. It is interesting to speculate that if the Turkana had given up their weapons, they might have lost their utility to the Matheniko, putting the alliance and Turkana access to dryland grazing at risk. (The disarmament campaign and other aspects of pastoral culture are discussed in subsequent sections.)


Some of the groups shown in the diagrams to be in conflict have shared and are today sharing dry season grazing areas and water points. One example is the Turkana, Toposa and Nyangatom. Such sharing can be a regular and peaceful occurrence for many years until some trigger sparks raids and retaliatory raids, as was reported to have been the case between Turkana and Pokot until an incident kicked off a cycle of violence circa 1957. During periods of drought and hunger, groups in the Cluster can make temporary pacts to share resources, particularly grazing areas and water sources. After the rains return and the herds recover and begin breeding, raiding to restock can take place. Innovations in grazing systems do sometimes occur, however<sup>20</sup> – violence is not the only response to environmental stress.

Key current conflicts, as gauged by the conflict intensity criteria presented earlier, are described in greater detail in Annex D.

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
<sup>20</sup> See Jeremy Lind's research on "arumurums" which are rangeland areas with mutually observed boundaries within which pastoralists can graze their animals in large mixed herds belonging to many families. They tend to be formed in the dry season nearer to areas of known insecurity. Arumurums are commanded by an appointed elder, who regulates membership in the arumurum grazing association and who directs younger men in grazing and patrolling the boundaries. This is one clever adaptation to rising levels of criminal violence. Personal communication, Lind to Ned Greeley, 4/8/02.

Diagram 3  
POKATUSA Conflict Map, June 2001<sup>21</sup>



<sup>21</sup> Pete Amodoi at [amodoi@hotmail.com](mailto:amodoi@hotmail.com).

**Diagram 4**  
**POKATUSA Conflict Map September 2001**



## B. Conflict with Groups outside the Cluster

In early discussions with REDSO in Nairobi, the team agreed to look also at some conflicts involving KC group with groups outside the cluster. It is widely believed by knowledgeable sources that the three national governments and the majority of the populations of the three countries are much more concerned about the impact of conflict on groups outside the Cluster than the effects on groups within the KC. The table below provides a summary of these conflicts.

**Table 2: Selected Out-of-Cluster Conflicts**

Name of Conflict	Country
Iteso – Karamojong	Uganda
Acholi – Jie	Uganda
Jie- Labwor	Uganda
Pokot – Marakwet	Kenya, Uganda
Pokot – Sebei (no longer active)	Kenya, Uganda
Pokot – Trans Nzoia	Kenya
Turkana – Samburu	Kenya

Two of the most significant conflict areas on the Uganda side of the KC are out-of-Cluster conflicts. In both cases, the conflicts have escalated and become more serious over the past two decades with the increase in availability of small arms, the rising ecological pressure on pastoralists, and general regional instability. The Iteso (a.k.a. Teso)/Karamojong conflict has a fifty-year history, and it is one with major incidents of violence in the past three years. Deaths have numbered in the hundreds, and there are now thousands of internally displaced people (IDPs). The primary groups involved in raids are the Pian and Bokora, who live in close proximity to Iteso areas such as Katakwi (border region), Soroti and Kumi Districts. The Iteso have lost many heads of cattle to the Karamoja over the years and, as a consequence, they have come to feel that the government does not have the will or ability to respond. This issue was a factor in fueling the Teso Rebellion against the central government. The rebellion ended in 1993.

During the annual dry season, Jie people have historically shifted their cattle from their semi-arid homeland in Kotido District and moved into the Acholi community in Kitgum and Pader Districts to take advantage of more plentiful pasture and water. This pattern increases the risk of conflict between the groups but does not make it inevitable. During the dry season in December 1999 to March 2000, violent conflict between the Acholi and the Jie did occur and resulted in 80 people killed along the common border from Orom and Namokora (Kitgum district) to Paimol, ParabonGOK Lapono and Adilang sub-counties (Pader district).<sup>22</sup> The conflict is further complicated by the activity of the Lords Resistance Army in this area as well as by the ongoing civil war in neighboring Sudan. The Acholi Labwor, who live in between these two groups, are caught in the middle and often victims of violence from both sides.

<sup>22</sup> Acholi Religious Leaders' Peace Initiative, 2001.

In response to this violence, an effort jointly organized by the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI) and the Kotido Peace Initiative (KOPEIN) has provided the opportunity for locals most affected to voice their grievances and fears and to begin working toward a peaceful future. The ARLPI and the KOPEIN were widely credited with rapid and meaningful intervention in the conflict and may serve as an important model for further successful conflict response in the KC. (See Annex D for more a more complete description of this conflict.)

In Kenya, there are four significant conflicts (as gauged by the conflict intensity criteria) with groups outside the Cluster. Three of these involve Pokot, and in two of the three, the Pokot of Uganda are also said to be involved. With respect to the first conflict, the Pokot and Marakwet are closely related groups, both speaking Kalenjin languages. The Marakwet are primarily agro-pastoralists, and some are able to benefit from irrigated agriculture. They tend to be better educated than the Pokot and Turkana, with many men leaving for seasonal employment in the more developed parts of the highlands. There has been considerable interaction and intermarriage over the years between Pokot and Marakwet. Thefts of livestock have, however, been common, and minor conflicts have taken place from time to time. In 1970, Marakwet killed about 70 Pokot at a market. Nine years later, the Pokot organized a large revenge raid. It is interesting to note the considerable time lag between the “trigger” and the Pokot response. In the 1990s, there was a serious escalation of conflict between these two neighboring groups. Large scale attacks by Pokot on Marakwet using modern weapons led the Marakwet to respond by escalating their acquisition of modern weapons.<sup>23</sup> There was considerable loss of life, and some areas were abandoned. It is particularly significant for this assessment that in 1998 the Marakwet and Pokot residents of the highlands were able to forge what has been described as a traditional peace pact (modern institutions were also used to promote peace) that has endured while the conflict has continued in the lowlands. The main cause of the conflict is said to be related to the need of the Pokot to continue to have customary access to Marakwet territory for dry season grazing. The Marakwet (and other neighboring groups) are less inclined to share their traditional grazing lands with others than they reportedly were back in the 1960s. The hatred between the two groups now is intense, reducing inclinations toward cooperation.

The Pokot also had a conflict with the Sebei, another related Kalenjin-speaking group living near Mount Elgon in Kenya and Uganda. The conflict began in the early 1970s when Pokot warriors stole cattle from the Sebei, leading to a series of raids and counter raids, thefts and counter thefts for several years. The leaders of the two ethnic groups are said to have successfully resolved this conflict.

The Pokot are also involved in a conflict with the residents of parts of Trans Nzoia District. They maintain that the colonial government took the land of Trans Nzoia (and beyond) from them and gave it to European settlers. After independence, this land was not returned to Pokot as some expected. Key areas of contention are the large-scale farms under the Agricultural Development Corporation. In the pre-colonial period, Trans Nzoia had been a major dry season grazing area. Today, as one of the most fertile agricultural areas in the highlands of Kenya, land

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<sup>23</sup> It has been less easy for the Marakwet to obtain modern weapons because they do not reside along an international border, where weapons smuggling is easy.



in Trans Nzoia is highly sought after by commercial farmers and investors. Generally, the government has favored farming interests over those of the pastoralists.

In regard to the fourth example, the Turkana are involved in a major conflict with Samburu pastoralists. During the colonial and independent periods, large numbers of Turkana moved to the east and settled in Samburu District during the colonial period. There has been considerable conflict in recent years between these two pastoral groups in northwestern Samburu District, adjacent to the Cluster. The Pokot and Samburu have forged a traditional alliance against their common Turkana enemy. Pokot raid Turkana living in Samburu district, and Samburu raid into Turkana District.

## **C. The Effects of Violent Conflict**

Conflict inside the Cluster and with neighboring groups has had many negative consequences. It has worsened the condition of an already impoverished people. Many informants reported to the decline in cattle per capita, one clear sign of poverty. Many people have been killed or maimed in conflicts (far larger numbers than in the past when spears and bows and arrows were used in place of small arms), and even more have been rendered destitute. The number of people impoverished by conflict is large; evidence of this can be readily seen in settlements near towns, trading centers and mission posts. Many have lost their ability to be self-provisioning. They desperately need assistance to survive and become economically active again. In many cases, they have very little or no access to social services. For example, Matheniko raiding beginning in the 1960s pushed many Bokora and Pian out of pastoralism. Many fled the district.<sup>24</sup>

The existence of widespread conflict is a major hindrance to effective development. It interferes with normal trade and local development efforts, and greatly reduces the willingness of Government officials and NGO staff to work in the areas. The climate of insecurity is a serious impediment to improving economic and social conditions, which are essential to effective, long-term reduction of poverty.

Large areas of the Cluster have become abandoned because of conflict. This includes, for example, valuable grazing areas on the borderlands between Turkana and Pokot in Kenya. The Pokot near Tot in Kenya has now abandoned large parts of Marakwet district on the floor of the Kerio Valley as a result of a 3/01 attack. There are also abandoned villages between the Iteso and Karamojong in Uganda.

Conflict, whether in pastoral, agro-pastoral or agricultural areas, can cause people to abandon their farms and homes. Schools are closed, health centers left vacant. Conflict forces pastoralists to remain in or move to the safer areas, interfering with the normal movements of livestock and people that are central to the pastoralist systems of natural resource management. The crowding of people and animals into the more secure areas puts heavy pressure on the available resources

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<sup>24</sup> The Bokoro were able to reenter the pastoral economy when they gained modern weapons and developed links with Museveni's National Resistance Movement. Unpublished paper by Sandra Gray, "The Experience of Violence and Pastoralist Identity in Southern Karamoja," 2002.

and is believed to be causing environmental degradation in some areas. Because crowding fuels competition, it also promotes conflict. The combination of large numbers of people rendered destitute and even larger numbers prevented from pursuing their normal occupations creates an increased need for food aid.

The most vulnerable populations tend to be those living at or on the boundaries of groups in conflict. When members of group A raid group B, the raiders often come from distant areas, including from different districts and even across international borders. When members of group B retaliate, they don't necessarily strike at the original raiders. Instead, they target the people in group A living near the boundary. The groups living in these boundary areas tend to include strong advocates for peacebuilding efforts, especially among the women, because of their heightened vulnerability.

One example may suffice. In what has come to be known as the Ngariam (Uganda) incident of 13 September 2001, seventeen Iteso in a boundary village were killed by Karamojong raiders, some of whom came in vehicles and took roofing from a school.<sup>25</sup> This was followed the next day by two separate incidents in Katakwi and the Ocorimogin market, in which nine Karamojong travelers passing through the towns were killed by mobs in retaliation. Subsequently, the Ugandan People's Defense Force (UPDF), in response to the raid, struck at a number of Karamojong boundary villages, resulting in additional injuries, suffering and death.<sup>26</sup> A large stretch of territory between the Iteso and the Karamojong is now empty. There are 88,000 IDPs living in camps as a direct result of this conflict. This winter, Karamojong entered Katakwi district with an estimated 30,000-40,000 heads of cattle. While there is peace at the moment, fear is high among the Katakwi residents, for past experience has shown them that violence is possible as the Karamoja head back home with the onset of the rains. Those still in camps are staying in camps and those who had returned home are reported to have returned to the camps. FEWSNET's February 2002 Newsletter reported that over 85,000 people continue to face moderate food insecurity in Kapelebyong and Usuk Counties of Katakwi District. Civil insecurity for more than a year has limited access to cultivable land, which has resulted in limited crop cultivation and below-normal harvests. Household food stocks remain low and many households mainly depend on borrowing from relatives in urban areas and wild foods for their subsistence

## **D. The Changing Nature of Conflict**

Over the past 20 years there has been a significant increase in violent conflict in the Karamoja Cluster and adjoining areas. This point was widely expressed and often emphasized by individuals interviewed in Kampala, Nairobi and the various districts visited by the assessment

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<sup>25</sup> The informants were Iteso Parliamentarians, 2001.

<sup>26</sup> The villages included Alemukere and Muruaturkan of Kalokwameri Parish and Naputurio, Nakabekobe, Napongae North and Losimit in Nabilatuk sub-county, Nakapiririt District. Uganda Human Rights Commission and the Human Rights and Democratization Programme (DANIDA/EU), 2001.

team. An increase in the level and severity of conflict over the past 15 to 20 years was widely reported by Ugandan informants. The reasons (discussed more fully in the following chapter) include the widespread lack of economic opportunity (in particular the lack of alternative livelihoods for the youth); the enormous increase in the availability and use of modern weapons; the politicization of conflict (notably, but not only, as a result of the civil war in Sudan); and the introduction of “commercial” raiding (in which individuals hire and pay raiders to steal livestock for sale at market). At the same time, at least one Ugandan informant indicated that for some parts of Karamoja, the increased state capacity and growing stability of the central government has led to less frequent violence, in contrast with the period of social disorder and government disintegration in the 1970s and 1980s in Uganda.

The nature of the violence has also changed over the past 20 years. The traditional rules that governed raiding and warfare in the Cluster and surrounding areas have loosened and have been at least partially replaced by more random violence. The extent and degree to which these traditional rules obtained and were actually observed in prior years was not determined, but Kenyan informants invariably said that the rules once were followed. Traditionally, non-combatants were spared. Women, children and the elderly were not killed or injured. The raiding groups could abduct young children and girls, but they were assimilated into the kidnapping groups and not treated as slaves. Recent years have witnessed extreme levels of violence against even women and children. Many residents of the Cluster are appalled and infuriated by these changes, and it is an important factor stimulating efforts at reconciliation and peacebuilding. However, the increase in violence has also led to increased animosity and hatred, and a strong desire for revenge. These factors further inflame the situation, leading to further violence.

Many believe that the enormous increase in modern weapons has played a key role in both the increased levels and the changed nature of violence.<sup>27</sup> Traditional raiding and warfare required long training and special skills, and some of these are no longer needed when modern weapons are used. Those who were not expected to defend their livestock under traditional rules can now do so with modern weapons. For this reason, many argue, livestock thieves and raiders shoot and kill women, young boys and elders. But this reason does not explain the random acts of violence against small children and against women begging for mercy in traditional fashion. It is clear that the tensions and antagonisms between certain groups have reached very high levels. The Kerio Valley in Marakwet District, where Pokot-Marakwet rivalries are played out, was described as “our Kosovo.”

These changes in the scale and nature of conflict in the region have led some to conclude that traditional methods of conflict resolution alone cannot effectively deal with current conditions. While there is debate on this point, even within the assessment team, it is important to recognize that what is needed is an appropriate combination of “traditional” and “modern” methods of conflict resolution and peacebuilding. The traditional systems of the societies in the Karamoja Cluster are much stronger than the traditional systems in the more socio-economically developed

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<sup>27</sup> John Laphear does note that appalling incidents of violence even before the advent of AK 47s were not necessarily rare. He gives one example of Jie campaigns against the Karamojong and Dodoth at the turn of the century – there were few survivors. Quoted in Sandra Gray, unpublished paper, “The Experience of Violence and Pastoralist Identity in Southern Karamoja, 2002, 13.

areas of Eastern Africa. In addition, there is enormous strength and resilience among the people of the Cluster.

## **IV. CAUSES OF CONFLICT**

This section provides a more detailed discussion of the causes of conflict in the Karamoja Cluster and neighboring areas divided according to the research protocol's categories of structural or root causes, proximate causes and "triggers." As discussed in subsequent sections, reducing violent conflict and promoting peace in the Cluster and nearby areas will require addressing all three levels of causes. This section closes with a brief discussion regarding the possibilities of predicting and locating future conflict.

### **A. Structural Causes of Conflict**

Structural causes of conflict in the Cluster include competition for scarce resources, traditional pastoral cultural values, increasing frequency of drought since about 1980, and the general poverty of the cluster.

#### **1. Competition for scarce resources**

Competition for scarce resources (grazing land and water) was identified as the single most important factor by several pastoralists interviewed and by individuals working on peacebuilding and development activities in the Cluster, and particularly by those who are themselves of pastoral origin. These sources argue convincingly that the root cause of many conflicts between various groups within the Karamoja Cluster, as well as conflicts with groups outside the Cluster, concerns access to and use of dry season grazing areas. Section II. emphasized that pastoral systems of natural resource management require adequate dry season grazing areas (with sufficient water) for the pastoral system to function effectively. From the perspective of pastoralists, one of the most serious consequences of the enormous changes that have taken place in Eastern Africa in the past 100 years is that pastoralists have lost access to key dry season grazing areas because land was alienated for other uses and/or occupied by other peoples.

As noted, the imposition of colonial boundaries in many cases cut off pastoralists from their traditional dry season and drought reserve areas. Over the years some residents of the Cluster have increasingly been able to claim ownership of the lands of their particular district. This entitlement is even stronger in districts neighboring the Cluster where agriculture is practiced. In the highlands of Kenya, legally registered individual titles to land in African-occupied areas began to be issued in the mid-1950s and accelerated rapidly in subsequent decades. Group ranches provided the members with legal title as groups were established in some pastoral areas, notably the two Maasai districts in southern Kenya. Legal title provided the owner(s) with the right to exclude others from entering and occupying land. Over a century ago, pastoralists grazed their herds on the plateaus of the western highlands of Kenya. Today, the majority of land on these plateaus is used for mixed farming, ranging from small plots to large commercial holdings. This eliminated an important safety net for pastoralists. Pastoralism is now practiced almost entirely in semi-arid and arid areas of the Kenya and there is some question as to whether

pastoralism remains a very viable form of livelihood under such conditions. While hard evidence to prove a per capita decline in cattle do not exist, logic suggests that if larger numbers of pastoralists are crowded onto more marginal lands (due to land alienation)<sup>28</sup>, with decreased access to adequate dry season grazing areas, herd size must diminish. Prolonged periods when rainfall is below normal contribute to the problem, affecting the amount, type and nutritional value of pasturage. Intense grazing in such areas has a very deleterious effect on herds.

Within the semi-arid and arid pastoral zones, there is intense competition between pastoral groups for the remaining areas suitable for dry season grazing. The competition is increased when drought is severe and/or long lasting. In some areas, particularly where settled agriculture is practiced in and/or adjacent to the Cluster, the heightened competition is a result of the increased population pressure. In other, usually drier, areas it is believed that the number of people actually practicing pastoralism has remained fairly stable, *but now they have access to less land than in the past*. While competition for resources (specifically dry season grazing areas) has been identified as the root cause of many conflicts in and near the KC, this **competition is itself a consequence of the combination of the various structural causes of conflict**. The competition is also evidence of the severe problems pastoralists face in their efforts to continue with their systems of natural resource management.

## 2. Traditional pastoral cultural values

Traditional pastoralist culture is another structural cause of conflict. Pastoralists have competed for pasturelands and water sources for centuries. Cattle raiding has been, and in many areas remains, a culturally accepted activity. While not all residents of the KC agree that these values remain appropriate, they are still substantially in effect.<sup>29</sup> Traditionally, livestock raiding is not considered a crime and successful raiders are respected. Killing an enemy in battle earns respect. Livestock raiding has long been one of the most important methods of restocking herds after drought or other calamity.

The cost of getting married is another factor driving raiding. In some areas, the family of a young man may pay a very high bride price to the family of the chosen bride. Bride price a generation ago was in the neighborhood of 25 head of cattle per bride in Uganda; now it appears to range from 50 – 200 head of cattle. Sandra Gray reports that among the Matheniko in the late 1990s the bride price was frequently over 100 head of cattle – she puts this down to the extraordinary success Matheniko warriors have had as raiders.<sup>30</sup> The estimates given to the Kenya team were lower – in the range of 30-60 head of cattle generally, possibly with the addition of other items or products. The amount of the bride price does seem to vary considerably within the Cluster. In Turkana, it was reported that the actual bride price paid varied with the wealth of the families involved and for the poor could be far lower than the numbers reported above. The high bride price required for marriage exists alongside declining per capita livestock holdings and deepening poverty. The inflation is hard to explain (except perhaps among the most successful of the raiding groups), except that the advent of modern weapons makes it at least feasible to procure larger numbers of animals than was traditionally possible via raiding. The consequences

<sup>28</sup> This may be truer of Kenya than Uganda.

<sup>29</sup> Section V. of this report discusses attempts to modify these values.

<sup>30</sup> Oral communication with Lynn Carter, March 12, 2002.

however are not in doubt: it is extremely difficult for a young man or his family to obtain the required number of livestock through normal means. In addition, sometimes it is expected that the bride price will be paid all at once (making the receiving family at risk of raiding!), instead of over a period of time as was traditional. These factors clearly encourage a young man to steal or to raid.

Another factor driving youth is taunting by girls and women. Cluster females, in song and dance, sometimes encourage young men to prove their bravery and gain wealth by raiding for livestock. Tribal prophets or seers also encourage the youth to raid, as the seers themselves receive their (variable) share if the raid is successful.

### 3. Decreasing Rainfall and Rainfall Variability

Rainfall in the KC region is highly variable (in amount and timing) and thus totally unreliable from one year to the next. There can be considerable variation from one microclimate to the next. It is this factor alone that renders the KC environment “non-equilibrium.” For example, Central Turkana averages 200 –300 mm of rainfall per annum but the coefficient of interannual rainfall variation (or CV) is in the range of 50-60%. This is a very high CV (the variability of rainfall from one year to the next becomes more significant a factor than the mean annual rainfall once the coefficient reaches the 20-30% range). The increasing frequency and severity of drought in the KC was widely reported by residents of and regular visitors to the Cluster, but the harder evidence for this is not entirely clear. From 1979 to the present, there have been 7 years of drought and crop failure.<sup>31</sup>

Rainfall has been below average in Ethiopia and Uganda since the mid-1970s and in Sudan since the mid-1960s Kenya experienced moderate desiccation (a lengthy period of below average rainfall) between 1910 and 1950; rainfall has been more erratic since. This analysis is both very aggregate and very crude since there can be considerable variation in rainfall from one station to the next within one country.<sup>32</sup> Longer-term desiccation, to the extent that it affects the KC, has an impact not only on rangeland production but also on species diversity and nutritive quality of forage plants, affecting ultimately the size of the herds that can be sustained. An estimated 20% of the Turkana population left the pastoral system during the droughts of the early 1980s.

FEWS (Famine Early Warning System) has reported serious food stress in large parts of northern Kenya for much of 2001, and lingering food insecurity generally in the arid areas of Eastern Africa. The rains in the pastoral areas were erratic and below average again in 2001, in some areas for the fourth straight year, offering limited potential for recovery. In Sudan, food insecurity continues to be exacerbated by conflict

### 4. Poverty

General poverty is one of the most evident characteristics of the Karamoja Cluster. The residents have extremely limited access to education, health services and safe water supplies compared to

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<sup>31</sup> Sandra Gray, “A Memory of Loss: Ecological Politics, Local History and the Evolution of Karamojong Violence,” Human Organization 59 (2000): 4.

<sup>32</sup> UNDP Office to Combat Desertification and Drought (UNSO), <http://www.undp.orh/seed/unso>.

the majority of the populations of Uganda and Kenya. The civil war in Sudan has reduced the already very limited access to these basic services in the south of that country. Physical and administrative infrastructure is poorly developed in the KC. Livestock is the basis of the economy in the Cluster, yet opportunities for livestock marketing are meager. It is important to recognize that there are very limited economic opportunities for the population of the Cluster. This factor is particularly relevant to the young men and women living in the KC, as opportunities are limited both in the traditional pastoral sector as well as outside the sector. Large numbers of people have dropped out of pastoralism, primarily because they have lost their livestock to drought, raids or disease. Many of these people are destitute, and have been so for many years. Kenya's National Poverty Eradication Plan 1999-2015 reports that the highest incidence of poverty in the country occurs in the arid and semi-arid districts where the poor account for nearly 80% of the population. The largely pastoral districts are said to provide the most intractable poverty problems in the country.

## **B. Proximate Causes of Conflict**

Proximate causes of conflict in the KC include systematic neglect by governments of pastoral areas, politicization of conflict, the enormous increase in modern weapons, inappropriate government responses to conflict, provision of food aid without developing suitable livelihood opportunities for the recipients, interference by political leaders, weakened traditional authority systems, increased levels and non-traditional nature of violence, inflammatory media, and the introduction of commercial raiding. Most of the causes are external to the Cluster, or are the result of external influences. *In several cases, the proximate causes listed above are also effects of violence, creating a vicious circle of influence.*

### **1. Government Neglect**

A strong anti-pastoralist bias exists in the dominant society in each of the three countries concerned. A key result of this bias has been systematic government neglect of pastoral areas. Pastoral systems of natural resource management and pastoral culture are not understood or accepted by the dominant culture. The needs and aspirations of the leaders of the dominant ethnic groups have shaped government policies since independence. These policies have directed investment toward the higher growth agricultural areas of the country due to (1) the political clout of the ethnic groups in these areas, and (2) the economic argument that the returns on investment are much greater and surer than in pastoral areas. The lack of appropriate and effective land tenure policies and laws in pastoral areas have meant that pastoralists' land rights have not been respected or protected, particularly in regard to dry season grazing areas. The latter are often coveted and taken by other groups primarily because of their higher agricultural potential. Land tenure policies seem to be more a topic of current attention in Kenya than Uganda. In the former country, pastoralist parliamentarians have been able to unite across party lines to pursue concerns like this. In Uganda, various mining ventures are underway and these may prove disruptive to pastoralist livelihood (especially a marble quarry near a Karamojong shrine near Moroto).

In Uganda, the team noted that even among elite Karamojong there is a tendency to accept many of the negative stereotypes of pastoralism put forward by the dominant culture. The rhetoric of many prominent individuals that the team spoke with was dismissive of pastoral cultural values, viewed the conflicts in Karamoja as simple questions of law and order, and assumed that only when cattle are raised in a settled and controlled environment will the conflicts cease among the Karamojong and between the KC and neighbors. In Kenya, the team encountered similar views among some Pokot leaders, but not among the Turkana.

Although pastoral development in semi-arid and arid areas is admittedly a difficult challenge, the anti-pastoralist bias of the dominant cultures and the systematic government neglect have been major factors in the contrast between conditions in certain parts of Uganda and Kenya and conditions within the Karamoja Cluster. The Kenya Government Sessional Paper of 1986 promoted investment in the high potential areas of that country in an effort to achieve greater and faster returns on investment. Some major donors have also played a role in the current situation when they deliberately withdrew from supporting development efforts in pastoral areas starting around 1980. The results of Government and donor focus and investment in the high potential areas of Kenya and Uganda have included a two track form of development in which the areas already better off continued to develop while the areas already worse off stagnated and became embroiled in violent conflicts. In addition, some people from the better off areas moved to the pastoral areas to take advantage of business opportunities in commerce because they had relevant business skills, experience and contacts. Some outsiders then gained access to choice land that pastoralists had used (or reserved) as dry season grazing, etc. This has led to a real sense of neglect (and exploitation in some cases) on the part of pastoralists.

Growing marginalization and poverty combines with a deep sense of alienation and detachment from the government for the Karamojong in Uganda. Reportedly, the Karamojong refer to government as "Ngiserukale," or that that "eats our cows."<sup>33</sup> The phrase, "*We cannot wait for Karamoja to develop*" is often heard among the Karamojong and gives evidence of their feeling of the government's insincerity in wanting to assist the people of Karamoja to move from impoverishment to secure and contributing members of Ugandan society.<sup>34</sup>

Despite the alienation, it is worth noting that the Karamojong, unlike other neighboring peoples, have never rebelled against the authority of the Ugandan government. Some say, in fact, that the Ugandan government uses the Karamojong to counter those, like the Acholi or Teso, who are inclined to rebellion. Both the Teso and the Acholi accuse the GOU of allowing Karamojong to prey on their people as retaliation for previous rebel activity based in these two areas.

The Sudan presents a direr situation. The long running civil war in the Sudan has largely stymied development efforts and has led to great insecurity, particularly violent conflict, and destitution.

## 2. Politicization of Conflict and Regional Instability

The KC region has been adversely affected by several decades of instability in the Eastern Africa region. The civil war and related problems in the South of Sudan since 1955 has had an

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<sup>33</sup> Inselman, 2000.

<sup>34</sup> Karamoja Parliamentary Group, 2001.



enormous negative impact on the inhabitants of the Cluster. The many years of civil war and internal rebellions in Uganda have also had a destabilizing effect on the people of the cluster, including years of lost opportunities for socio-economic development. Nearly two decades of civil war in Ethiopia have also caused problems in the KC. The collapse of the central government in far off Somalia in 1991 has also played a destabilizing role. Each of these factors has contributed to the general atmosphere of insecurity and lawlessness in the region, has led to the enormous increase in the availability of modern weapons, and increased destabilizing influences into the Karamoja Cluster and surrounding areas.

The most important external factor affecting conflict and related issues in the KC is the existence of two major actors, the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the SPLA, competing for allies among the various ethnic groups in southern Sudan. In the pursuit of their own objectives, these two actors forge alliances with members of certain ethnic groups and then arm and support these groups. In some cases, the actors arm and support different elements within, or different territorial sections of, the same ethnic groups (for example, the Toposa). The Toposa then use the guns to raid their neighbors' cattle. The results have included an enormous increase in modern weapons, increased conflict, and very well armed groups raiding other groups for livestock. The raids may or may not have anything to do with the pursuit of the objectives of the Government of Sudan or the SPLA, but they enormously increase and complicate efforts to resolve conflict and promote peace in the Karamoja Cluster. Members of some groups seem to clearly benefit from the lack of effective administrative control in the area, as it allows them to organize and carry out livestock raids with relative impunity.

To a lesser degree, the Lord's Resistance Army in rebellion against Uganda and trained, equipped and allowed refuge in Sudan is a significant subset of this competition and also helps to keep weapons and ammunition in circulation.

The Karamojong of Uganda are considered to be loyal Museveni supporters. Both the Iteso and the Acholi believe that the GOU has armed (or at least refrained from disarming) the Karamojong expressly because the GOU wants to punish the formerly rebellious districts. Even if this is not the case, the failure (up until the current disarmament campaign) of the GOU to effectively reduce the number of arms has given some credence to this accusation. Another important factor here has been the failed attempt on the part of the GOU to create armed community security groups, Local Defense Units, which were mandated to provide security against raids and attacks. The LDUs began as part of a greater effort to protect communities and diminish the need for individuals to have large numbers of guns. In fact, however, the LDUs were not well supported by the government, and they have largely either ceased functioning or become a tool of criminal elements.

It is widely believed by non-Pokot in Kenya that the government in their conflicts with Turkana and Marakwet favors the Pokot. The Pokot vigorously disagree, stating that the current government also marginalizes them. Some Pokot argue that government security forces do not pursue Pokot raiders as vigorously as they do other groups because the security forces are fearful of the Pokot. The alternative view is that, as a Kalenjin group, the Pokot are closer to the government than are the Turkana. The Marakwet are also a Kalenjin group, but a large number of Marakwet voted for the opposition in a national election in 1992 and many people in the

country believe that fact led the government to turn a blind eye to the attacks by Pokot on Marakwet, in particular by Pokot from the President's home district of Baringo. The views expressed in this paragraph about the Pokot have been stated openly in the national press, to the point that Pokot have become very concerned about their reputation as a warlike people.

### 3. Modern Weapons

There has been an extraordinary increase in the supply and availability of modern weapons in the Karamoja Cluster since 1979. Modern firearms first entered the Cluster around the turn of the twentieth century when the Turkana obtained rifles from the Ethiopian government and traders. For many years, those Turkana with rifles enjoyed an enormous advantage over their adversaries, as the Pokot and Karamojong still attest. Modern weapons also entered the Cluster during the periods of instability in Uganda. However, it is the Karamojong looting of the large government armory in Moroto in 1979, after the fall of the Amin government, which is said by several knowledgeable individuals, including pastoral leaders directly affected, to have played a key role in changing the nature of conflict in the KC. The Moroto armory was again looted in 1985 and 1986 as the Obote and Okello regimes fell providing a further infusion of weapons into the hands of the Karamojong pastoralists.<sup>35</sup> This supply of arms and ammunition continues today, principally from the Sudan, and is well documented.<sup>36</sup> It is estimated that the supply of firearms in KC is currently around 90,000 – 100,000.<sup>37</sup> The proliferation of weapons has become an increasingly important income generating activity for some Karamojong, who are selling both guns and ammunition.

Many pastoralists in the KC have come to feel they need modern weapons to protect themselves, their families and their livestock. Both the rival Pokot and Marakwet groups explained that members of their groups obtained modern weapons for the same reason. Because the government does not provide them with adequate protection, they feel compelled to provide their own security. One scholar hypothesizes that the use of modern weapons has permitted some groups to preserve their way of life as pastoralists by fending off government and other encroachments.<sup>38</sup> Still, this comes at very high cost to all concerned.

Shortly before the assessment team began its mission, there was an international workshop on arms-flows in the border areas of Kenya, Uganda and Sudan. The four-day workshop held in Jinja, Uganda, November 9-13, 2001 was organized by Pax Christi and funded by CORDAID, both of the Netherlands. Participants included representatives of governments, donors, NGOs, church groups and civil society organizations. Topics included the role of governments and security forces, churches and church organizations, and civil society (identified as humanitarian, developmental and peace NGOs). The workshop agreed on an "Action Plan and Way Forward" that emphasized, as a matter of urgent priority, the need for stakeholders and donors to fund programs and to lobby for the allocation of resources for peace and development work among pastoral communities. Civil society groups were to, inter alia, advocate for the development of a

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<sup>35</sup> Inselman, 2000.

<sup>36</sup> See for example Action for Development of Local Communities, 2001.

<sup>37</sup> Pax Christi Netherlands, 2000.

<sup>38</sup> Sandra Gray, unpublished paper, "The Experience of Violence and Pastoralist Identity in Southern Karamoja," 2002, 1.

comprehensive plan for the rehabilitation and development of pastoral communities at various levels. The need for cross border activities was highlighted, including the recommendation that governments facilitate pastoral communities' controlled or free movement across the borders as agreed upon by the concerned governments.

For non-Karamojong Ugandans, the feeling that the Karamojong have gotten away with murder for years has now seemingly reached the point of a united will for action.<sup>39</sup> From this point of view, the use of military force to secure disarmament resonates, and the President's Initiative for disarmament has moved forward. While the assessment team was in the field, the Government of Uganda launched its long awaited disarmament program in Karamoja sub-region. The residents of Karamoja were to begin voluntarily handing in their illegal firearms on December 2, 2001. Under the plan, the Karamojong had been given six months to turn in a hoped-for 40,000 weapons.<sup>40</sup> After the initial period, anyone found to possess an illegal gun would be arrested. President Museveni has promised to commit development resources to the area in exchange for weapons. The Ugandan People's Defense Force (UPDF) personnel were to be deployed along the borders with Kenya and Sudan to protect the residents of Karamoja from cross border raids.

The President of Uganda spent two weeks in Karamoja in November to launch the disarmament campaign in person. As noted in Section III., it was reported that all of the Turkana residents in Matheniko County of northeastern Uganda moved with their livestock back to Kenya, presumably to avoid GOU efforts to disarm them. After the team completed its fieldwork, there were press reports that Pokot had moved from Uganda to Kenya for a similar reason. There is concern now that these movements will greatly reduce security within Kenya, and there have been calls for the Kenya government to disarm groups in northwestern Kenya. Some pastoralists interviewed replied that as long as other groups remained armed and as long as the Sudan remained unstable, it would be unwise and unsafe for them to give up their own weapons.

As of late February, Uganda government officials reported that the disarmament program is progressing well and so far, 7065 guns have been collected. The government has delivered 348 ox-ploughs and chains to the three districts of Karamoja -Moroto, Kotido and Nakapiripirit - and another 600 ox-ploughs and chains will be delivered by the end of February 2002. A total of 3,308 Ox ploughs and 11,000 bags of 100kgs of maize grains will also be given to the Karamojong who voluntarily returned guns before the deadline of 15th February 2002. Forceful disarmament went into force on 15th February as schedule.<sup>41</sup> Despite this exercise, reports indicate that security is still fluid in the region, with road ambushes still taking their toll on travelers. For example, suspected Karamojong gunmen killed two engineers of Kampala based Incafex Solar System and seriously injured two others in an ambush along Moroto-Kotido road (at Lupe in Kotido district) on 6th February 2002.

The Uganda Human Rights Commission intends to establish a base in Moroto to ensure that the disarmament process does not involve the use of violence by government forces. As of

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<sup>39</sup> Omara, 2001.

<sup>40</sup> The estimated number of weapons in what used to be Karamoja district in Uganda.

<sup>41</sup> UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). <http://www.reliefweb.int>

December, sixty local defense units had been trained; the current status of their deployment is unclear.

The disarmament process needs to be monitored carefully to determine whether it is genuinely effective in disarming a significant part of the Karamojong and whether the disarmed groups are now at the mercy of fellow pastoralists who moved across the border to Kenya. Rather than reducing conflict, it could have the effect of increasing instability in both Kenya and Uganda KC areas. If relatively few weapons are turned in, it could of course have very little impact.

#### 4. Lack of an Effective Government Approach to Conflict in KC

There was widespread criticism of government responses to conflict and the three governments' lack of an appropriate and effective policy to deal with violent conflict in the Cluster. When governments have intervened in the past, they have often taken a very heavy-handed approach, often characterized by military operations with soldiers brutally punishing villages and communities as a whole. A key result has been resentment and mistrust on the part of the people affected. Requiring groups to make communal payments of livestock to compensate another group that had been raided, a practice that originated in the colonial era and has continued since independence has penalized individuals, families and communities, who had no involvement in the offenses, committed. At the same time, KC residents generally recognize that it is the responsibility of the government to protect the life and property of its citizens.

In Kenya, general security in each district is the responsibility of the Provincial Administration, under the Office of the President (provincial commissioner for each province, district commissioner and security officer for each district, district officers, and chiefs). Because of the many years of insecurity in Uganda and the long running civil war in the south of Sudan, there has been a permanent army presence in Turkana District for many years. The General Service Unit protects the Turkwell dam near the boundary between Turkana and West Pokot districts and the international border with Uganda.

There were several allegations that the governments concerned lacked the political will to significantly reduce violent conflict in the Cluster and neighboring areas. This allegation was in several cases specifically leveled at the governments' failure to stop commercial raiding (see below). One informant asked how it could be that criminal gangs of up to 1000 men strong could organize and operate without coming to the attention of the authorities.

There were also interesting suggestions that decentralization in Uganda may complicate a response to Karamojong violence, which as noted does not respect administrative boundaries. It may make it more difficult for government units to coordinate activities as well as for NGOs trying to work with local governments and communities. It is however at least possible that greater autonomy could give local government officials the ability to respond to escalations in tensions more quickly and effectively. Whatever the effect, decentralization is moving forward in Uganda. It makes some sense to try to calculate what impact new local government structures and powers might have on conflict.

#### 5. Relief versus Development

Considerable humanitarian assistance has been provided to people in the Cluster over the past 20 years. Much of the effort has been directed to Turkana District and southern Sudan. The tiny center of Lokichokio in the extreme northwest of Kenya has boomed in recent years because it serves as the headquarters of Operation Lifeline Sudan. Large numbers of huge trucks ply the paved road from Mombasa to Lokichokio, causing heavy damage to the road in Turkana District. There are now two Kenya Airways flights a day between Nairobi and the well-developed airport at Lokichokio. There are large refugee camps in Kakuma, about half way between Lodwar and Lokichokio. This humanitarian effort has clearly been necessary as a response to the civil war in the Sudan.

Long-term relief, however, has been provided without the concomitant development of income generation opportunities for the recipients. There have, however, been a number of development efforts in Turkana District over the past 20 years as this long neglected area received both humanitarian and/or development assistance from international agencies, bilateral donors, NGOS and church groups. Not all assistance has been well thought through. In addition to the humanitarian relief that began in 1980, a number of organizations have worked towards long term development. NORAD was the key development actor in the district for many years. A serious problem has developed, however, and can be expected to become much worse in coming years unless significant steps are taken. Put starkly, the relief efforts in Turkana District have kept large numbers of people alive but there has not been the development of livelihoods for the great majority of these people. These people have little opportunity of self-provisioning or “getting ahead” in life. This is one reason for the high incidence of road banditry in the region. In sum, the development efforts could not keep pace with the need for new livelihoods, in addition to the problems that previously existed, that was indirectly created by the humanitarian assistance.

In the Uganda portion of KC, little long-term development assistance has been planned and even less delivered. The only genuine development successes appear to be small-scale community development activities, like those of the Lutheran World Federation around Moroto. Possibly this will begin to change as a result of the promises that accompanied the GOU disarmament campaign. Museveni is already given some credit for having done more to promote development among the Karamojong than had other presidents.

There has been considerable interference by political leaders in development activities. This has significantly hampered socioeconomic development, and it has reduced willingness of donors and NGOS to invest resources in particular areas. A key example was West Pokot District. The former Minister for the Environment and Natural Resources was a powerful man in West Pokot and on the national political scene for many years. His reported attempts to re-direct resources of donor projects to certain areas and to otherwise interfere in project decisions are thought to be the main reason one donor closed down a major project in the district after many years, and is considered a key reason that some development NGOS avoided working in the district for several years. Current political leaders are said to be eager to change the situation (they are supporting Pokatusa, described in Sections III and V), and the leaders in the district who met with the assessment team clearly stated their view that the district needed to receive more development assistance.

## 6. Weakening of Traditional Authority Structures

Traditionally, raids were authorized by the group's elders and were blessed, and even sometimes instigated, by the "seers" (the term currently being used to describe diviners or prophets). However, some erosion in the authority of elders appears to have taken place in the last couple of decades. It is difficult to quantify this erosion and while its degree is assumed to differ across the KC groups, it is not possible after only a brief amount of fieldwork to name the groups where traditional authority is most and least eroded. It is interesting to note that urban sources felt that there had been a greater degree of erosion in role of elders than did KC elders and other pastoralists. Both elders and youth stated that raiding does sometimes now occur without the formal sanction of elders. In some cases, elders, however, described the young men carrying out such raise as a small group of "bad apples," and not part of the mainstream.

When unsanctioned raids occur, elders often seem to be involved in trying to retrieve the cattle that young men in their group raided. The assessment team heard of instances where the youth themselves refused to return stolen livestock when the elders demanded that they do so. When the stakes are high, the authority of elders may be reinvigorated or unaltered. Their actions can include threats of punishment or actual punishment. Elders may sometimes act in the interests of preventing a retaliatory cycle or they may also act to protect their authority by demonstrating that unapproved raids will be rewarded with severe penalties.<sup>42</sup> The team did not come across sufficient comparative data to determine whether the elders in some groups had lost more authority than those in others. All groups are likely to have been effected by the simultaneous pull of cultural tradition and the push of modern factors but it might not be unreasonable to speculate that those groups furthest removed from traditional culture had witnessed greater erosion. Male elders and opinion lenders generally still play a key role in decision-making. Traditional structures and methods of conflict-resolution still do provide an important starting point for developing peace and development strategies in the region.

The Uganda wing of the assessment team found that when KC elders and youth were asked about their response to raids, elders generally said that they would take legal action through government and would not respond directly. This may of course have been the most politic thing for them to say. Youth on the other hand would say that while they would be prepared to give their elders and the government a few weeks or a couple of months to reclaim the cattle or negotiate the compensation, they would not wait all that long and would undertake a retaliatory raid if needed. It may be that elders are sometimes pushed by youth to sanction such raids if formal government processes are producing no results.

## 7. Role of the Media

Inaccurate and biased reporting by the media is criticized by some for presenting the residents and groups of the Karamoja Cluster as vicious savages. Such inflammatory reporting furthers the anti-pastoralist bias that already plays such a key role in forming the views of the dominant

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<sup>42</sup> The team observed final peace talks between the Jie and Dodoth near Kotido, Uganda in November. Jie and Dodoth elders seems to be in charge of the talks and took strong sanctions, destroying the homestead of the primary Jie raider, when he refused to cooperate in returning the animals or providing compensation.

culture. There is clearly a need for more balanced reporting that is not biased against marginalized groups. It should be noted that there have been numerous accurate media accounts in recent years. The reporting of the Pokot-Marakwet clashes in The Weekly Review of Kenya in April 1998 was solid and provided an informed historical perspective, although it also reflects a limited understanding of pastoral systems of natural resource management. However, many accounts are factually inaccurate and some continue to present an anti-pastoralist perspective.

## 8. Commercial Raiding

The introduction of commercial raiding represents a major change for the worse in the Cluster. Powerful, wealthy individuals, including livestock traders, arms dealers and others, sponsor the raids. Young men are hired to carry out a raid, and the organizers may provide guns on credit to the raiders. The cattle are stolen and in some cases are herded into trucks waiting alongside a road. The livestock are then transported or driven on foot without official movement permits and with no respect for the quarantine procedures that are normally followed in Kenya when moving livestock from pastoral areas into the highlands.<sup>43</sup> Commercial raiding is a very sensitive issue and people in the districts were reluctant to talk about it in detail. Most of those interviewed recognized that it exists and is a problem, but many referred to activities in neighboring districts and were too nervous to talk about their own district because of the power of those involved in organizing the raiding. Based on research in south Turkana, one specialist has concluded that commercial raiding is a more important factor contributing to violence than ecological pressure.<sup>44</sup>

Commercial raiding is reported to be on the increase in Uganda. This is particularly troubling from the point of view of trying to secure the restitution of stolen animals. When the cattle are removed and sold in distant markets, the ability to locate and restore these cattle to rightful owners is destroyed. Commercial raiding also causes a reduction in the per capita numbers of cattle among KC pastoralists. This is in contrast with traditional raiding, which redistributes rather than removes cattle. This increases the pressure on those social and cultural requirements that cattle fulfill. As young people become less and less able to meet inflated bride-price, they become less invested and integrated into systems of social and cultural control and more apt to participate in raiding for pay. This in turn may be part of the reason that victims of contemporary raiding are no longer restricted to the warriors. With the commercialization of cattle raids, the value of cows is no longer simply cultural but is tied directly and concretely to market forces. Because controls and limits on raiding cease to be governed by social sanction, violent raiding increases, revenge killings proliferate, and cycles of violence grow more and more serious.

There were no reports of commercial raiding taking place in the Sudan.

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<sup>43</sup> These restrictions were imposed in the colonial period to protect the herds of white settlers from livestock disease. The many efforts to eliminate these restrictions have been unsuccessful and are an impediment to livestock marketing from pastoral areas of the country. Transmission of livestock disease by movement of livestock across international borders from neighboring countries has long been a major concern of Kenya's veterinary department.

<sup>44</sup> Personal communication, Jeremy Lind to Ned Greeley, 4/8/02.

## C. Immediate Triggers of Conflict

Several factors can trigger violent conflict between groups in the Cluster and surrounding areas, including a specific violent incident, a series of livestock thefts, a raid, a government operation, traditional taunting by girls and women, a seer's prophecy, an inflammatory media article or a politician's speech.

A specific violent incident can trigger pent up hostilities between groups. The incident can appear to outsiders to be relatively minor, such as the murder of one individual. The long peace between Turkana and Pokot is reported to have been broken by one murder in 1957, triggering the conflict that continues today.

A series of livestock thefts can trigger a major retaliatory response by the affected group that, in effect, says, "enough is enough." Such a situation is said to characterize the conflict between Turkana and Toposa, with the Toposa carrying out a series of raids until the Turkana respond. This may have been the case in the incident reported in the international press in late December 2001 when a total of 55 Turkana and Toposa were killed near Lokichokio.

A raid by one group on another, whether a traditional kind of raid by a traditional enemy or a previously friendly group, or a commercial raid, can be a trigger. The following events illustrate how a particular attack can lead to retaliation and a spiral of violence. As noted earlier, on September 11, 2001, a group of Karamojong carried out a cattle raid in Katakwi (Uganda) in which at least 5 people were reported killed. On the following day in a nearby town, a group of Karamojong were taken off a bus and summarily executed by an angry mob while others were attacked in the market place. Other than hailing from Karamoja, none of those killed on the second day had any known connection to the previous day's raids.

A government military operation intended to punish a group for taking part in a livestock raid or series of raids can also trigger conflict. When the operations are brutal and/or affect a large number of people, as for example the 1984 operation intended to disarm the Pokot of Kenya, the results can be not only bitterness among the punished population but also a determination to obtain livestock and weapons from another group to compensate for the livestock paid in communal compensation and for the guns confiscated.

The Government of Uganda has talked of disarming the Karamojong a number of times over the past decade. At least one source indicated that in the past when disarmament campaigns were announced, raiding increased dramatically in anticipation of guns being taken. Apparently warriors hoped to be able to consolidate gains in their herds by timing their raids as close as possible to the disarmament deadline so that retaliation would not be possible by their disarmed victims. It is unclear at this writing whether Museveni's current campaign has led to such practice.

Inflammatory public speeches and inflammatory media can also spark violence. Inflammatory speeches by politicians have frequently triggered outbreaks of violent conflict in the KC and neighboring areas. Such speeches may focus on the real or assumed offenses of another group, such as previous raids and/or violent attacks on women and children. Land issues tend to be



deeply rooted grievances, such as the loss of access to customarily used dry season or drought reserve grazing areas, and politicians frequently focus on these highly charged issues. For example, the Pokot base part of their claim to land in Trans Nzoia that was alienated for white settlement in the early decades of the twentieth century on the findings of the Carter Land Commission of 1932 that reviewed the land claims of various groups in many parts of Kenya. In the 1980s and 1990s Pokot raided large farms in Trans Nzoia, terrifying some that the conflict of the pastoral areas could affect the settled, modernized highlands. There are often competing claims for land, further complicating the situation. It was claimed that media reports could also trigger violence, as they demonize already marginalized groups. Politicians and other leaders are said to use such media reports to incite their followers. Incitement by politicians played a key role in the ethnic clashes in the run up to Kenya's national elections in 1992 and 1997. Non-Turkana were pushed out of Turkana District and many, but not all, non-Pokot were pushed out of West Pokot. However, the major clashes during these two periods occurred in districts outside the Cluster. There is considerable concern that there could be violence in the Cluster and nearby areas in the run up to the national elections in 2002.

## **D. Predicting and Locating Future Conflict**

In the Karamoja Cluster, it is very difficult for those involved in conflict reduction activities to identify and quickly respond to triggers of conflict. It is even more difficult to accurately predict the location and timing of future outbreaks of conflict even though one might be able to forecast that retaliation will occur. As noted above, communities residing nearest to opposing groups are often targeted for retaliatory raids. Pastoralists may wait long periods of time before responding to specific triggers with a large-scale raid or attack. They usually plan their raids and attacks carefully in an effort to achieve surprise, and they use traditional methods of surveillance of the other group's territory to identify their targets. The specific sites of conflict can vary, which makes the identification of "hot spots" particularly difficult. The possibility that new, temporary alliances can be established between groups, even between traditional enemies, further complicates an already complex situation.

## V. PEACE CAPACITIES

As articulated in the Conflict Assessment protocol, there are a host of existing and potential peace capacities that can be leveraged in the broad category of activities that fall under the umbrella of CPMR. By strategically matching conflict sources/causes with peace capacities, the conflict sources may prove more amenable to solutions. The nature of conflict response, however, will not always entail activities that fall clearly under a CPMR rubric. Because structural and proximate conditions shape the conflict environment in fundamental ways, CPMR activities must engage with and be integrated carefully into broad development strategies for conflict response to be more than palliative. Without attention to this point, CPMR could serve to promote or perpetuate unjust or in-egalitarian outcomes and circumstances which may result in greater levels of conflict in the long-run, even if successful in stemming particular conflicts in the short-run. Thus CPMR activities should not only aim at the reduction, solution, mediation or prevention of conflict, but more importantly to the improvement of structural factors that give rise to conflict situations. When CPMR is integrated with sustainable, participatory, community-based development, CPMR can serve to contribute to broad USAID cross-sectoral imperatives as well as reducing levels of violence in particular circumstances.

This section examines CPMR activities in the Cluster (both extant and potential) using the framework introduced in Section I above and followed in Section IV of Conflict Causes. For each of the three levels of analysis, we draw distinctions between and explore the utility of the dualities of traditional and modern CPMR. We also consider the role of women, faith-based leadership, and the media in CPMR activities as well as the use of problem solving dialogues. We note the important role of regional organizations and the promotion of inter-state activities. And finally we include a summary of the team's impressions of particular CPMR activities as a result of our observations.

The team was not engaged in formal evaluation and thus it is vital for the reader to view the judgments made in this regard as tentative and impressionistic. To provide a more systematic means of making judgments, the team adopted the following broad criteria in regards to CPMR activities. Using key informant interview and observation, document reviews, and limited and brief interviews with partners and beneficiaries, the team noted the degree to which:

- Activities are consistent with stated objectives
- Tangible results that can be cited, and or explained convincingly, and
- Partners and beneficiaries recognize and articulate the contributions/success of the activity

Even with the use of these criteria, the team as a whole believes that their impressions should not be used to make definitive partnering decisions. Though we spent a good deal of time working with and observing organizations like OAU/IBAR, Lutheran World Relief and POKATUSA, many other organizations were met only once for an hour. The purpose of many of these interviews was to gather data about the conflicts in the KC and in some cases there was clearly inadequate opportunity to observe the groups themselves.

## A. Structural or Alleviating Capacities

The nature of structural capacities is such that the capacities change slowly over time. Patterns of behavior, cultural practice, levels of economic development, and environmental factors are difficult to influence except when one takes a long-term view. Thus structural peace capacity development will require long-term commitment. Quick fixes are not likely to result in lasting change, and could even prove to have a negative impact on conflict if not well grounded in solid strategy.

### 1. Competition for Scarce Resources/Patterns of Resource Sharing

Virtually all groups in the KC engage in some measure of cooperation with other groups to allow for use of needed natural resources. While competition and conflict over resources is common, cooperation and mutually beneficial solutions are also. Some groups have maintained alliances over a long period of time (such as that between the Turkana and Matheniko, operative since 1973), while others forge resource-sharing partnerships from formerly conflictual relations. One example of this is the renewal of an old alliance between the Turkana and Jie that allows the Turkana to graze on Jie lands during the early dry season while the Jie in turn enter into Acholiland to graze on even more favorable pasturage. This renewed cooperation was only made possible in turn by the recent negotiated settlement between Jie (in Moroto District) and Acholi (in Kitgum District) that gave Jie the right to graze during dry season in return for turning their guns in to the authorities on entry into Kitgum. These sorts of multi leveled relations tend to promote resource conservation and increases the overall carrying capacity of the land because they allow for all available pasturage to be used instead of having the kind of no-go zones that dominate in some parts of the Pokot/Marakwet border in Kenya. The Toposa and Turkana, for example graze their herds together in dry grazing areas along the borders and in Sudan, yet they are in frequent conflict with each other. Peace agreements have often been made that resulted in relative peace, sometimes for long periods. The Pokot and Turkana, while perpetual enemies, share grazing areas in the dry seasons, but increased and intensified conflict between these two groups in the recent years has resulted in some grazing areas (Olorua and Marich) being deserted and therefore inaccessible to either group.

### 2. Traditional Pastoral Cultural Values

#### a) Changing Structures

If an issue as difficult as land-use can be successfully negotiated in the KC, as the above example illustrates, one may speculate that certain enduring cultural values, which in some settings support conflict, may also be flexible enough to serve as peace capacities. For example, in other parts of Africa, pastoralists have negotiated agreements on bride price caps. These caps have diminished upward pressures similar to those seen in the KC today. Such a movement, if it were to take hold, could change incentives for women, seers, and others who encourage raiding as well as reducing the desperation that seems to drive many youth to excess violence.

### b) Role of women

Being part of the communities in which conflict frequently occurs, women share the cultural values and perceptions about raiding, war and peace. While they do not go out to raid and to fight, they play a role of encouraging, even inciting the men to raid and revenge. Women and children suffer most the impact of conflict; they lose husbands and sons, livestock and source of livelihood, they are raped, maimed and killed, and suffer long-term physical and psychological impact of conflict. Because of this suffering, women are becoming more and more involved in peacebuilding, challenging men and youth to end conflict.

Traditionally, women do not participate in decision-making regarding war, raiding or use of grazing lands. *However*, in recent years, women have played key roles in various efforts to reduce violent conflict. The two “Women’s Peace Crusades” supported by OAU/IBAR were reported to have been valuable in creating awareness and stimulating men, women and youth to cultivate peace. The crusades gave women the opportunity to play their role as the conscience of the community - to remind the male participants of the gravity of the situations and the need to take effective actions to stop violent conflicts. The assessment team witnessed women performing precisely this function in powerful speeches at the large workshop in Lokichar and the meeting in Lokichokio. In addition, the women heard from the Kiramiran Women’s Peace Group in Moroto that women formed “peace choirs” and set out walking to the enemy (the Matheniko) where Matheniko women joined them. This activity helped put an end to violence in the area.

On the whole, women may well be the strongest proponents of peacebuilding activities in the KC. Recognizing the important role women play in conflict and peacebuilding, NCCK now supports women groups (women link) to reach out to more women and to create awareness on peace.

### c) Role of Elders

Many older men appear interested in reducing cattle theft and raiding, although still others promote and encourage the practices. After an incident of livestock theft or a raid, there are many examples of elders identifying the young men within their own group who stole the livestock, tracking the stock to certain kraals and then taking part in effective actions to return some or all of the stock to the group from which the livestock was stolen. This is one of the most important methods used to confront and reduce livestock theft and raiding between groups within the KC and with adjoining groups. The influence of certain elders is very powerful within all groups, and understanding these issues is a key factor in on the ground conflict reduction efforts.<sup>45</sup> Where traditional authority structures remain effective, the views of the elders are very important. Any particular incidents would seem to fall under the proximate/channeling or immediate/suppressing category (one such compelling description is provided below) but the net impact of multiple events like this can add up to a gradual change in cultural practice and thus structural evolution in favor of conflict reduction.

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<sup>45</sup> It is perhaps worth noting that traditional and Christian elders have played a very important role in peacebuilding in the southern Sudan.

Elders have also been engaged in negotiations, peace talks, community fora, etc. between different ethnic groups in efforts to come to agreement on grazing rights. OAU/IBAR has also sponsored a large number of these types of activities along with local government officials, and with the participation of many NGOS in the communities in which they take place across the KC. By promoting the pattern of negotiation, creating and reinforcing personal linkages between groups over long distances, and by providing mechanisms for the linkages to mature into agreements, then formal treaties, then to be consummated in practice, there is reason to hope for less dramatic shifts in violence levels when group alliances inevitably shift to accommodate changing environmental conditions, herd health, and general pastoral needs.

Most of the CMPR actors in the region recognize the important role the elders play in decision-making, particularly with regard to conflict and try to build on this through different types of peace committees. While the assessment team recognized this as a very good approach to strengthen the communities for peacebuilding, it was also observed that important changes are taking place in the social structures in KC with groups other than the traditional male elders playing an increasingly important role in creating or ending conflict. It is important that strategies for peace recognize and incorporate changes that are taking place in KC as in other areas in Africa

#### d) Role of the Warriors

The young men of the Karamoja Cluster, and in some cases of surrounding groups, appear to be the strongest supporters of livestock theft and raiding. At the same time, even among young warriors, there are many that express antipathy for the violence. If there were alternatives to raiding and the great risks that it entails, most would likely be willing to pursue them. Cultural practices like initiation ceremonies, bride price, raiding and heroism play an important part in shaping the perceptions and behaviors of the youth, both male and female. The assessment team recognized a need for CMPR strategies to pay more attention to the youth. Activities and programs for the youth need to be incorporated in the peace and development programs.

While the team recognizes the need to engage and promote traditional and local-level CPMR strategies, it also recognizes the limitations of traditional mechanisms. Some current conflicts seem far beyond the capacity of traditional mechanisms alone to effectively cope with. This came out clearly in a meeting held with representatives of Toposa and Turkana who made strong suggestions that OAU/IBAR and other organizations facilitating the peacebuilding process "develop other strategies" to deal with the increasing complexities of conflict and peacebuilding. The meeting facilitators and the representatives of POKATUSA and ITDG who also attended the meeting shared this conclusion. As a result, outside assistance is necessary to deal with this conflict including the participation of security forces, law enforcement, and other formal means of assuring peace when basic social order threatens to deteriorate. In December, a BBC News article detailed how this conflict resulted in more violence with 55 people being killed. The Lokichokio meeting is indirectly referred to in the news story and in spite of these meetings, serious violence has not abated. Clearly long-term cultural change must be supported and buttressed by other structural factors or it simply will not prove viable.

Finally we note that traditional mechanisms span structural, proximate, and immediate capacities and are referenced in the appropriate sections below as well.

### 3. Poverty

The most salient finding in regards to structural peace capacities in this regard is the importance of recognizing how poverty and lack of opportunity, low levels of education, and ignorance all fuel or deepen violence in the KC while at the same time, traditional peace capacities exist and can be leveraged to improve conflict conditions. The need for economic development is palpable and the inclusion of a conflict component across USAID strategic objectives programming could dramatically enhance the likelihood that development efforts at the very least “do no harm”. Particular development initiatives like Alternative Basic Education in Karamoja (ABEK) (sponsored by the World Bank in Uganda) take account of pastoral patterns of migration and need for mobility by providing both a primary school curriculum relevant to pastoral life and teachers that follow family groups as they move during seasonal migrations. Thus families do not have to choose between abandoning pastoralism and education for young people.

The OAU/IBAR's Livestock Development Project (CAPE) and the GUK/World Bank (ALRMP) are the two key agencies with specific programs for pastoral development and resource utilization in addition to conflict management. Both of these work in Turkana while OAU/IBAR works in Sudan and Karamoja as well.

## **B. Proximate/Channeling Capacities**

### 1. Role of Government and Civil Society

#### a) Role of national government

Few government institutions are monolithic and though there are dominant patterns of neglect in the KC, there are also some counter-tendencies. In Uganda, there is some evidence that in contrast to patterns of government neglect at the level of economic development, the state has provided a level of commitment to conflict prevention by pursuing disarmament. The GOU has as noted put in place a disarmament campaign. Some have argued that the Uganda Movement system (as opposed to a system of competing political parties) mitigates against the politicization of ethnicity by removing partisanship from politics altogether. At the level of parliament, for example, though there are not party groupings, there are geographic groupings in which parliamentary delegations from the same areas affiliate and strategize regarding issues that impact on their home areas. In the case of the KC, this seems to produce mixed results, however - sometimes different ethnic groups can ally and sometimes their leaders remain in fierce competition even when the needs are similar. For example, Karamoja and Acholi politicians have articulated the need to increase economic development for their mutually neglected areas. However, the team also found that it was unable to host a meeting of parliamentarians from Karamoja and Teso because the two groups would not agree to meet in the same room. To be fair, this was during a tense moment in the Teso/Karamoja conflict but one would expect that at

the highest levels of government, officials would be able to communicate civilly in an attempt to pursue peace.

In Kenya, security issues are a responsibility of the Office of the President, with one of the ministers being specifically responsible for security in the country. At the local level, the provincial administration with its authority chain of provincial commissioners, District commissioners, District officers at the divisional level and chiefs and assistant chiefs at the community level provide the arm of government and are charged with ensuring peace and security. The Kenya government response to conflict in the past has been through organizing peace meetings, facilitating peace negotiations between conflicting groups and sometimes using the police and the General service unit to quash out violence. ALRMP, in collaboration with OXFAM has organized conflict-training sessions for all district commissioners in conflict areas as a means to improving government response. The two organizations are also supporting joint peace committees at different levels - national, provincial, district and community level whose membership includes government personnel.

#### b) Role of local government

The role of local government officials can also be a positive influence. To the degree that consistent and fair application of law is evident and when local officials are successful in partnering with NGOS, CSOs, and donors to conciliate and mediate conflicts, they can provide a vital resource for CPMR. The Wajir example is instructive here. In the Kotido and Moroto Districts of Uganda, one international NGO reported that a very sympathetic and active local government leader provides invaluable support to their CPMR activities. Even with limited local resources, this DC leverages support for meetings, uses his connections to reduce military abuses, and consistently works with church leaders, NGOS, and local elders to “put out fires” before they escalate. This type of engagement and commitment may be difficult to replicate but can be encouraged with training, access to resources, and by exposure to the notion that this type of work is expected of local administrators.

#### c) Role of donors and civil society

A collection of local and international NGOS have made concerted efforts to address friction points, establish reliable mechanisms for conflict response, and to engage communities in peacebuilding. There are a modest number of civil society groups in the KC that are active in CPMR activities as well and, after the security forces, the NGOS and CSOs form the front-line against escalation of raids and cattle theft into revenge killings. Chief among these groups are religious leaders and other ecumenical groups. Traditional organizations, women groups, performing groups (*youth and women's choirs*), and youth clubs have also made efforts to deal with issues of violence in the KC. As a group, these community-based organizations, local NGOS, and even to some degree the donor-supported groups tend to be under-financed and lack institutional capacity. At the same time they possess unique strengths including a good grounding in the communities in which they work which provides for in-depth local knowledge and a high level of commitment to their activities.

#### d) Role of the media

One of the identified CPMR priorities of REDSO is the use of media. The assessment team endeavored to speak with media representatives, particularly community radio, in the KC and was disappointed to learn of the very weak infrastructure for radio. On the Uganda side, radio signals are weak, and with the exception of the national radio station, do not cover the entire area, the same seems to be true in Kenya. As a potential area of investment, radio could be very promising in terms of civic education, *awareness creation*, and *training on* conflict resolution and problem solving, and in terms of its educational potential (e.g. radio schools in combination with Alternative Basic Education), but the issue of reception would have to be addressed first.

### 2. Developments and Conflict

Donors and government representative alike in the KC have recognized the need to link development to conflict. The obvious conclusion that effective development cannot take place in an environment of violence was brought home dramatically in 1999. The Oxfam Karamoja Project Programme Manager was shot in the leg within a few meters of his home and project offices in Kabong. Unable to assure the safety of project staff, Oxfam withdrew from the region after sponsoring projects there for 20 years. Unlike development professionals however, the thousands of victims of gunshots who live in Karamoja do not have the option of exit. The very organizations that have attempted to meet stark development challenges had become targets of violence and thus unable to continue their work. In some ways this event sparked a surge in conflict assessments, studies, and strategies among international NGOs and donors in the KC that as of this writing is only just beginning to result in conflict “sensitive” development projects. Beyond relief work, and grounded in local solutions and community level peace making, organizations like OAU-IBAR (community participatory veterinary care) POKATUSA (conflict response and community development) and Lutheran World Federation (community development and conflict response). ITDG and the GOK/World Bank ALRMP have now recognized the link between conflict resolution and development. GTZ has recently made conflict a cross-cutting concern in its program.

### 3. Indigenous Responses to Violence

In Uganda, organizations such as Kotido Peace Initiative and the Matheniko Development Foundation have demonstrated the kind of vital grass-roots linkages that allow for the support of community-level traditional responses to conflict. The approach of POKATUSA, OAU/IBAR and NCKK in working with local committees and networks seems to build on and to strengthen community level response. Support for local NGOs and CBOs who are made up of religious people, teachers, and other concerned community members could be a promising investment. The Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative is also an example of an organization that works at this level and uses customary conflict response methods in concert with more Western methods to excellent affect. Linking Muslim and Christian religious thought and practice with traditional social and cultural practice, the ARLP along with their counterparts in Kotido district, have been able to mediate a serious and long-standing violent conflict that engages local communities, security forces, and other NGOs and CSOs and does not threaten pastoral livelihood.



#### 4. Changed Incentives for Peace

The development of the above mentioned culture of revenge and the changed nature of violence (highly charged, vicious, indiscriminate) in the KC in a perverse way has itself served to change incentives for peace making on the part of victims. Many informants expressed horror at the level of violence and noted that people were now willing to make many sacrifices to change things.

### **C. Suppressing Triggers**

While it is not possible to predict exactly when and where the next cattle raid will occur or when one will spiral out of control, there are a number of conflict response techniques that could serve to reduce the probability, frequency, and severity of such events.

#### 1. Immediate response to raids

In an effort to prevent the escalation of thefts or raids to larger scale battles or a series of revenge attacks, some organizations have seen the need to carry out rapid response whenever they learn of cattle being either stolen or raided. In Kotido, Uganda, the local Karamoja Project Implementation Unit (KPIU - EU supported) supports rapid response on the part of other NGOs and local government officials in town. When a report of a cattle raid is received by any of the groups that work in the area (including POKATUSA, Church of Uganda, Catholic Peace and Justice Commission, Kotido Peace Initiative), they immediately organize to deploy a team to the effected community to gather information, track the cattle, and identify the perpetrators. Often this is successful and the lead organization then sends a delegation to the offending community to negotiate restitution. A quick response is seen as key as it provides a means for identifying and holding raiders accountable. While the KPIU sometimes participates as a team member, they also serve a vital function as they have flexibility to provide resources for these actions (gas for the local government official's car) the absence of which would mean the activity could not take place. The Kotido experience suggests that importance of multiple contributors to rapid response, some with local expertise, some with financial resources, and still others government officials to allow for the appropriate legal procedures to operate.

NCKK has been working with communities to develop an early warning and response mechanism to enable them and other organizations involved in conflict provide quick response to conflict and prevent spiraling effects of it. Through its partners in the field, OXFAM facilitates establishment of early warning and quick response teams that can move quickly to diffuse tension and mediate dialogue. Such quick responses and the reconciliation that these organizations promote have demonstrated the ability to restore stolen cattle, and to short circuit revenge. A few days after a minor cattle theft at a village near Kotido, one group of elders told the assessment team that they would wait as long as it took for the authorities to find their cattle. The group of youth who were also part of the focus group chimed in that the old people might be willing to wait, but that they were not. "Unless someone does something to get our cows, it is our job, and we will do it." Under these circumstances, establishing the confidence of young warriors is paramount to avoiding the possible trigger for a conflagration.

## 2. Rule of law and public security

The importance of a reliable and consistent police force as well as secure national borders are vital for avoiding rapid raids that often come across international borders. Further, public security forces that respect the rule of law allow for legal processes to take their course and assure that rapid response does not turn into mob justice and the kind of excesses that this could lead to. A number of NGOs involved in CMPR activities told the assessment team that they have learnt from experience that peacebuilding cannot be effective without the active involvement of government who are responsible for enforcing law. Based on this experience, OXFAM, NCKK and other CMPR organizations have made recognizable efforts to step up the involvement of government personnel (district commissioners, chiefs, even ministers and members of parliament)

## 3. Media as a tool for “cooling the earth”

Radio, newspapers and other types of media can help cool or increase tension and further conflict. The assessment team had several examples in which the media exaggerated or underplayed cases of conflict, resulting in misunderstanding and contributing to increasing tensions between groups. Media reports on Pokot/Marakwet and Pokot/Turkana conflicts provide useful examples. Some NGOs have found it necessary to organize seminars for media personnel to sensitize them to issues of conflict and the importance of balanced and accurate reporting. Pokot personnel in Pokot reported that they noted improvements in reporting after they trained media groups working in the area.

Though not widely employed in the KC at this time, radio could serve a calming function by providing information at a key moment of crisis. Radio reports of peace treaties being reached or the return of cattle, help to establish patterns and expectations that allow people to respect the rule of law because they gain greater confidence that it functions.

## **D. Impressions of Groups Engaged in CPMR Activities**

In the forgoing presentation of peace capacities, we have presented examples of a range of organizations currently involved in CMPR and related activities at the local and district level, national NGOs, international NGOs, church-based organizations, national governments, regional governmental organizations, and donors/funding organizations.

This mosaic of groups provides ample experience and knowledge of most of the issues raised in this assessment report. Table 3 below provides a summary of group names, their major areas of development focus, the geographic regions that they work in, and brief comments from the team’s observations.

<b>Table 3: CPMR Groups in the Karamoja Cluster</b>			
<b>International NGOS, Donor Partners, and other International Organizations</b>			
<b>Group Name</b>	<b>Development Focus</b>	<b>Geographic Region</b>	<b>Comments</b>
OAU/IBAR	Animal health, CPMR (organizes and facilitates communities to come together for peace talks; builds on traditional methods of negotiation and reconciliation; supports women's peace crusades; makes use of modern AV media)	Regional in KC area	Important, knowledgeable and experienced partner, responsive, professional, and well respected in the field by community members and NGOS. Sound knowledge of pastoralist development system and social structures. Excellent entry point to pastoral societies through community veterinary program. Since beginning its efforts to reduce conflict in the KC three years ago, has been an important actor involved in conflict reduction activities. As an interstate OAU entity, well placed to coordinate and facilitate cross-border initiatives. In spite of these advantages, IBAR is thinly staffed, making expansion of follow up of activities difficult.
The Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD)	Broad development goals, and Conflict Early Warning Response Mechanism CEWARN	KC Cluster, Great Lakes, Greater Horn	CEWARN has been approved by the heads of states and governments of IGAD member states. The implementation process is underway. At a different level, IGAD houses the Sudan Peace Process.
World Vision - POKATUSA	POKATUSA is a three year cross-border (Kenya-Uganda) World Vision project (2000-2003) funded by DFID. It seeks to reduce violent conflict among four ethnic groups: Pokot, Karamojong, Turkana and Sabiny. The stated purpose is to enable the four communities to develop, better understand and maintain mechanisms for sustainable peace.	KC Cluster Pokot, Kenya and Uganda; Turkana	POKATUSA is thinly staffed and has limited funds. The staff is drawn from the pastoral and agro-pastoral groups of the KC and neighboring peoples. It has a presence in key districts of the KC. Pokatusa is currently the lead agency for conflict reduction in Turkana district. Quality and impact of Pokatusa activities differ considerably between districts in Kenya and Uganda.
Oxfam GB	Poverty reduction, secure livelihoods, reduction of root causes of conflict through policy advocacy and establishment of local, national and regional structures for peacebuilding.	Provincial, national and regional levels	<p>Works through partnerships and networks with other NGOS, CBOs and government organizations; capacity strengthening for peacebuilding work; building on existing traditional channels and experiences for peacebuilding; research and documentation of experiences and lessons.</p> <p>Experienced professional organization. Main actor in establishment of national steering committees in Kenya and Uganda as a tool for influencing policy and action on conflict reduction. Developed good relations with government at different levels. This is essential for policy influencing and increasing government response to conflict. Ability to work with different types of CPMR groups-government, NGOs, religious organizations, CBOs, policy makers and politicians</p> <p>Previous strong presence in Uganda KC, developed new conflict strategy, posted someone to work on early warning. In Kenya, Oxfam works in 10 districts covered by the World Bank, in coordination with Government of Kenya (Office of the President) Arid Lands Resource Management Project (ALRMP).</p>
Lutheran World Federation	CPMR, community development	KC Cluster (Uganda)	Long term commitment to KC. LWF runs the oldest community development project in Karamoja. Good experience throughout East Africa.

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<b>International NGOS, Donor Partners, and other International Organizations</b>			
<b>Group Name</b>	<b>Development Focus</b>	<b>Geographic Region</b>	<b>Comments</b>
Intermediate Technology Development Group (ITDG)	Natural resource management, animal health; conflict management Works with regional peace committees composed of Turkana, Merille of Ethiopia and Nyangatom of Sudan; also works with other CPMRs in facilitating peace meetings	Cross border conflict areas (Turkana, Merille in Ethiopia, Nyangatom in Sudan)	ITDG has considerable experience working in pastoral areas of northern Kenya, including the KC. Its work in pastoral development is innovative and respected. It has recently established a Conflict Resolution component, headed by an experienced and well qualified individual in Nairobi. The ITDG staff in Turkana District play a key role in conflict reduction activities there, including facilitating OAU/IBAR workshops and Women's Crusades in Kenya, Sudan and Uganda. One ITDG focus is the cross border (Kenya-Ethiopia) Turkana-Merille conflict.
Dutch Development Organization (SNV)	Natural resources management, CPMR	West Pokot, Turkana	SNV implements Netherlands-funded (much of it from CORDAID) pastoral development activities in many parts of Kenya including: Turkana, West Pokot, Marsabit, Samburu, Keiyo and Marakwet. SNV supports OAU/IBAR workshops and meetings by providing transport and at least one facilitator. Through its support to SARDEP, SNV is involved with NCCK in a joint project in the Kerio Valley that has potential to prove an important model of integrated peacebuilding and natural resource management/socio-economic development.
Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS)	Emergency assistance, refugees, conflict cessation, resettlement	Southern Sudan	A large number of cooperating NGOS in Sudan, limited opportunity to observe
CORDAID	Pastoral development, development, relief, drought management and conflict management	Eastern Africa	CORDAID is a major player in pastoralist development in Eastern Africa, and the Regional representative emphasized that CORDAID is interested in and open to collaboration in conflict management and related fields.
<b>National NGOS, CSOs, Government Entities and Ecumenical Organizations</b>			
<b>Group Name</b>	<b>Development Focus</b>	<b>Geographic Region</b>	<b>Comments</b>
National Council of Churches of Kenya Development Programme (NCCK)	Community development; peacebuilding to reduce suffering	Kenya: works in Pokot, Kerio and Marakwet areas; also works in other conflict areas in Kenya	Well known as an advocacy and peacebuilding organization, having been involved in peace work since the 1992 tribal clashes in Rift Valley. A grass root organization that has developed trust among communities. Has recently developed a joint strategy with SARDEP <sup>46</sup> that recognizes the link between conflict management and development. Based on their comparative strength, NCCK is to implement the peacebuilding component while SARDEP implements the development component.
ALRMP	Resource management Conflict reduction Facilitates establishment of peace committees at	10 ASAL districts in Kenya including Turkana Focus is on	Long experience in the area As a government organization, ALRMP is in a good position to influence government policy and to coordinate peacebuilding work between different

<sup>46</sup> The Semi-Arid Rural Development Programme (SARDEP) is a program of SNV Kenya, operating in Keiyo and Marakwet as well as Kajiado and Laikipia. Although SARDEP is not currently operating in KC, its activities and linkages with CPMR's have an influence on development and peacebuilding in the region.

<b>Table 3: CPMR Groups in the Karamoja Cluster</b>			
<b>International NGOS, Donor Partners, and other International Organizations</b>			
<b>Group Name</b>	<b>Development Focus</b>	<b>Geographic Region</b>	<b>Comments</b>
	district, divisional and community levels Works closely with other development and peacebuilding organizations	conflicts within Kenya' s borders	actors
Action for Development of Local Communities (ADOL)	Applied research, analysis, planning	Uganda, Moroto and Kotido Districts	USAID supported, worked on Jinja small arms conference and experience in KC
Africa Peace Forum	Regional peacebuilding organization coordinated by Bethuel Kiplagat, Ambassador and former Permanent Secretary, Kenya Foreign Ministry.	Covers the Horn of Africa and Great Lakes region	APF has been particularly active in the Sudan in encouraging the IGAD peace process for Sudan with contacts between both foreign ministries, heads of state, bilateral aid organizations and with prominent NGOS. APF is also active in peacebuilding among parties to the conflicts in the Great Lakes region. Has developed Great Lakes network. USAID partner
Peace Net	Umbrella organization for NGOs involved in peacebuilding; works through networks	North Rift, including Pokot and Turkana, Western and North Eastern Kenya	Being an umbrella organization, Peace Net would play an important role in providing information on organizations involved in peace work. Good organization for training in peacebuilding and conflict response. Draws on framework developed at Eastern Mennonite University and Responding to Conflict Program in Birmingham, England. Also works on early warning in the Kenya portion of the KC.
Coalition for Peace in Africa (COPA)	Peacebuilding focus	Kenya	Grew out of graduates of the Birmingham Responding to Conflict (RTC) program but membership GOEs much beyond that now. Important player in peacebuilding. Works closely with Peace Net (their offices share the same compound in Nairobi). Their focus is grassroots training in peacebuilding and networking in a manner complementary with Peace Net. Good organization for training in peacebuilding and conflict response. Draws on framework developed at Eastern Mennonite University and Responding to Conflict Program in Birmingham, England.
Larjour Consultancy	Research, arms proliferation	Sudan, with Nairobi office	Based in Nairobi, Larjour Consultancy carried out field research in the Sudan and prepared a background paper (on illicit firearms proliferation and the implications for security and peace in the Sudan, Kenya and Uganda border region) for the November 2001 Jinja Small Arms Conference.
Security Research and Information Centre (SRIC)	Research	Kenya	Based in Nairobi, SRIC carried out research in northwestern Kenya and prepared a background paper (on the proliferation of small arms in the North Rift region of Kenya) for the November 2001 Jinja Small Arms Conference.
Nairobi Peace Initiative (NPI-Africa)	Conflict research, training and capacity building	All conflict areas in Kenya	One of the oldest organizations involved in peacebuilding (since 1994). Often works with WANEP, the W. Africa Network for Peacebuilding, based in Ghana
Center for Conflict Resolution (CECORE)	CPMR, training, institutional strengthening, networking, advocacy, research	Uganda, Great Lakes, Greater Horn	Kampala-based, a professionalized NGO, contacts in field but not field-based, a service provider

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<b>Group Name</b>	<b>Development Focus</b>	<b>Geographic Region</b>	<b>Comments</b>
Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI)	CPMR, rapid response, peacebuilding, outreach to victims, advocacy	Uganda, Kitgum, Pader, Kotido, Moroto, Katakwi, Districts	A vibrant and influential young organization, played a key role in bringing peace to Kitgum in the wake of Lord's Resistance Army, brokered peace with the Jie through connections with church and mosque leaders in Kotido, working with Karamoja/Teso conflict to reduce tensions. Nearly every one that team spoke with was admiring of their work. Represents an important model.
Church of Uganda	Human rights, community development, CPMR	Uganda, Moroto, Kotido (present in all districts)	An important ally and resource for knowledge of communities and access, short visit in Kotido did not allow adequate opportunity to observe
New Sudan Council of Churches	Human rights, CPMR, emergency assistance	Southern Sudan, (office in Nairobi)	No opportunity to observe directly. The Episcopal Church of Sudan and the Roman Catholic Church initiated the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) in 1989 in Torit, eastern Equatoria. The Presbyterian Church of Sudan, the Africa Inland Church and the Sudan Interior Church are now also members of NSCC. Due mainly to the war in the south, NSCC moved to Nairobi in 1990 where they began to adopt a major focus on peace and reconciliation leading to the People-to-People peace process initiated in 1997. NSCC seeks to speak as one voice for the churches of southern Sudan. Runs a People-to-People initiative in the south – while this does not work directly in KC, it does have a modest spillover effect in lessening tensions in S. Sudan.
Diocese of Torit		Sudan (headquarters in Lokichokio, Kenya)	No opportunity to observe directly.
Anglican Church of Kenya – The Diocese of Kitale		Turkana, West Pokot, Marakwet and Trans Nzoia districts.	The ACK Diocese of Kitale covers Turkana, West Pokot, Marakwet and Trans Nzoia districts. The Bishop has been a key player in peace efforts for many years. Works closely with NCKK and POKATUSA. The Bishop is very concerned with the current negative image of Pokot as the aggressors in their various conflicts.
Catholic Justice and Peace Programme -	Justice and human rights issues, conflict response	KC cluster	Found in both Uganda and Kenya, with different emphases in different areas. The Diocese of Eldoret has been very involved in the Pokot-Marakwet conflict. The Diocese of Kitale puts heavy emphasis on a rights-based approach. Has raised serious concerns about the security implications of large numbers of armed Pokot moving to Kenya in response to the GOU's Disarmament Campaign.
<b>Local and District Level NGOS, CSOs, etc.</b>			
<b>Group Name</b>	<b>Development Focus</b>	<b>Geographic Region</b>	<b>Comments</b>
Kotido Peace Initiative (KOPIN)	Conflict rapid response, conflict resolution, mediation, peacebuilding	Kotido District and neighboring districts, Uganda	Strong on the ground presence, closely integrated with kraal leaders
Karamoja Initiative for Sustainable Peace (KISP)	Conflict rapid response, reconciliation	Moroto and Kotido Districts, Uganda	Limited staff, project associated with EU Karamoja Project Implementation Unit so able to fund activities with some flexibility; seems quiescent at present but did fund dialogue efforts in 1998-2000. Lost funding in 2000. Know how to work with elders.
Mateniko Development	Community development,	Moroto and	They are a key player in facilitating women's groups

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<b>Group Name</b>	<b>Development Focus</b>	<b>Geographic Region</b>	<b>Comments</b>
Forum	conflict resolution, mediation	Nakapiripiri Districts	active in peacebuilding and generally organized for various community development initiatives.
Joint Kerio Valley Development Project	Multi-sectoral development	Kerio Valley in Merkwet District	NCKK and SNV/SARDEP are jointly developing this innovative approach that is based on deliberately combining peacebuilding efforts with a development project aimed at sustainable natural resource management and socio-economic development in the Kerio valley. Potentially, a promising model.
Conflict-reduction Sub-Committee of District Development Committee	CPMR, coordination, networking, institutional development	Turkana District	Composed of the major organizations working on CPMR in Turkana district: OAU/IBAR, ITDG, POKATUSA, OXFAM-GB, ALRMP. Works to coordinate and promote conflict reduction activities in the district and in cross-border areas (Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda, as well as West Pokot, Baringo and Samburu districts).
District Peace and Reconciliation Committee	CPMR, coordination, networking, institutional development	West Pokot and all other districts where POKATUSA has a presence	Established by POKATUSA in the districts in which it is working in Kenya and Uganda. In November 2001, DPRCs in West Pokot and Turkana districts still being set up and trained, but not yet formally approved by the provincial administration. Members are capable and knowledgeable, but primarily educated and Christian. DPRC does not include traditional leadership, a significant omission. Reported to be moribund in Kotido district, Uganda.
Toposa Development Association	CPMR, community development	Sudan, Eastern Equator	No opportunity to observe directly.

The team recognizes that any effective strategy on the part of USAID will entail partnering with a host of organizations, careful coordination, and mutually complimentary strategies. Not all organizations have the same functions nor should they. If engagement with local organizations is pursued, strategically it makes good sense to look to a set of local peacebuilding groups, but care should be taken to support the peacebuilding work they are already engaged in and build their capacity to undertake more. The developing strategy and programmatic aspects to support it should be a product of the local organizations, arrived at through continued dialogue.

Most CPMR groups emphasize building on existing traditional structures. While this is essential, it is equally important that these groups gain the capability to analyze the strong and weak aspects of traditional structures and strengthen those that are positive and have the potential to foster peace, equity and democracy.

CPMR activities are relatively new and there are many new organizations coming into this field. While some of the personnel working in this field have developed important skills and the expertise required to deal with the complex issues involved, many others have inadequate technical and social skills to effectively facilitate the process of negotiation and build the capacity of local groups and individuals for peacebuilding. Some of those interviewed felt that there is a gap in knowledge and skills and that appropriate training programs, research and increased access to information and relevant experiences would go a long way in strengthening CPMR capacities. Organizations such as Nairobi Peace Initiatives, Peace-Net, Centre for Conflict Resolution and Africa Peace Agenda could be supported to review on-going training

programs and based on the needs and existing gaps, develop and implement appropriate training programs for different target groups.

Some of the CMPR organizations are working towards developing "early warning and quick response" mechanisms at different levels - community, national and regional level. Such a system, if well planned and implemented would contribute substantially to reducing conflict. It however requires a collaborative approach with different stakeholders taking up different aspects. This is an area in which REDSO support could be vital.

Different CMPRs have tried to develop peace structures at different levels. It is clear that such structures are essential for creating dialogue, preventing conflict and facilitating healing, hence preventing recurring conflict. However, this needs to be coordinated so those different peace committees do not overwhelm communities. The coordination mechanism being established between CMPRs working in Turkana seems to have potential to serve this purpose.



## **VI. RECOMMENDED PROGRAMMATIC APPROACHES**

### **A. The Need for a Strategic Approach**

As the preceding sections make amply clear, issues related to conflict within and adjacent to the Karamoja Cluster are very complex, emotionally charged and politically sensitive. It would be easy to make mistakes in efforts to address the problems leading to conflict, and some programming interventions could have either no impact or perhaps even serve to exacerbate conflict. Designing and implementing an effective conflict reduction strategy requires considerable knowledge and constant monitoring of pastoral cultures and systems of natural resource management, the ethnic groups involved, the sometimes shifting relationships of the groups to one another, the political and administrative contexts, the external factors that have changed the nature of conflict, and the capacity of the peacebuilding and development organizations concerned. It is critical to note the dynamic nature of the situation on the ground, and to keep in mind accurately predicting incidents of violent conflict in this area is particularly difficult. Consequently the team believes that at a fundamental level, REDSO should commit itself to working directly with and supporting the activities of organizations already on the ground that have a firm understanding of local conditions, pastoral culture, and are engaged in innovative and promising CMPR activities. This should take priority over the temptation to start new programs or cultivate new organizations (unless particular and important goals or objectives are clearly going unmet).

### **B. Limits, Constraints, and Opportunities**

Subsequent to completion of the initial research and drafts of this document, a set of constraints has been articulated that necessitate a thorough rethinking of the recommended strategy. There are a handful of givens that guide the current approach:

- 1) REDSO is likely to be limited to no more than \$500,000 per year for programming against objectives in CMPR *and* Food Security in the KC.
- 2) REDSO will use the current PACT/MWENGO grant mechanism to disperse these funds. This mechanism requires a degree of competition for sub-grantees and has an estimated duration of 18 months. USAID has only a very limited ability to direct these funds. The new solicitation may also spend some finds in eastern Kenya and across into Somalia and Ethiopia. The PACT/MWENGO grant will likely be re-competed at the end of this period which will mean at least a minor discontinuity as a new grant administration mechanism is put in place. It can also tap limited funds left in CQUICK, a rapid response mechanism with approximately \$500,000 left in it.
- 3) All activities funded must be explicitly cross-border and the specific problems that are the focus of activities should span borders.

These criteria have led us to alter the draft recommendations presented in the original draft of this report. This section aims to provide a series of strategy options which emerge from the

substantive findings of the report and which the REDSO Mission can use to guide programming decisions in the near and medium term. The section ends with a set of broader recommendations that could serve long-term assistance strategy development and may be able to guide not only REDSO, but other stakeholders as well.

## **C. Strategy Options**

### ***Strategy Option 1: FOCUS ON REGIONALLY RELEVANT ISSUE OR INITIATIVE***

The focus on a regional issue or set of related issues would not be conflict specific but rather issue driven. The logic here is that because there are multiplicities of conflicts and given the adaptive and unpredictable nature of pastoral conflicts in this area, working at a level slightly higher than particular conflicts (e.g. Jie-Acholi or Pokot-Marakwet) is a useful and needed contribution. Further, the assessment team believes that a focus on linking development and conflict response is vital. Thus, possible issues that REDSO could use as foci for grant making decisions that are highly relevant to conflict drivers explored by the assessment team include: cattle health, cattle rustling prevention strategies, negotiated inter-group bride price controls, peace radio infrastructure and content, disarmament efforts, advocacy on behalf of pastoralist issues and concerns, and cross-border resource access.

**Cattle Health:** In the area of cattle health, REDSO could look to support the ongoing and successful work of OAU/IBAR and their stakeholder community organizations. OAU/IBAR uses an innovative notion of community participatory veterinary service provision. This in turn has provided them a natural and compelling leverage point for access to some of the most at-risk communities in the KC. By pursuing a series of community reconciliation activities between many groups within the KC, OAU/IBAR provides both important specific contributions to conflict response and a useful model for other organizations to adapt to particular development issues. Chief among the lessons seem to be that successful conflict response needs to have immediate relevance to the community and be linked to other concrete issues that communities care about. Additionally, community involvement and grass-roots participation are placed at a premium in this approach. Additional success may be garnered to the degree that OAU/IBAR is able to forge more meaningful linkages between their own activities and those of local NGOS, religious leaders, and others who are rooted in the particular communities in which they work.

**Cattle Rustling Prevention:** In meetings with Ugandan Parliamentarians, the team was made aware of a variety of mechanical methods that may be used to deter cattle theft and rustling, some of these have been promoted by the Uganda Government's Anti-Stock Theft Unit (ASTU). By inserting a coded but invisible identity tag under the cow's skin, an owner can then identify their cattle in the event of theft. Widespread use of this or related methods could make the identification of stolen cattle nearly foolproof. This would result in the resale value of cattle stolen for commercial raiding to drop and allow for easy identity of cows stolen and absorbed into the perpetrator's herds. Used in conjunction with other methods for CMPR, this tool might enable easier enforcement and reduce incentives to raid or steal cattle. For successful implementation there would need to be community buy-in to the practice of both cattle identification as well as the modalities for assuring verification of cattle ownership. Buy-in

would be most efficiently generated through community meetings, media campaigns, and through state and NGO offices. The governments would also have to participate as the proper functioning of police or security forces would be relied on for enforcement. Further study and analysis of the potential benefits and liabilities of various mechanical contributions to changing incentives may be warranted.

**Bride Price Controls:** High and rising bride price was identified as a major conflict driver by a number of informants. The assessment team did not however run across any group that had made efforts to negotiate lower bride prices in the KC however there is precedence for such efforts in other parts of Uganda including local referenda to limit or alter the nature of bride price.<sup>47</sup> This does not mean this it has not been tried in the KC, but it was not evident at the time of the assessment team's fieldwork. Such efforts have also been tried successfully among the Wajir and also among Fulani pastoralists in West Africa. In the latter case, particular clans, and sub-ethnicities have been persuaded to "deflate" unsustainable bride prices through a process of community education and negotiation. Study of the feasibility and participatory design of the modalities of such an effort in the KC could be the focus of a useful grant. Because of the direct relevance to all KC groups and immediate potential benefits that a successful effort could provide, REDSO might want to consider support for a model program of this nature as well.

**Peace Radio Infrastructure and Content:** The vast distances and few roads of the Cluster hinder effective communication. Broadcasting information over the radio has the potential to be an effective means of overcoming such communication difficulties, however, in much of the KC, radio infrastructure is very weak. As reported above, there are large areas of the cluster that are not accessible to radio broadcasts. Mountains can block the transmission of radio signals and even the national radio stations do not have universal full-time coverage in this area.

Under these circumstances, it might be appropriate to fund the construction of transmission stations and support other infrastructure improvements. USAID is unlikely to have the funds for infrastructure, but may be able to make important contributions by seeking partnerships with other donors. Small grants that improve the reach of existing stations or that support the development and production of CMPR materials for broadcast could also be strategically important. Broadcasts might include programs directed at peacebuilding and culture change as well as those that meet the practical needs of pastoralist peoples. In addition, radio can be used as an important mechanism for changing general public attitudes toward pastoralists. Increasing public understanding of pastoralist problems and diminishing public disdain could ultimately result in improved policies toward the KC and increased development expenditures. Peace Radio content should follow recommendations from previous USAID supported research.<sup>48</sup>

**Disarmament Efforts:** There has been much recent publicity given to Ugandan President Museveni's efforts at disarming the Karamojong. Because the Ugandan government seems to be pursuing this effort with some vigor at the present time, and because there seems to be considerable sympathy for the efforts on the ground among the Karamojong, USAID/REDSO

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<sup>47</sup> [New Vision](http://allafrica.com/stories/200201080091.html) (Kampala) January 8, 2002 reported on such an effort in Tororo, Uganda. "Tororo Up in Arms Against Bride Price" <<http://allafrica.com/stories/200201080091.html>>

<sup>48</sup> Notably see the USAID/REDSO document "The Effectiveness of Civil Society Organizations in Controlling Violent Conflicts and Building Peace." <http://www.usaid.gov/regions/afr/conflictweb>.

should consider further support for these efforts. That said, support should be informed and targeted because of the findings of this assessment and many other analysts that disarmament can prove destabilizing and dangerous for those disarmed if the larger context of easily accessible guns in the region is not dealt with.

Ultimately the employment of guns can be seen as symptomatic of violent relationships while at the same time their potential to escalate violence to dramatic levels is extremely problematic. Assistance to buttress disarmament efforts may be best placed in support of groups that develop effective strategies for protecting disarmed groups from predation by still armed neighbors. This may include CSOs, community groups, or others who interact with the military or police to assist in more effective provision of citizen security. Alternatively REDSO could support those NGOs that engage in monitoring the impact of the disarmament process and then use this information for advocacy, or direct peacebuilding efforts between newly conflicting groups.

While these may offer areas to support the disarmament efforts, it is important to recognize that without multi-country and cross-border efforts, disarmament is not likely to fare well in practice. Without effective protection and predictable citizen security, the long-term prospects for voluntary, induced, or forced disarmament are very dim in Karamoja. On balance, guns will remain as long as they remain relevant and political instability in Sudan and lack of complete control of border zones in Uganda, Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya all mitigate against a single country effort. Attempts to reduce the number or availability of guns may have temporary destabilizing effects in the uncertain border areas that the KC encompasses and USAID should be attentive to this likelihood.

**Cross-border Resource Access:** Land tenure and land access issues are a key component of any long-term development strategy for the KC and have in the past proven to be a common cause of conflict at macro, proximate, and trigger levels. The sustainability of the pastoral mode of production demands access to dry season and drought reserve grazing areas by various KC groups on a seasonal, annual, and or occasional basis. This moving mosaic of individual groups, meteorological shifts, economic development choices, and political forces make for an extremely complex mix. The Action Plan that emerged from the Jinja Small Arms Conference recognized the need for “governments to facilitate pastoral communities controlled or free movement across the borders” precisely to accommodate this bundle of factors that impact directly on conflict in the KC.

REDSO could focus grant resources on groups that would 1) review the considerable existing knowledge on the subject; 2) conduct further applied research to identify specific resource access problems and suggest potential mid-term and long-term solutions; and 3) engage in advocacy with relevant governments to implement suggested reforms or policies to ease tensions on issues of land tenure and land access.

### ***Strategy Option II: DISSEMINATE SUCCESSFUL MODELS***

The assessment team is aware of at least one highly successful cluster of CMPR activities that have been employed in an area similar in many regards to the KC. The Wajir model (and other successful measures) could become a strategic focus for REDSO. USAID resources could focus

on trying to transplant key aspects of the Wajir model to the KC. In 1993, conditions in the Wajir district looked in many ways similar to contemporary KC. Intense drought in the early 1990s had led to a series of violent conflicts, refugees and weapons were passing back and forth over international boundaries either to escape or in search of conflict, and hijackings, looting, arson, rape, and murder were commonplace. “It was in this atmosphere that the Wajir women’s peace initiative began.”<sup>49</sup> Ultimately this modest movement served as a central organizing mechanism for the mobilization of actors across the district and beyond in search of solutions to the chronic mistrust between clans and others and the resultant violence.

The key aspects of the Wajir success seem to include the following factors:

- An active and committed grass-roots group (in this case, it began as a women’s NGO and evolved into the Wajir Peace and Development Committee). This points to the vital importance of community involvement, community commitment, and grass roots driven project support that ensure ownership of CMPR activities.
- Partnerships between NGOS, business leaders, religious leaders, government officers, security personnel, clan elders, youth, and others. All voices were brought in and participation in the process was seen as an all-important method that would assure both commitment on the part of participants, but also that a variety of voices and a multiplicity of ideas could shape holistic solutions.
- The development of a “hybrid institution” that brings together the clan elders, local political leaders, and NGOS to guide and focus development efforts and CMPR activities. The use of traditional community healing and cleansing ceremonies is also an important method employed here that has also demonstrated success in other KC contexts. This can be profitably combined with hybrid institutions to bring to bear all community resources.
- Community dialogue served as a first step, promoted by clan leaders and political representatives alike. Dialogue led to peace agreements and then a Rapid Response Team was set up to diffuse tension and mediate new triggers as they come up.
- Of critical importance has been the Wajir Peace and Development Committee’s effort to concentrate on conflict and development issues hand in hand. “Drought is one of the major contributors to poverty and poverty is also one of the contributors to the escalation of conflict to violence. Anticipating drought and early intervention saved lives and also livelihood of the people affected.” Such linking of development and conflict is also consistent with a central finding of the current assessment and should feature prominently in REDSO grant making in the KC.

In addition to Wajir, there are a number of other successful models and approaches that recommend themselves and that have been developed in the KC itself. These include some the issues that are featured under Strategy Option I above as well as local approaches identified in Section V above. Of note, REDSO could consider the nascent but promising actions of the local NCKK and SNV where they are combining their skills in joint peacebuilding and development activities in the Kerio Valley. These groups have come together in the context of the Turkana District, District Level Sub-Committee on Conflict, which includes representatives of POKATUSA, OUA/IBAR, Oxfam GB, ITDG, and the Arid Lands Project.

<sup>49</sup> “Wajir Peace Initiative – Kenya Back to Future Dialogue and Cooperation” by Fitzroy Nation <http://www.euconflict.org/euconflict/publicat/nl2.1/page3.html>

A POKATUSA model is another potential source for REDSO support under this strategy option. Similar in many respects to the Wajir model, POKATUSA combines community peacebuilding activities through community dialogue and rapid response to conflict events with the ongoing work of community religious leaders. It has the added advantage that the POKATUSA program currently operates on both the Uganda and Kenya sides of the border (however in at least one locality in Uganda the POKATUSA project had experienced many internal administrative problems that had resulted in a temporary cessation of project activities).

There are a number of possible activities that are suggested if REDSO desires to take the approach of disseminating the successful model of Wajir and other selected successful models.

- Fieldtrips for idea seeding. REDSO could support grants that sponsor fieldtrips to Wajir, Kenya to witness the coordination of development and conflict response activities and to explore the “hybrid institutions” of customary authorities and state structure. These ideas could then be pursued in the context of further support for similar locally led initiatives in the KC.
- It is indeed difficult to “create” with project support the type of local initiative and drive that animated the Wajir experience, however, many similar minded and demonstrably committed individuals and groups are already active in the KC. Facilitating ongoing work with small grants after idea seeding would likely prove advantages for the further development of the capacity of some of the more exemplary efforts that have been highlighted in this report.
- Given the prominent place that networking has played in Wajir, grants to support facilitators and network builders seem likely to pave the way for greater levels of cooperation across social, political, and occupational gaps in the KC as well.
- Support for community dialogue activities and rapid response committees to consolidate gains from the dialogue are both important. Wajir participants in these activities could be used to share their experiences in the KC. Exchanges that bring key Wajir figures to the KC would make this possible. REDSO should also pay attention to the fact that many times those who provide vital functions to the success of these local initiatives are not always the most visible community leaders of clan elders. Often lower level administrators or social entrepreneurs are driving successful efforts and a concerted strategy to identify such individuals in Wajir may be important to avoid passing on general platitudes and instead promoting the sharing of concrete strategies.
- Provide support for organizations like the Turkana District, District Level Sub-Committee on Conflict. As a group, they have a deep understanding of the conflict issues and are actively working to solve a variety of conflict drivers. The individuals are all from this district or neighboring districts and are bright, well-educated and capable professionals. Their initial efforts could be encouraged and strengthened by modeling their activities to other districts and providing institutional capacity strengthening resources to this group in the process. This type of small-grant targeting allows REDSO to leverage two objectives (that of publicizing and disseminating a successful model and that of capacity building) with a smaller amount of assistance. These types of opportunities should be sought out whenever possible.
- Promote the use of blended CMPR activities that take seriously the potential contributions of community healing and cleansing as well as other blended modalities for conflict response.

### ***Strategy Option III: GEOGRAPHIC CLUSTER***

The final (and least preferred) strategy recommendation would be a focus on one or at the most two specific conflict relationships. This would allow REDSO to concentrate resources on a narrower geographic focus (still bearing in mind REDSO's regional mandate) and try to “bulk” activities in that area. This strategy might successfully be pursued by focusing on a small number of pilot activities and then expand out from that geographic base as methods are tested and found to work. One approach to a narrower geographic focus would be to choose a set of conflict relationships (see the two diagrams that lay out the relationships of the Pokot and Turkana in Section II above respectively as an example of what is meant here). REDSO could then sponsor work on improving those relationships, trying again to establish models that can be replicated throughout the cluster over time.

Because of the nature of pastoralism, it is difficult to fix with precision the identifying characteristics of a “cross-border” conflict. Some conflict relationships include groups that are only occasionally in conflict over international borders and who may at times have cooperative relations (the Turkana – Jie for example) or groups that may straddle borders but only a particular sub-group is actually in conflict with other groups inside of the borders. (There are large populations of Pokot inside Uganda and they are often in conflict with Karamojong sub-groups, but for the most part, these are not the same Pokot groups that are in conflict with the Marakwet in Kenya.) Those conflict systems that seem to respond most convincingly to the REDSO criteria of cross-border include the following:

- 1) Turkana-Toposa (Kenya/Sudan)
- 2) Pokot – Karamojong (Kenya/Uganda)
- 3) Turkana – Dodoth (Kenya/Uganda)
- 4) Turkana – Pokot (Kenya primarily/Uganda)

*Three of these conflicts (highlighted in bold) are described in great detail in Annex D on page 77 of this report. In addition, suggested programming interventions with potential implementers are provided for the three in the Annex.*

## **D. Long Range Strategy Considerations**

The final headings of this section summarize a number of general assessment findings that should be taken account of as REDSO or other donors embark on long range strategy formation and in planning with other donors and stakeholders in the KC. These points have informed our three strategy options presented above and should be further integrated into future planning.

### ***The Need to Integrate Conflict Resolution with Socioeconomic Development***

Sound CPMR activities can be very helpful in reducing violent conflict, but these efforts alone cannot and will not solve the underlying problems that engender violence in the Karamoja Cluster. Broad and effective socioeconomic development to overcome the deep and pervasive poverty of the area is essential if lasting peace is to be built and sustained. **Socioeconomic**

**development and peacebuilding are in effect two sides of the same coin**, and well designed and effective efforts need to be made on both fronts. Similar conclusions were drawn by those interviewed at all levels: pastoralists themselves at grassroots meetings with the assessment team and at workshops, leaders of pastoral communities, staff of CPMR organizations working in national capitals and the field, staff of organizations involved in social and economic development, as well as officials of bilateral and multilateral development agencies. The participants at the November 2001 Workshop held in Jinja on Small Arms emphasized this conclusion in the workshop's *"Action Plan and Way Forward."*

While much successful conflict response in the KC is likely to be a product of individual and group dialogue, conflict response should also include an advocacy component in virtually all cases. NGOs and other stakeholders engaged in conflict response must provide justification and policy relevance to their local and national political leaders to ensure political and financial support. Enabling environments can be improved and state actions that aggravate conflict situations can be avoided or reduced when advocacy engages decision makers. Public awareness of and engagement in key issues can also be enhanced through advocacy. Sometimes informal advocacy is the most productive approach at local levels. For example, the informal efforts of church groups in Kotido, Uganda were enhanced considerably when they intergrated their activities with those of local government authorities. Authorities provided vehicles for rapid response, donors provided fuel, and church groups provide conflict response and mitigation expertise. Developing a constituency for conflict response at all levels (inside the KC, in the individual nations, and at the regional level) is an ongoing challenge that a wide array of advocacy techniques can be expected to address.

So there is a real need to develop a broad approach to deal with the many interrelated problems **by integrating CPMR and socioeconomic development**. Real opportunities for alternative livelihoods need to be developed if the underlying pressures are to be dealt with successfully. This combination of activities will require the:

- successful involvement of all key stakeholders
- genuine participation by grassroots pastoralists
- effective local level involvement and decision making for both CPMR and development activities
- a sound approach to gender issues
- appropriate applied research
- effective advocacy to bring about appropriate policies and commitment at the highest levels
- high quality, relevant training
- high quality, basic education
- well designed and well implemented programs and projects
- effective M&E to learn lessons of experience in order to improve programs and methods.



### *Should the Peoples of the Karamoja Cluster Abandon Pastoralism?*

It is likely that the majority of Kenyans and Ugandans living outside the KC **consider pastoral culture to be the basic problem** underpinning violent conflict within the Cluster, and between KC groups and others. They therefore contend that the solution to violent conflict is to convert pastoralists into settled farmers, businessmen, teachers and civil servants. Interestingly, this view is also fairly widespread among well-educated individuals of pastoral origin. This perspective reflects the efforts and teachings of mainstream missionaries over the past 100 years, although some missions have supported and continue to support the continuation of pastoralism. Significantly, although the Government of Uganda has declared that it is committed to the development of Karamoja, and has established the Karamoja Development Agency, it has also stated that pastoralism is backward and should be abandoned in favor of settled agriculture.

Pastoralism, however, is the **most effective system of natural resource management** in the Karamoja Cluster, as well as in many other semi-arid and virtually all other arid areas of Eastern Africa. This point is widely recognized by specialists in the field of pastoralist development and by those actually practicing pastoralism.<sup>50</sup> Pastoralists' systems of NRM use the limited natural resources for the benefit of relatively large numbers of people, certainly far higher human populations than can be supported by other economic activities in the area as a whole. If pastoralism were seriously undermined by alternative development activities in the remaining dry season and reserve grazing areas, the problems of the pastoral residents of the Karamoja Cluster would increase enormously.

Most residents of the cluster consider those able to practice pastoralism to be very fortunate compared to those who have been forced to drop out of pastoralism. Pastoralists want to maintain their way of life. Yet pastoralism today provides only limited opportunities for young men and women, while the opportunities outside the pastoral system are extremely limited to both pastoralists and dropouts.

It is unrealistic to think that the residents of the KC can abandon pastoralism and take up settled agriculture. Many in the Cluster already practice agro-pastoralism whenever they can, most notably in parts of Uganda and Sudan. However, even if the residents wanted to (and some may well want to) there simply is not enough good quality agricultural land in the KC to make this a realistic alternative. West Pokot has good agricultural land in the highlands, but certainly not enough for the large number of Pokot living on the plains. Turkana District has very little land where rainfed agriculture can be practiced on a sustainable basis.<sup>51</sup> There is already tremendous competition for good quality agricultural land in Kenya among the residents of the highlands.

A major effort to promote a switch to agriculture in the Karamoja Cluster could have serious implications for the future of pastoralism as farming would have to be attempted in the areas now used as dry season grazing areas. Well-designed, relatively small-scale irrigation schemes could be appropriate, and there is some evidence of success with such schemes in the region. There is, however, the need to ensure that the irrigation schemes complement and do not undermine

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<sup>50</sup> A widely quoted work is *Living With Uncertainty: New Directions in Pastoral Development in Africa*, edited by Ian Scoones.

<sup>51</sup> Over one forty-year period, the mean annual rainfall at Lodwar was 166mm (6.5 inches).

pastoral systems of NRM. Large-scale irrigation schemes in pastoral areas of Eastern Africa were long ago judged environmental and economic disasters.

### *The Need for Effective Inter-State and Regional Conflict Reduction Mechanisms*

As noted, the Karamoja Cluster is located in four countries: Kenya, Uganda, Sudan and Ethiopia. Some of the groups that make up the cluster overlap the international borders, and members of other groups cross international borders as part of their semi-nomadic movement patterns. Factors external to the Cluster (the civil war in Sudan, the enormous increase in the availability and use of guns, politicization of conflict, governments' inability to provide protection to the residents, government' inappropriate policies and commercial raiding) have a huge influence on the level and nature of violence in the KC. There is clearly a need for effective regional and inter-state mechanisms to address and deal with the cross-border and regional problems involved.

A potentially promising initiative, an interstate and intrastate conflict early warning and response (CEWARN) mechanism hosted by IGAD, has been approved by the seven member states of the Horn of Africa. Article 8 of the protocol establishing CEWARN indicates, "individual clusters of member states experiencing common security problems, such as livestock rustling, may form Sub-Regional Peace Councils, or refer such problems to existing bilateral arrangements."<sup>52</sup> IGAD and OAU/IBAR have begun consultations about working together in the KC. The assessment team spent several days in northwest Kenya with staff of OAU/IBAR's Pastoral Communities Harmonization Initiative that works in all four countries of the Cluster. USAID/REDSO is already supporting CEWARN and helping establish country and local level CEWERUs. This is an important mechanism for alerting government actors, NGOs and donors to changing conditions and rising tensions so that actions can be taken. While the conflict analysis unit of IGAD is at an early stage, as soon as it proves possible, REDSO should consider directing specific efforts to expanding what seems to be an already nascent early warning system in the KC. Examples given earlier in this paper demonstrate that various parties do keep an eye on raids and retaliation and do try to work together to organize a response to prevent escalation.

Sponsoring continuing efforts, such as the recent Jinja workshop, on efforts to grapple with the regional aspects of arms trading and movement could make good sense. Possibly this can be done through IGAD. Important disarmament lessons can be learned from the Wajir experience in Kenya (In 1998, hundreds were killed by Ethiopian raiders after a disarmament).

There is also a wider regional context that affects the KC. For example, the ban imposed in the Arabian peninsula on the import of livestock from East Africa has an impact. USAID's REDSO office is currently discussing the need to look more systematically at trade barriers and the possibilities for cooperation in the region.

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<sup>52</sup> See the forthcoming volume *Early Warning and Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa* (eds. Ciru Mwaura and Susanne Schmeidl) for a detailed description of CEWARN, its design and current state of implementation.

### *The Need for Adequate Coordination*

In recent years there has been considerably increased interest by donors, NGOS, and inter-state organizations in conflict issues in Eastern Africa and the Great Lakes region. A number of organizations have initiated or expanded CPMR activities in the Cluster, particularly in Uganda. There is a real risk that there will be inadequate coordination of activities by the many organizations and groups involved. There is also the risk of efforts to direct CPMR work by remote control from Kampala or Nairobi. This report presents key elements of a strategy to reduce conflict in the Karamoja Cluster but also one that seeks to prevent or overcome both risks. USAID should consider supporting and fund the activities and directions set out below.

Organizing and carrying out effective CPMR activities in the often difficult conditions found in the Cluster can be significantly enhanced when skills, knowledge and experience are shared and coordinated by the organizations involved. The coordination and quality of conflict reduction activities the assessment team observed for one week in Turkana District deserve recognition and support. The approach also merits careful attention by donors and NGOS involved in CPMR activities elsewhere in the region. The coordination would proceed even more effectively if there were a common funding source, with common reporting requirements, for joint activities.

A parallel approach should also be taken in regard to promoting improved coordination of cross-border conflict reduction activities. **The CPMR work currently carried out in adjacent districts that are in different countries is often hampered by lack of close communication and coordination, a result of different systems of administration, policies, laws and other factors.** The work of OAU/IBAR should continue receiving support, and an external review of the Pastoral Communities Harmonisation Initiative should be undertaken with the aim of learning lessons and improving the performance. Efforts need to be made to share information and better coordinate activities by the organizations funding cross-border conflict reduction and development activities in the Cluster. USAID should initiate and contact and coordinate activities with other donors, such as CORDAID. One of the Cluster's groups, the Merille, lives in Ethiopia at the north end of Lake Turkana. Efforts to promote improved cross-border relations between the Turkana and Merille have been recently carried out by ITDG, POKATUSA and OAU/IBAR. USAID should consider expanding its coverage of the Cluster to include Ethiopia so that its work in the KC does not overlook this key conflict zone.

### *The need to Promote Exchanges of Experience*

**The USAID strategy should include promoting learning from experience and exchanging information within the individual countries of the Cluster and across the borders.** This point largely informs strategy Option 2 above. This component is particularly important as many of the CPMR activities and organizations are recent, and much is still exploratory. Activities would include funding workshops and supporting networking that actually provides useful information. A key aspect is to fund applied research on topics related to better understanding conflict and how best to reduce it. Such research should be directed at improving the operation of CPMR activities in the KC. Because of the exploratory nature of much of the CPMR work, it is critical that the organizations involved be supported to develop simple but effective M&E systems. A key objective of these systems would be to obtain both quantitative and qualitative information that could be used to guide and improve the implementation of the activities. Efforts

should be made to identify improved methods of tracking and assessing conflict reduction activities. A major objective of this component is to identify the “best practices” and disseminate this information in ways that are accessible by, for example, Community Based Organizations (CBOs) involved in CPMR activities.

The Need to integrate customary peacebuilding approaches into formal conflict reduction mechanisms and approaches

This step will be necessary in the Cluster because the traditional mechanisms there are still quite strong, although they have been undermined. The efforts in this field of ITDG and some other organizations should be supported. There should be examination of the opportunities to extend certain traditional practices beyond their current limits. In particular, the practice of paying traditional compensation for a murder (30-60 cattle in some communities) should be followed up. These practices now extend only to the boundary of an ethnic group, sometimes to only one section of an ethnic group. For example, if a Turkana kills a Pokot, there is no compensation and no way to arrange one. Extending the compensation to another group and, ideally to the entire Cluster and beyond would reduce the incidence of murder.

*Need to promote the involvement of women in CPMR activities*

Women play a traditional role as the conscience of the communities. In regard to conflict, most women are very upset by the current heightened levels and non-traditional nature of violence in the Cluster. At peacebuilding meetings, they spur men to face up to the issues regarding conflict and to make difficult choices. Women also have customary methods of discouraging the youth from stealing and raiding that should be supported. The elders traditionally dominate pastoral societies, and women have limited opportunity to be involved in decision making. This fact needs to be recognized and efforts made to overcome these limitations when promoting women’s greater involvement in conflict reduction.

## **VI. APPENDICES**

- A. USAID REDSO/GHA Conflict Assessment Protocol
- B. Interview Protocol
- C. Common Reporting Framework
- D. Descriptions Of Key Kc Conflicts
- E. Workshop Decisions Of The “Karamoja For Peaceful And Effective Disarmament”
- F. Individuals Consulted By The Team
- G. Selected List Of Documents

# APPENDIX A: USAID REDSO/GHA CONFLICT ASSESSMENT PROTOCOL

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## I. INTRODUCTION

This protocol is presented to guide the efforts of two research teams that are projected to carry out conflict assessment fieldwork and analysis for REDSO and USAID Missions on cross-border pastoralist conflicts in GHA over the next few months. The purpose of any research protocol is to assure a common approach and method sufficient to allow systematic comparison of data gathered by different researchers across time and or in a variety of settings. By following a few basic premises of comparative social science research and program evaluation methods, the research teams and analysts should be able to provide the three basic components of this study.<sup>53</sup> These are:

- 1) highly contextualized but systematic and ordered accounts of Causes of Conflict as well as Causes of Peace in the areas in which they conduct field work,
- 2) a summary characterization of the kinds of existing USAID and other donor activities that are already going on in the area of the conflict, with some assessment of whether, to what extent, and how effectively, they address the cause of conflict or capacities of peace;
- 3) a set of recommendations that suggest programming options that USAID can pursue to reduce the likelihood of violent conflict; and
- 4) baseline data for key S.O. performance indicators for REDSO and USAID/Uganda.

The next four sections of this protocol provide some guidance on how to approach these tasks. It is hoped that the protocol will prove useful in structuring the activities of the research teams. It is intended to be used as a suggestive checklist of key questions that provides a jumping off point to structure fieldwork and assure comparability across cases. It draws heavily on MSI's experience in conflict assessment in other conflict-prone settings and specifically in the Greater Horn of Africa Peacebuilding project, Phase I. We have found, for example, that frequent if not daily conversations among the members of the team as to what is being discovered and observed, cast in the terms of the protocol framework, is a fruitful way to formulate collectively the analytical significance of the often raw information that is being gathered.

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<sup>53</sup> A cottage industry exists of conflict early warning specialists and frameworks. Individual analysts and newly-arising organizations such as the Center for Preventive Action, the Forum for Early Warning and Response (FEWER), and the International Crisis Group have been publishing assessments of the potential for conflict in specific countries and regions. The purposes of the present set of assessments are both more modest and more targeted. Modest in that USAID is *not* attempting to produce a set of authoritative or predictive conclusions as to precisely which sets of violent conflicts are likely to arise and where, nor to provide a cookbook to programming that proceeds in a tightly deductive and literal manner. Targeted in that the assessments are both intra-national and cross-border in scope such that they demand careful attention to the particular socio-cultural and micro-political components of conflict as well as the larger structural and even inter-state implications.

However, the protocol does not demand strict and unswerving fidelity, and it is assumed that each research team will apply its own collective expertise to the tasks at hand and feel encouraged to posit hypotheses as it GOEs along, based on informed intuition. The teams should document their methods and approaches when they adapt or depart from the protocol in order to increase the analytic utility of each set of data that is produced.

## II. DIAGNOSIS OF THE CONFLICT SITUATION

The first challenge is to find a way to identify the ingredients of the conflict situation (the “problem”) in some methodical way so that specific facets of the contest that is going on between conflict and cooperation can be addressed through informed and well-targeted interventions that therefore have some chance of making a difference (i.e., the “solutions” conceptually speaking -- though with no pretence of omnipotence or finality).

Sources of Violent Conflicts The theory of conflict that this protocol assumes is that conflicts involve a perceived clash of interests, which can be pursued either violently and destructively or constructively. *Violent* international and intra-national conflicts (dependent variable) in the GHA can be thought of as emerging from various combinations of three types of interacting sources (independent variables) or Causes of Conflict. These Causes of Conflict (meaning violent conflict) are outlined in Table 1 below.

<b>Table 1 Causes of (Violent) Conflict</b>
<p><b>Structural/Conductive Factors:</b> These are underlying, pervasive, socio-economic and historical conditions that predispose communities to conflict (often called “root” causes), although they cannot by themselves cause violence. They normally change slowly over time and thus require long-term efforts to remedy. We can think of three general categories of structural problems: 1) competition over scarce and valued socio-economic resources; 2) the structure of communal identities and history and status of inter-communal attitudes and relations; and 3) macro-economic or environmental trends. Examples of structural factors include unemployment and economic stagnation, gross inequality, general poverty and physical need, a strong sense of ethnic or religious identity, degradation of the natural resource base, historic memories of inter-state tension or violence, etc.</p>
<p><b>Proximate/Enabling Factors:</b> These are the proximate, inter-mediating sources of conflict. They include institutional and political processes and organizations that define and aggregate the interests of people and mobilize and channel political and social activity in pursuit of those interests. These can be more amenable to change in the medium or short term though often requiring considerable effort. They can be divided roughly into four categories: 1) identity group mobilization; 2) official political/governing institutions and processes and the role they play in dividing or pitting interests against one another, such as by neglect, capture of assets by one side or another, or division of assets between groups; 3) non-governmental institutions and organized social processes such as trade in weapons, media, and civil society activities; and 4) interaction of middle-level elites. Examples of proximate factors include discriminatory government policies, inflammatory media, systematic governmental neglect of particular geographic areas, ethnically</p>

divided civil society groups, specific laws and policies determining land or resource allocation and access, access to arms, organized political challengers to central government, etc.

**Immediate/Triggering Factors:** These are the particular immediate actions, events, or circumstances that directly evoke or provoke specific time-bound instances of violent or coercive behavior. Examples include incendiary public speeches, violent acts themselves such as bombings or the assassination of prominent leaders, precipitous price drops, sudden weather changes, sudden death of herds through an epidemic, egregious human rights abuses, leadership succession decisions, etc. To some extent, triggers may overlap with the other two categories but it is useful to distinguish the precipitating factors in violence. For example, the decline in water availability due to sustained drought may be a factor that predisposes neighbors to violence but the sudden involvement by government in developing new sources of water may draw a reaction from those who believe that the resource is not being fairly shared.

Because the eruption and continuance of violent conflicts usually depends on the accumulation of several factors (and thus is multi-causal as well as contingent, not inevitable), it is important to look at all these possible levels in the chain of causation. It should be noted that the conflict sources at each level above may originate both from within the arena of the conflict studied and from outside that arena (such as, for example, the support of insurgencies by neighboring states or structural adjustment policies by the IMF). Thus, they may be local, regional-sub-national), national, or regional-supra-national).

Peace Capacities In addition, there usually will be present some peace capacities or “causes of peace” that are functioning to some degree to offset the pressures that are driving conflict, by preventing, mitigating or peacefully channeling them into constructive forms of (non-violent) conflict. For example, in the Karamojong area, there is a traditional practice of women getting together and complaining in song and verse when they are fed up with the behavior of men in the community. This practice has been effective in embarrassing men into taking action they might not otherwise have taken. It is now being used as a peacebuilding tool in the area. OAU/IBAR has funded “women’s crusades” to help women apply pressure in this culturally powerful form against raiding.

The value of deliberately looking for and describing these ameliorative factors as an integral part of the diagnosis of the conflict situation is that such trends and capacities within the arena of the conflict might suggest amenable entry points for external actors to reinforce. These Causes of Peace mirror the Causes of Conflict in that they can be organized around the same three overall categories.

These capacities may exist traditionally in a given community. They may also be developed, with assistance from outside the community, through development efforts and activities. Table 2 below summarizes illustrative examples under each variable.



<b>Table 2: Causes of Peace (Capacities for Peaceful Management of Conflicts)</b>
<p><b>Structural/Alleviating:</b> This category captures social, cultural, and economic factors that offset the following three categories: 1) competition over scarce socio-economic resources; 2) communal identity and structure and inter-communal attitudes and relations; and 3) macro-economic or environmental trends. Examples include a common historical experience, commercial relations and economic interdependency, and effective international, national, or local efforts targeted at economic growth and equity;</p>
<p><b>Proximate/Channeling:</b> This category captures institutions, process and policies that counteract the corresponding causes of conflicts: 1) institutions and channels that cross-cut "separate identity groups" cohesiveness; 2) political/governing institutions and processes that play conciliatory and accommodating roles; 3) inclusive non-governmental institutions such as media and religious groups; and 3) the negotiations and other interactions of elites that bridge social cleavages. Examples include activities that provide alternate peaceful channels for representing interests, cross-cutting interest groups (e.g., women across tribal boundaries organizing to press the government for more attention to resource problems that cause conflicts among men), changes in institutional rules that might move identity-oriented practice toward interest-based politics and increase the strength of cross-tribal groups promoting peace, mobilization and channeling political and social activity for advocacy on broad public issues, restrictions on ethnic-based or religion-based political parties, establishment of broad-based mechanisms for voice and accountability vis a vis local and national entities, effective and fair policing, promotion of fora for elites from different groups to talk in a neutral setting; systems for negotiating acceptable solutions to boundary disputes; efforts designed to enhance the natural resources base, education efforts to change ethnic prejudices, involvement by religious leaders in promoting tolerance, etc.</p>
<p><b>Immediate/Suppressing:</b> It is difficult to prevent specific violence-provoking events. But the probability and frequency of such events can be reduced, through effective deterrence and suppression by security forces, and their escalatory consequences can be contained through responsive actions such as crisis management actions and decisions that address sudden stress. What is also possible here is to establish early warning and response systems that provide timely information on flashpoints, organize quick and appropriate reactions to dampen the effect of a trigger, increase the protection of vulnerable groups, and provide steady micro-economic management.</p>

The inclusion of both of these two tables reveals that while this approach recognizes the important role of the lack of socioeconomic development, or so-called "roots" of conflict, as a cause, it is important not to unconsciously adopt the "boiling pot" model of conflict that often lies behind many current early warning reports. This "boiling pot" paradigm assumes that a growing laundry list of socio-economic distresses will mount up to produce violent conflicts, by themselves -- such as through mass violence erupting spontaneously, or general frustration being tapped by extremists. The cataloguing of a number of social and economic distresses is sometimes used automatically to predict the outbreak of conflict, as if social maladies inevitably produce violence. Yet these analyses are often not specific about the locus, scale or timetable of the conflicts they warn about. All poor communities, for example, do not erupt into violent conflict.

This is analytically unsatisfying for four important reasons:

- 1) The ample socioeconomic maladies that are catalogued do not necessarily affect the same groups or areas at the same time. Because different problems are found in different groups and locations, they do not necessarily aggregate or cumulate to focus immense pressure on the stability of the status quo in any one place, or in ways that cannot be compensated in some way.

- 2) This model ignores the need for conflicts to have specific, concrete agents (e.g., “ethnic entrepreneurs,” political parties, rebel movements, criminal warlords, etc.) who in turn require sufficient financial support, political following, and weapons before they can effectively mobilize discontent on a sustained basis and outmaneuver police or security forces.
- 3) There is also a “populist” assumption that conflict always arises in a bottom-up fashion from discontent at the grassroots among masses, whereas it also can be “top-down:” arising from struggles within and between elites or stimulated by small, well-armed groups;
- 4) Finally, this paradigm fails to factor in the already-existing capacities for suppressing such conflicts or peacefully managing them, or if these are listed, to estimate their impacts on suppressing or transforming conflicts. In short, along with “debits,” a balanced exercise in conflict “accounting” needs also to look at “credits.” The diagnostic issue is whether the latter are sufficient to outweigh the former.

### Application of the Framework

Each assessment team is asked to examine the conflict arena of interest with the above described conflict/peace variables in mind. The overall diagnostic task is to pull together a coherent picture of the incidence, scale, sites, sources, and emergence of these conflicts, including trends in these characteristics. (This does not mean the study must be complete and exhaustive, however).

It is useful to think of the product to be written from the diagnostic part of the project as a conflict “profile.” This profile would have both overall and more specific components that address the following dimensions of the conflict situation:

### Overall Regional Assessment

A first objective is to gain an overall picture -- a sort of mapping, or lay of the land -- regarding the basic parameters of the conflicts in the area examined: who is doing what to whom with what means and in what places? To be clear about the scope of the conflict phenomena that is encompassed, we need to delimit the focus of the study, i.e. define the unit of analysis. It may be useful to think of the focus of the study as a conflict-prone region that is experiencing increased levels and episodes of localized pastoralist violence that is carried out by various groups at different times and places, but that has many common ingredients. This area is fairly big, covering Southern Sudan, NE Uganda, and NW Kenya. There are 14 Karamoja tribal groupings and they fight with each other as well as with outside, neighboring groups. The team is assessing not only conflict among the tribal groups that are the main focus of the study (i.e., within and between the 14 Karamojong groups in the first study) but also the major conflicts between Karamojong groups and other, outside groups. These groups and areas have experienced a traditional pattern of cattle rustling that has increased in scale and grown out of control for several reasons. So one aim is to characterize the typical parties, numbers of people, scale or magnitudes of violence, typical types of weapons used, and whereabouts of this violent behavior. The team is also not simply doing a point-in-time study but is looking at the overall trends in these features and how trends may have shifted over recent years.

Thus, besides the topics mentioned above, other important questions to be addressed in this section would be:

1. Generically, who are the principal antagonists engaged in the conflicts? Which groups have most frequently been involved in violent conflict? From what constituencies do they draw their support? What is their relative power in terms of their ability to mobilize people and resources? Are there indirect stakeholders who benefit from conflict or from the situation as it is? It is important to understand the relative interests and power of those who gain from fomenting tensions and those who work to dampen tensions.
2. What are the current major “hot spots?”
3. Is there a significant potential for current violent conflicts to escalate, continue or diminish in the areas surveyed? What types/scale of conflict can be predicted from this information?
4. What are the differences the team sees across sub-regions (i.e., specific parts of the Karamojong zone, such as districts on the Uganda side of the border) in the conflict zone, and what appears to account for those differences (e.g. different government responses, different tribal or clan relationships, greater or lesser access to water)?
5. Estimate the readiness of communities in conflict to build peace. Have they reached a mutually hurting stalemate?

### Sources of the Conflicts and Peace Capacities: Mini Case Studies as Samples

A second key kind of finding is the sources and dynamics of the violence in this region, so as to expose generic entry-points where interventions might make a difference: How do the various structural and other causes combine and interact in order to produce violence? It might be possible to discuss some of the structural or other causal factors generically or regionally -- for example, the entire Karamoja Cluster has been very affected by drought in recent years. But there may also be national (or sub-cluster) situational differences between, in the case of the Karamoja Cluster, the Ugandan, Sudanese and Kenyan portions. So this part of the study might be more manageably approached by doing in-depth case studies of one or two “representative” conflicts and thus of particular violent episodes that have arisen in them.

Here is where the causes of conflict described above come in. Because there are several groups fighting, the best way to explain how such conflicts might be mitigated or channeled in a peaceful manner is perhaps to present specific mini-case-studies of representative conflicts between particular actors in particular places, perhaps one in each country (minus the Sudan). In each case study, the following kinds of questions should be addressed. Each team needs to be able to answer two sets of questions that correspond to tables 1 and 2 above Causes of Conflict (meaning violent conflict) and Causes of Peace:

### III. CAUSES OF CONFLICT

1. Which underlying, pervasive, socio-economic, cultural and historical conditions obtain?
  - How are changing weather patterns and environmental degradation implicated in conflict? What natural phenomena are increasing competition over key resources? To what extent and over what period has environmental degradation and drought - less water and grazing land forced more people to clump up over these scarce resources?

- What impacts do ingrained, reinforced tribal, ethnic or religious identities have?
  - What are the attitudes toward other tribal groups?
  - What are the historic patterns of inter-state tension or violence in the area?
  - Do changing cultural patterns affect conflict – e.g., the role of tribal elders, youth, and women?
  - Are there larger structural processes at work, such as inflation or deflation, which affect tensions?
  - Are drought and famine early warning systems in place? If so, are they operating effectively?
2. Which proximate causes are operating? What are the cultural, institutional, and political processes and organizations that define and aggregate interests, and mobilize and channel political and social activity?
- Are local powers organizing the cattle raiding on a larger scale for profit?
  - Has there been a decline in influence and authority of traditional elders?
  - Is there evidence of ethnically based political parties, political groups or movements? How well organized are these? What resources and support can they command? What are their interests?
  - Are national or local politicians manipulating the conflict for gain? For example, one ex-MP reportedly was stirring up violence to make his opponent (the current MP) look bad in the hope that he could win the next election
  - What are relations like between leaders at different levels – grassroots leaders (village and clan elders, CBO leaders, village health workers, etc.); mid-level leaders (tribal leaders, NGOS, religious leaders, district administration); and top leadership (MPs, military, etc)?
  - Are there discriminatory government policies, systematic neglect of particular geographic areas, corruption that leeches benefits from government development assistance, political challenges to central government, etc.? Are government institutions captured by one group or another or divided between groups? Do they generally play helpful or harmful roles?
  - What is the relationship of local government structures (development agencies, central administration, police) and critical central government structures (military) to the people in this region and to traditional leaders?
  - What mechanisms for participation, accountability and transparency exist? Are local people able to affect government decision-making?
  - How does the easy availability of small arms in the study area affect the conflict and the prospects for conflict mitigation?
  - What negative role might the media be playing, if any? How strong is civil society (church, NGOS, private sector) – how well is it organized, how well funded is it, and what role does it play?
  - Are there large numbers of unemployed, undereducated youth with too few legitimate opportunities to engage them?
  - Has the government neglected the region instead of either strengthening the traditional way of life or providing viable alternatives to those willing to do something else other than herd cows? Has this resulted from disdain by political elites for pastoralists?

- Has access to arms increased/decreased in recent years?
- Has reduced respect for traditional rules of engagement regarding the rituals of cattle rustling led to more severe forms of violence?
- Actors and Issues (the “tip” of the iceberg): What are the key issues that the core parties see as ostensible reasons for the conflict?

In each instance, what is the impact or plausible relationship between these entities or processes and ongoing or potential for conflict? Proximate factors may differ nationally or by district, depending in part on central or local government factors.

3. Which are the most common and observable triggers for recent instances of violent conflict? The team should pay particular attention to examining the triggers in the most violent instances. What acts or events are raising tensions by expressing interests violently or coercively or are likely to provoke such expressions? What triggers might the team predict based on the evidence gathered?

- Has recent violence stemmed from unexpected behavior by leaders, the assassination of prominent local leaders, unexpected acquisition of weapons or sudden loss thereof (e.g., Ugandan army forcibly removing weapons from particular groups), sudden death of herds, egregious human rights abuses, specific land or resource allocation and access, electioneering and leadership succession?
- Have there been sudden changes in weather patterns? Are there differences between traditional and current responses to drought that affect factors that trigger or mitigate conflict?

Is there evidence of precipitous price drops or other economic instability, price gouging, or other predatory economic practices?

#### **IV. PEACE CAPACITIES**

Keep in mind that these “causes” may be long-standing indigenous capabilities or new, emerging factors that are struggling to have an impact on peacebuilding.

1. How do structural factors support peace? What structural factors are mitigating the clashing of interests?

- Are there effective international, national, or local efforts targeted at economic growth and equity? Has there been “trickle down” from country economic growth?
- Have long range weather trends improved, eliminating further deterioration in the natural resource base?
- What is the status of social safety nets?
- Are objective, fair, and authoritative solutions to boundary disputes or access to natural resources pursued?
- What constitutional or high-level political reforms to diffuse identity-based politics are evident?

2. How effective are major processes and institutions in controlling or alleviating the particular social and economic problems that are sources of actual or potential conflicts, or in helping to resolve issues between the emerging interests that are clashing?
  - Are efforts afoot to create social and political “space,” more or less protected from violence, within which groups who cut across the lines of conflict or reside within one side or the other can relate to each other in non-violent constructive ways to address the conflict or sources of the conflict?
  - To what extent are these efforts linking up with each other horizontally, and seeking to be more coordinated so they have a more aggregate impact? Is mobilization and channeling of political and social activity for peaceful advocacy on issues occurring?
  - To what extent are these efforts enlisting influential actors at middle-level and higher levels of the political and social system? Are mechanisms for representing interests to the government authorities in place or expanding?
  - Are helpful changes in both institutional rules and political practice from identity-oriented toward interest-based politics evident? Is there new “space” for dialogues about peace between groups engaged in conflict?
  - Are new civil society groups emerging to build peace? Is the church playing a role in building peace? Is the media contributing to peace? Is the private sector promoting peace?
  - Are these innovative processes taking lasting institutional forms?
  - Are there restrictions on ethnic-based or religion-based political parties? If so, are they warranted or used successfully?
  - Are there equitable and transparent government policies combined with the establishment of mechanisms for voice and accountability vis a vis local and national entities that serve to mitigate conflicts?
  - Are there neutral fora in which elites can discuss contentious issues? Are there new leaders emerging who work for peace?
  
3. Are Peace Triggers extant? What specific acts, speeches and events are discouraging, suppressing, or limiting the violent expressions of interests, or are publicly encouraging accommodation and cooperation?
  - Are conflict management early warning systems in place? How well do they work? Do they generate timely and appropriate responses in the sense that actual violence is stopped and the perpetrators are caught?
  - Is steady and predictable micro-economic management an established norm?
  - Does a respect for basic human rights obtain?
  - Are equitable and participatory conflict management strategies in place?
  - What is the state of policing and general citizen security?
  - What mechanisms and programs attempt to build social capital and what impact if any is evident?
  
3. **Typical dynamics:** Present an analytical chronology of a “representative” conflict. How do the various sources identified above combine and interact? What are the conflict’s antecedents, triggers, counter-responses, and effects? What has been the overall ebb and flow of the conflict – its scope (population and geographic coverage), evolution and intensity through time?

In summary, teams should be able to delineate the primary sources of potential or ongoing conflicts and the main factors restraining them. This exposition is needed in order to reach “bottom-line” judgments about the likelihood of conflict breaking out, the need to establish or strengthen peace capacities, and the likelihood of peace capacities taking the upper-hand. Showing which typical sources of conflict or, equally, capacities for peace, are present is crucial. These factors will serve to point the team and USAID to various “entry points” that could receive assistance.

## **V. DATA COLLECTION SOURCES AND METHODS**

The suggested fieldwork methods for the assessment teams might best be described as “opportunistic”. That is, it is recognized that each team has a limited timeframe and particular skill sets and capacities. Thus it will be vital to leverage the skills and knowledge of each team member both in terms of their methodological competencies and their knowledge of local circumstances and conditions. The team leader and team members are expected to follow the opportunities that will inevitably present themselves over the course of the fieldwork and adapt to the likelihood of evolving circumstances. This is of course precisely why we employ highly experienced and seasoned professionals.

The two pastoralist conflicts that are the subject of these studies have been extensively examined through a variety of expert social scientist and participatory methods. The team should access and build on this body of research. Overall, it is suggested that the teams employ a combination of key informant interviews, focus group interviewing, archival or documentary research, and when available should look for and gain access to existing data bases of relevant information. Each team should establish a standard interview protocol and division of labor so that as key informants are engaged, the most salient issues for comparison are treated. This of course does not imply that interviews need to be artificially constrained or constricted such that important specific information is lost or not pursued. When appropriate and feasible, a focus group methodology can serve to enhance efficiency by bringing out a number of views and a variety of information in a relatively short time. This method though is not the same as a “group interview” and should probably be pursued only when the team members have skills and experience in this area.

## **VI. STATUS AND IMPACT OF CURRENT PROGRAMS AND ACTIVITIES**

After a general analysis of the Causes of Conflict and Causes of Peace, the assessment team needs to make important analytical and evaluative judgments about the status and impact of current activities of international donors and NGOs; national governmental and non-state programs; and local NGOs/CSOs which are working in areas relevant to conflict mediation and prevention within the target assessment zones. USAID’s draft scope of work for this assessment calls for the team to:

- “Evaluate the design and effectiveness of interventions and [identify] specific opportunities that may exist for USAID or other donors to help improve their efforts by bringing in

additional financial or technical resources. The evaluation of the design and effectiveness of the interventions should include the perspective of the beneficiaries.”

These could be development activities such as vet services or provision of water, or activities designed directly to mediate conflict. But the team is not required to map every single activity on the thin argument that any development assistance or self-help might help mitigate conflict. USAID is especially interested in three approaches that grow out of phase one - problem solving dialogues which could be geared to different levels from grassroots to top leaders, engagement of religious leaders and media. They are also promoting conflict analysis and helping set up early warning and response systems and they are interested in promoting networks. And of course they do civil society institution building for groups working on conflict.

Many of these activities will become apparent as the team investigates the *Causes of Peace* but a systematic effort needs to be made to include an evaluative component to these programmatic interventions. That said, all parties recognize that the assessment team is not an evaluation team and that robust program impact and activity evaluations are not expected from this exercise. Instead, the teams should strive to provide a “gloss” or impressionistic views of impact and triangulate sources on the issue of impact (what kind, how much, how useful). It is obvious that donors, contractors, and NGOS have an interest in demonstrating the success of the particular activities in which they are involved. It is hoped that by consulting numerous sources over the course of the assessment a general picture of effectiveness in key areas relevant to conflict mitigation will be obtained. In a few cases, the team may actually be able to observe activities underway and then will have additional information about impact to draw upon. The team should attempt to evaluate the openness/honesty of its informants. Some individuals or groups may not be very willing to share information. Data that the team feels is questionable should be noted as such, so that programmers can be careful to investigate an activity further if it turns out to be crucial to developing a USAID program in the area.

The team should keep in mind that activities often have unintended consequences – impact may be both positive and negative. It will be as important to learn about perceived harmful impacts of assistance efforts as well as the positive ones.

Current, recent past, and soon-to-start activities should be assessed in relation to conflict/peace categories/variables. The team should develop a way of looking at whether there is a “match” between these activities and the key conflict/peace variables they have identified in the diagnostic section. This does not mean that every activity on the ground in the area that might ever be thought to mitigate some aspect of tension needs to be counted. We are really looking for the research teams to look at the most significant of those activities to see if they 1) address significant structural sources of tension; and 2) appear to be working to channel conflict peacefully, at least in some measure, and/or 3) have some suppressive effect on triggers such as violence itself. For example, in relation to triggers, the Ugandan army periodically tries to disarm its groups and plans to do so again on 11/30/01. But such disarmaments may have weakened some groups permanently and affected their ability to protect themselves.



It is understood that activities or clusters of activities may address more than one conflict variable. The point is not to be unduly rigid in the mapping exercise, rather to ensure that efforts address major drivers of conflict to strengthen what appear to be the most important peace capacities.

- **Mapping.** Inventorying activities in geographic terms. First, by country (Uganda, Kenya, Sudan). Second, by sub-areas within the country. For example, are there some geographic sub-areas where there are many activities underway and others where there are few or none? Are some types of activities concentrated in particular sub-areas and lightly distributed elsewhere? What appears to account for this? Examples of explanatory factors might include human (in)security, remoteness and difficulty of physical access to the area, government hostility or help, and historical ties. The team will need to decide how to construct sub-areas.
- **Matching.** Asking how the key activities and their goals are designed in such a ways that they can affect conflict sources or peace capacities (whether they are consciously intended to do so or not), and whether the type of activity is appropriate given the nature and scale of the problem presented by the conflict situation. For example, IBAR is working to increase veterinary services but also bringing warring groups to talk together in a neutral setting. They also fund the women's crusades. These activities appear to address several types of conflict causes, but not all of them. Are there gaps in the causal chain and cycle of conflict where efforts are absent and needed?
- **Depth of impact.** This involves asking whether these interventions are working in terms of actual discernable effects on the sources of conflicts or the capacities for peace. What seems successful or unsuccessful in reducing the sources or strengthening the capacities, and why? For activities that are related to key conflict variables, the team should try to understand: the extent of the impact (who is affected and to what extent), whether the scale of the activity is appropriate to the size of the problem, and whether the quality of the implementation appears particularly good, acceptable or unimpressive.

Quality can only be assessed in an impressionistic manner and there will be a natural tendency to assume that the quality is good if impact is showing up. The team should try to get a sense of the adequacy of the staffing and resources, the correctness of the approach toward implementation given objectives, the buy-in of critical stakeholders (community leaders, government officials, politicians, NGOS).

Current activities are the most important. In terms of recent past activities, only those that were completed within the past six months *and* were of significant size should be captured (and then only provided that reasonably informed sources can be consulted). In terms of planned activities, only those designed to start within the next 6 months should be recorded, since plans do change. Obviously, the team cannot assess the impact of activities that are not yet underway; instead, the team should seek to ascertain the scope and objectives of planned activities, as well as the likelihood that they will actually get off the ground.

At the completion of this mapping exercise, the research team should at the overall pattern of activities that can contribute to building peace. What do they add up to? Are their multiplier

affects at work between them? How comprehensive are they? Are they contributing to building relationships and space to pursue dialogue?

## **VII. RECOMMENDATIONS ON PROGRAM DESIGN**

The research team is not undertaking a detailed design, but rather is making recommendations to USAID about how to reposition, add to, reallocate or supplement the existing development/conflict resources to mitigate tensions or increase peacebuilding capacities. Recommendations may target the need for traditional development assistance (e.g., micro-enterprise credit) and/or conflict resolution/mediation assistance. In doing so, the team should consider:

- Gaps in existing/planned activities that should be filled;
- Under-served versus over-served sub-areas and whether activities would focus in a small part of the Karamojong (and if so which part);
- Opportunities to augment existing activities, thereby achieving a significantly greater impact; and
- Likelihood of success or positive impact.

This section can parallel the structure of questions identified in the previous two. The team should tie its specific recommendations to the overall regional assessment and to the three categories of variables: structural, proximate and triggers. The team should notice into which of the three categories of variables, structural, proximate and triggers, the bulk of the existing activities fall. For example, if most activities are addressing longer-term structural issues, there may be a need to focus more on proximate issues. It should prioritize across recommendations in terms of the leverage suggested activities might gain on conflict. If there are sequencing issues involved in undertaking different activities, these should be identified. The team should pay particular attention to the utility of the three peacebuilding approaches that the REDSO conflict team wishes to promote: problem solving dialogues, which can be geared to different levels, engagement of religious leaders in peacebuilding, and use of the media to increase information, counter rumors and build tolerance.

The team should discuss the extent to which factors driving conflict might be mitigated or those promoting peace encouraged by the recommended activities.

## **VIII. BASELINE DEVELOPMENT FOR KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS**

The team will be asked to provide sufficient information that baseline data for key performance indicators for the REDSO conflict strategy (S.O. 6) can be calculated once programming decisions are made. Baseline data should be calculated for the Uganda mission's conflict strategy (S.O. 9). These indicators are as follows:

### **FOR USAID/REDSO:**

1. Status of a conflict early warning system for the zone. While these indicators have not been specified fully as yet, the team should assess the state of development of such a

system for the conflict zone and whether warnings (to the extent that they are given) generate a response which is a) timely and b) appropriate. The team should not who is participating in monitoring to provide warnings and who is taking part in responding. Such warning system(s) may be formal or informal.

2. Density or coverage and frequency of activities addressing conflict. This grows out of the mapping exercise. The actual baseline data will have to be compiled once USAID has decided which sub-areas it will work in and which activities it would like to affect over time. However, the team's descriptive material about activities must be precise enough and complete enough that the baseline can be compiled once decisions about program are made.
3. Complete map of the following approaches: problem-solving dialogues, engagement of religious authorities, and use of media in peacebuilding.

**FOR USAID/UGANDA:**

1. For one S.O. 9 conflict indicator, for the Karamoja Cluster, peace dialogue agendas. [This requires more clarification from USAID/Uganda. The mission recognizes that the baseline is zero. It is not clear what the mission needs assistance with.]

## **APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL**

### **USAID/REDSO MSI KARAMOJA CONFLICT ASSESSMENT**

#### **I. Purpose**

It is vital to state that each interview situation is unique and the team should make every effort to spend at least a few minutes prior to the interview discussing both the main purpose and identifying roles for team members. Some interviews will likely focus on broader information about conflict causes and peace capacities, some will take a more practical bent and focus on the universe of conflict mediation activities, and still others may be entirely prosaic and look particularly at the activities of NGOS, CSOs, CBOs, religious groups, or others involved on the ground in the Karamoja cluster. Some interviews will combine all three. This interview protocol should be used to guide each team and assure the collection of relevant and comparable information in a timely manner. This should allow the team(s) to be both efficient and respectful of our interlocutor's time. The protocol is not devised as a script to be memorized and each interview should be flexible enough to pursue particular points of interest.

#### **II. Roles**

Each interview team should appoint a primary spokes person and a rapporteur for each interview. The role of the primary spokesperson is to introduce the team, outline the basic purpose for our trip and the specific reason for the visit to the interlocutor. The spokes person then takes the lead in gathering appropriate contact information and other information about the groups or individuals visited, and guides the substantive component of the interview. The spokes person could be chosen based on knowing the interlocutor or because they have particular substantive knowledge of the issues likely to be most salient in a particular interview. If neither of these considerations applies, then it is recommended that the team rotate the spokes person and rapporteur roles.

The rapporteur has primary responsibility for note taking and recording the proceedings of the interview. Verbatim notes are not required, but every effort should be made to capture the main points of each participant's interventions. On the whole because the job of rapporteur requires extremely vigilant concentration, the rapporteur should not be required to serve for more than an hour at a stretch. In the event that interviews take longer than this, a switch may be recommended to either a third team member or the rapporteur and the spokes person could trade-off (less than ideal).

Because the production of the assessment document itself is a contractual responsibility of MSI, MSI personnel should normally take the lead in directing interview content and direction as well as assuring the quality and content of notes recorded during the interview. Though USAID personnel will be available to serve as a resource and even take notes when needed, the primary responsibility for the data gathering rests with MSI.

### III. Interview Components

- 1) Team introductions, suggested language: *\* Hello, thank you so much for giving us a bit of your valuable time today. I am < > and I work for Management Systems International, a professional development company based in Washington DC. We have been asked by USAID to conduct a series of interviews and meetings in Kenya and Uganda to explore the important issue of conflict prevention and conflict mediation. We are particularly interested in your thoughts, experiences, and knowledge about these issues as they apply to the Karamoja Cluster areas, which for the purposes of this assessment we are defining as the Karamoja area in Uganda, the Pokot, Turkana, in Kenya, and neighboring border groups in southern Sudan. The purpose of our interviews and meetings is to provide data for an assessment report that our team will provide to USAID. This report will in turn be used to guide the design of appropriate activities targeted at conflict mitigation in this area.*

We have a general set of questions that will guide our interview today, but before we launch into those, let me have each of our team members introduce themselves. <Brief introductions>

- 2) Contact Information, suggested language: *I want to start by making sure we have accurate contact information for you/your organization. <Fill in any blanks that you do not already have either from initial contacts or from business cards collected in the introduction process. Don't neglect this seemingly banal process, as it is a long way back to Lokochokio if you forget an important piece of information! It can also be a good way to break the ice.*

Group Name	Primary Contact Name	Address	Phone	Fax	Email	Misc. Contact Info	HF Radio/ Frequency /Time/Call sign/USB-LSB
						<i>IE, Ask at the mayor's office, or near the Pink Garter Beer Garden</i>	

- 3) General Conflict Identification: *\* We recognize that violent conflict is very complex and can be a product of many internal and external factors. We would like to start though at a more practical level. We understand that there is considerable conflict in the Karamoja Cluster but that it is neither universal nor constant. We would like to get a general sense from you about:*

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\* Please use your own language and not my stilted prose. The suggested language is just to get everyone "singing out of the same hymn sheet".

\* Note that we have generally avoided any suggestion of political motivation or political implication in conflict. This seems prudent. We assume that such political causes and politically salient impacts will be uncovered in the interview process in both particular interviews and over the course of the study. Interview teams should be sensitive to subtleties in this area of inquiry and be careful not to cross any "trip-wires".

- a. *Who are the principle antagonists engaged in conflict in the areas that you are most familiar with, i.e. who is fighting and where? What are the major “hot spots”?*
  - b. *What are the general parameters of the conflict? How serious? What seem to be the direct conflict triggers for these conflicts? IE cattle raids, boundary disputes, access to water or forage, revenge, others?*
  - c. *In the past five years or so, are there any previous “hot spots” that have cooled? When and under what circumstances did this occur?*
  - d. *Are there any other potential conflicts that are brewing but have not turned violent?*
- 4) *Structural causes of Violent Conflict: We would like to turn to a discussion about broad sources or causes of violent conflict. Our experience and study of violent conflicts in many places around the world indicates that conflict can result from many sources including broad environmental, socio-economic, cultural, and political conditions.*
  - a. *Has changing weather influenced conflict?*
  - b. *How would you describe attitudes toward other ethnic groups among the pastoralists in the areas you are most familiar with? Attitudes toward inter-ethnic clans.*
  - c. *What about the role of tribal elders, youth, women?*
  - d. *What is the current economic situation in your view?*
  - e. *Can you describe for me the opportunities that exist for young men, young women, older men, older women, and for future generations?*
  - f. *What are the historic factors that influence violent conflict in Karamoja (a history of violent relations between particular groups)?*
  - g. *What cultural factors play a role in supporting and enabling violent conflict as “a way of life”? IE, what do you make of the often noted Karamoja culture of violence, or gun culture? Is violence inevitable for the Karamojong?*
- 5) *Proximal causes of Violent Conflict: Violent conflicts often follow lines of social cleavage, occur between identity groups, and can respond to government policies.*
  - a. *What is the role of identity groups, ethnic groups, or religious differences in the violent conflicts that you are most familiar with?*
  - b. *Sometimes government policies can either enhance or deepen conflicts depending on how they treat access to resources (land tenure, water) or by virtue of agricultural promotion patterns, marketing regulations, etc. Are you aware of instances where the policies of the state have brought different groups into conflict? Please describe.*
  - c. *What are relations like between grassroots leaders, clan elders, community development agents, local political leaders, district level officials, veterinary service providers, NGOS, churches, political parties and other relevant actors in your area? Please outline any relationships that seem problematic and may contribute to violent outcomes.*

- d. *Are there specific mechanisms for participation, accountability, and transparency in the decision making process and administration of services for the communities in question?*
  - e. *How easy is it for those who may wish to pursue violent conflict to get arms? What role does the availability of arms play? How do people get access to arms?*
  - f. *The media can be used to fan the flames of violence or can be a voice for non-violent solutions to conflict. What has the role of the media been (if any) in the conflicts with which you are most familiar?*
  - g. *What is the role of traditional leaders, and the long-standing cattle rustling tradition in Karamoja? How have these patterns of leadership and cultural economic practice evolved?*
  - h. *How do women in particular either enable or mitigate against violent conflicts?*
- 6) *Trigger or immediate causes of Violent Conflict: Violent conflicts normally have an immediate triggering event associated with them. For the conflicts that you know best, please tell us what you think the immediate triggers are (for multiple answers, please rank for the most common triggers):*
- a. *Revenge or reprisals for previous violent acts*
  - b. *Drought or access to water*
  - c. *Access to fodder*
  - d. *Public speeches*
  - e. *Elections or politics*
  - f. *Economic need or necessity*
  - g. *Other conflict triggers, (please specify)*
- 7) *General Conflict Response Identification: There are many groups, organizations, churches, and individuals who speak out against violent conflict and engage in activities designed to reduce violent conflict. We are interested in the activities of groups with which you are most familiar.*
- a. *In your experience, who is trying to reduce conflict in the Karamoja Cluster or in particular areas within the cluster?*
  - b. *Can you tell us about these activities? Where do they take place?*
  - c. *What types of conflict are they attempting to address?*
  - d. *What methods do they use?*
  - e. ***What, if any, impact have they had?*** *Can you give us examples of impact? Would you please rank the most effective to the least effective conflict response activities of which you are aware?*
  - f. *What have been the roles of and impacts on women?*
  - g. *Are there any activities that have occurred in the recent past (no more than five years previous) that you are aware of? Can you tell us a little about them?*
- 8) *Topics of discussion with NGOS and other Conflict Response Service Providers: Please describe for us the nature and scope of your conflict response activities. Include:*
- a. *Districts, or towns in which activities take place*
  - b. *Length of time activities have been underway*
  - c. *Periodicity – how often do activities take place*

- d. *Resources involved in preparing and delivering activities*
- e. *Number of people who are impacted by activities both directly, and indirectly*
- f. *Other groups, organizations, state agencies or ministries that you cooperate with in planning, funding, delivering, following-up on, or evaluating your activities*
- g. *How do you conceptualize your activities in relation to the particular violent conflicts in the areas that you work?*
- h. *How do you identify the contributions of women in your activity design and implementation? What mechanisms do you use to maximize women's contributions?*

Each team member should make every effort to summarize and write up field notes on a daily basis. Each evening or early the next morning is a good time to accomplish this. If the task is left till the end, memories fade and the task becomes unwieldy. To the extent possible and to the degree that it makes good sense, following the basic outline of the interview protocol will also aid in organizing and digesting the raw data of field notes. As the interviewers become more conversant with the basic questions and issues to be broached in the interviews, they will become more free and able to ask appropriate questions as well as follow interesting and compelling directions suggested by our interlocutors. Again, it is expected that each interview is unique and no interview will pose all of the questions indicated above. Over the course of the fieldwork period and hundreds of both formal and informal interactions with information sources, the team should be able to have ample and deep coverage of the relevant issues. To the extent that the data is gathered systematically, the work of report writing will be dramatically easier.

FINAL 11/17/01



## APPENDIX C: COMMON REPORTING FRAMEWORK

### CONFLICT AND CPMR MAP

#### USAID/MSI Assessment of the Karamoja Cluster

Please use this form to collect details pertaining to particular conflicts that surface during the interviews. Please enter information in “bullet” form and note the source.

1. Name: Ascribe a name to the conflict that points to the antagonists, nature and geographical area.
2. Nature of the Conflict: Describe the history, current situation, expected evolution.
3. Actors: Identify the antagonists, alliances among them and other players and characterize their roles.
4. Causes of the Conflict: Describe the internal and external factors that have provoked or the influenced conflict at each of the following levels.

##### Structural Causes

Describe the opportunities that exist for young men, young women, older men, older women, and for the future generations. (Lack of opportunities)

##### Proximate Causes

##### Triggers

Roles of women in causing/trigging conflict

5. Local Peace Capacities: Summarize local/traditional counterweights to the to the conflict that exists (whether active or inactive at the same three levels and suggest ways that they might be strengthened or activated.

##### Structural/Alleviating

##### Proximate/Channeling

##### Immediate/ Suppressing

6. Outside CPMR Interventions: Summarize individual interventions mounted by outside actors noting their focus, description, quality of design and implementation, effectiveness, opportunities/needs for additional support.

What if any impacts have they had? Give examples of impact. Rank the most effective and least effective conflict response activities.

Peacebuilding organizations capacities to recognize and support the roles of women in conflict and peacebuilding.

7. Overview of CPMR Interventions: Identify coordination mechanisms, instances of overlap of efforts. Undressed opportunities for traditional or outside approaches.

## **APPENDIX D: DESCRIPTIONS OF KEY KC CONFLICTS**

The conflicts “itemized” below meet the criteria laid out at the beginning of this report for “conflict intensity.” These are conflicts that either were until recently or continue to be heated.

Three conflicts are described in considerable detail as they are the most relevant to the concerns of REDSO. At the end of each description of the three conflict descriptions is a table of programmatic approaches. The three conflicts that receive special attention in this annex are:

- **Pokot – Karamojong (Kenya - Uganda)**
- **Turkana – Pokot (Kenya - Uganda)**
- **Turkana – Toposa (Kenya – Sudan)**

The final section of this Annex contains descriptions of four additional conflicts:

- Pokot – Marakwet conflict (Kenya)
- Jie, Matheniko and Pian (Turkana) vs. Bokora (Uganda)
- Karamojong – Iteso (Uganda)
- Jie–Acholi (Uganda)

## 1. POKOT – KARAMOJONG CONFLICT (Kenya-Uganda)

### Description of the Conflict

Name	Nature	Actors	Causes	Local Peace Capacities	Outside Interventions	Overview/Other
Pokot – Karamojong (Pian, Matheniko and Bokora) Conflict (Kenya and Uganda)	<p>The Pokot and Karamojong consider one another traditional enemies with whom they are, in effect, at war. The Karamojong and Pokot have long been in contact, and pastoral Pokot living on the plains have adopted much of the culture of the Karamojong.</p> <p>In the 1920s colonial authorities reportedly permitted Pokot from Kenya to move into and live in what became known as Upe County in Uganda (“Upe” is the Karamojong name for the Pokot) in compensation for the Pokot loss to European settlers of some of their best dry season grazing areas in the Trans Nzoia District of Kenya.</p> <p>The Karamojong are said to have lost 15% of their grazing land to the Pokot between 1920-1940.</p> <p>Enormous increase in modern firearms in the area, initially a result of the 1979 Karamojong raid on the GOU armory in Moroto. Karamojong sold weapons to Pokot and others, became an income generating activity for some pastoralists. Modern weapons are now obtained from Sudan.</p> <p>As a result of recent conflicts, large areas have been abandoned, including centers and schools.</p>	<p>Pokot VS the Karamojong (Pian, Matheniko and Bokora). The Pokot live in both Uganda (Nakapiririt District, in the southeastern part of what was once the large Karamoja District) and Kenya (West Pokot and the northern part of Baringo districts). Pokot describe themselves as one people, in spite of the fact that they live in different countries and districts. Pokot are comprised of a highland group of settled agriculturalists with a culture similar to other Kalenjin, and a lowland group of pastoralists and agro-pastoralists that has assimilated much of the pastoral culture of the Karamojong and Turkana.</p> <p>The Pian, Matheniko and Bokora comprise what are known as the “Karamojong proper.” They live in Moroto District of Uganda.</p>	<p><b>Structural:</b> conflict over very good pastureland with water on the Uganda side of the border. Both the Pokot and Karamojong want access to this excellent dry season grazing area. Pokot maintain that the Karamojong are trying to force them out of Uganda.</p> <p>Shared pastoral cultural values in which livestock raiding is accepted, even encouraged, and killing an enemy in battle earns respect. Very high bride price required to get married. The bride price has reportedly increased, particularly among the Karamojong.</p> <p>Decline in rainfall and increased frequency of drought since 1979.</p> <p>General, pervasive poverty with very limited opportunity for young people within and outside the pastoral system. The residents have</p>	<p><b>Structural:</b> long history of relationships, inter-marriage, and negotiations by elders for access to pasture between the Pokot and Karamojong groups.</p> <p>Shared pastoral culture. However, in spite of this shared culture, Pokot are not one of the Ateker peoples (who share the Karamojong language and culture). This distinction between the two peoples is widely recognized and may be a barrier to establishing long lasting, peaceful relations. Concerted efforts should be made to overcome this perceived problem.</p> <p>Women are playing an increasingly important role in peacebuilding in the KC. Because of their recognition that violent conflict has reached unacceptable levels, women are becoming more assertive in challenging elders and warriors to cultivate peace. In this</p>	<p>Previously, the Kenya Government has carried out military operations against Pokot (with a major operation in 1984) primarily because of conflict between Pokot, Turkana and Karamojong.</p> <p>The Uganda Government has often talked of disarming the Karamojong. In November 2001 the GOU Launched its long awaited disarmament program in Karamoja sub-region. The residents were to begin voluntarily handing in their illegal firearms on December 2, 2001. Under the plan, the Karamojong were given six months to turn in a hoped-for 40,000 weapons. After the initial period, anyone found to possess an illegal gun would be arrested. President Museveni has promised to commit development resources to the area in exchange for weapons.</p>	<p>The escalation and changed nature of violence is very disturbing to many in both communities, particularly to women. Since the 1980s, the traditional rules of raiding and warfare have been abandoned and women and children are now being killed. (The great increase in the use of modern firearms is said to be a major contributing factor to the increased levels and new kind of violence.) The killing of non-combatants and other atrocities have increased hatred, leading to a culture of revenge.</p> <p>What is significant about Pokot areas, in comparison with other areas, is how little socio-economic development and peacebuilding activities have been carried out or are planned. In West Pokot district in Kenya, there are few development and</p>

Name	Nature	Actors	Causes	Local Peace Capacities	Outside Interventions	Overview/Other
	<p>Socio-economic development has been “lost.”</p> <p>The final column notes that, in comparison with neighboring districts, there has been and is much less peacebuilding and development activity in West Pokot district. An important reason has been past interference by Pokot political leaders in development activities. This has hampered socio-economic development, and it has reduced the willingness of donors and NGOS to invest resources. A former Minister was prominent in the district and on the national political scene for many years. His reported interference in development projects are thought to be the main reason one donor closed down a major project in the district after many years, and is considered a key reason that some development NGOS avoided working in the district for several years. Current political leaders are said to be eager to change the situation (they are supporting Pokatusa) and the leaders in the district who met with the assessment team clearly stated their view that the district needed to receive more development assistance.</p>	<p>These three groups have combined to raid Pokot, and they have raided them independently.</p> <p>One group of Tepeth is allied with the Karamojong, another is allied with the Pokot. The Kadam of Uganda (probably a Tepeth group) is allied with Pokot.</p> <p>In 1999-2000 the Matheniko, Pian and Jie (and possibly the Turkana) combined to fight the Bokora.</p> <p>During a peaceful period prior to 1979, some Turkana moved into Pokot areas. In 1979, drought struck. A number of Pokot and Turkana formed an alliance and carried out a large raid on Karamojong, obtaining a large number of livestock, reportedly decimating the herds of Karamojong. The Turkana involved in the raid continued to live in Pokot territory. Some Karamojong induced Turkana to move into their territory and marry their girls. Some</p>	<p>extremely limited access to education, health services and safe water supplies compared to the majority of the populations of Uganda and Kenya.</p> <p><b>Proximate:</b> strong sense of being neglected and marginalized by colonial and independent governments. The Karamojong strongly hold this view. The Pokot of Uganda maintain that they were and are worse off than the Karamojong. Pokot say they were discriminated against during both the colonial and independent periods. The Karamojong were a much larger group with many educated leaders and government officials. The Pokot of Kenya also maintain that they have been neglected during the colonial and independent periods. They point to the very low levels of education among the pastoral Pokot.</p> <p>Politicization of</p>	<p>regard, they are fulfilling their traditional role as the conscience of the community. The evaluation team witnessed women give powerful speeches at the large workshop in Lokichar organized by OAU/IBAR and attended by Pokot, Karamojong, Tepeth and Turkana.</p> <p>The Kiramiran Women’s peace group (composed of women, primarily Tepeth, from the area near Mt Moroto) started a Peace Choir in early 1999 in their efforts to achieve peace between the then warring Karimojong groups.</p> <p>Some elders are also at the forefront of peacebuilding efforts. After a raid by their own group they track the stolen livestock, identify those who stole the animals, and negotiate the return of some or all of the stolen stock, and sometimes punish the offenders.</p> <p>More attention needs to be paid to the youth,</p>	<p>UPDF personnel were to be deployed along the borders with Kenya and Sudan to protect the residents of Karamoja from cross border raids.</p> <p>Local Governments attempt to provide security in the districts, but are faced with well-armed pastoralists. They have supported the efforts of OAU/IBAR, POKATUSA and others to hold peace meetings.</p> <p>Church groups and church leaders are involved in peace efforts concerning the Pokot-Karamojong conflict, but not to the extent found with some other conflicts in Uganda or Kenya.</p> <p>Since 1999 OAU/IBAR has played a leading role in efforts to address cross-border pastoralist conflicts in the KC, including the conflict between Pokot, Karamojong and Tepeth. Excellent entry point to pastoral societies through their community veterinary program. Visible and</p>	<p>peacebuilding NGOS and CBOs operating.</p> <p>Unlike Turkana district, there is no conflict reduction sub-committee of the District Development Committee (DDC) that actively promotes and coordinates conflict reduction activities.</p> <p>Also unlike Turkana District, there is no combined presence of the GOK’s World Bank funded Arid Lands Resource Management Project (ALRMP) that works closely with OXFAM GB’s Arid Lands Conflict Reduction Project.</p> <p>Unlike Marakwet District, there is no effort to deliberately combine peacebuilding activities with a socio-economic development project that aims to achieve long lasting peace (the efforts by the NCKK Development Programme, the Netherlands Development Organization (SNV) through the Semi-Arid Development</p>

Name	Nature	Actors	Causes	Local Peace Capacities	Outside Interventions	Overview/Other
		Karamojong then formed an alliance with the Turkana and carried out a massive raid on their old ally, the Pokot. Three years of heavy raiding ensued. The Pokot became so destitute that they required famine relief. There were also reported during this period to have been alliances between the Karamojong and Pokot who raided deep into Turkana District, taking huge numbers of livestock.	<p>conflict: it is widely believed in Kenya that the current government in their conflicts favors Pokot with other groups. The Pokot vigorously disagree, stating that the current government also marginalizes them. It is widely believed in Uganda that the Government has allowed the Karamojong to remain armed in order to punish the Teso and Acholi for their rebellions against the center (until the December 2001 launching of the GOU's disarmament campaign)</p> <p>Extraordinary increase in modern firearms. The Karamojong looting of the large Government armory in Moroto in 1979 led to an enormous increase in the possession and use of modern weapons. Pokot obtained modern weapons, initially to defend themselves against their enemies who were now armed.</p> <p>The use of modern weapons has changed</p>	<p>male and female, in peacebuilding and development activities. Given the extremely limited opportunities to earn income and gain wealth, stealing and raiding for livestock may be dangerous but it is very tempting to the young men.</p> <p>It needs to be recognized that the current conflict is far beyond the capacity of traditional peace making and peacebuilding mechanisms alone to effectively cope with.</p> <p><b>Proximate:</b> Conflict continues.</p> <p>Media reports can exaggerate, understate, misrepresent and lead to misunderstanding of conflicts. Politicians and leaders of one group can use them in their efforts to urge their followers to raid another group.</p> <p>Some NGOS have organized seminars for media personnel to sensitize them to conflict issues, and to the importance of</p>	<p>well-known group. Emphasizes traditional leaders in its peacebuilding efforts.</p> <p>The recently established World Vision POKATUSA Peace Project set up a District Peace and Reconciliation Committee in West Pokot (being trained in Nov 2001).</p> <p>At time of the assessment, committee had not been formally approved by the provincial administration in Kenya. Members are capable and knowledgeable, but primarily educated and Christian. The DPRC does not include traditional leadership (a significant omission).</p> <p>The Pokot-Karamoja conflict is a priority for POKATUSA, and the peacebuilding program was launched in Kampala in November. Political leaders said to be strongly supporting these World Vision efforts. Little information available re specific activities in</p>	<p>Programme (SARDEP) in the Kerio Valley.</p> <p>Moreover, there is no parallel to the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative that operates in northeastern Uganda.</p>

Name	Nature	Actors	Causes	Local Peace Capacities	Outside Interventions	Overview/Other
			<p>the nature of conflict, leading to much higher casualties, even among non-combatants who were protected by the traditional rules. This deepens hatred and leads to a culture of revenge.</p> <p>The GOU disarmament campaign led large numbers of Pokot to abandon Uganda and move to Kenya. There is concern that these developments will greatly reduce security in Kenya.</p> <p>The governments' lack of an effective policy to deal with conflict of this nature was and is evident.</p> <p>Introduction of commercial raiding said to be a serious and increasing problem in the KC. Non-Pokot claim Pokot are involved. Those interviewed during the assessment declined to discuss this issue regarding their own district.</p> <p><b>Triggers:</b> Single raid or series of raids. Minor or major incidents of people</p>	<p>accurate and balanced reporting. POKATUSA staff reported that they noted improvements in reporting after training media staff.</p>	<p>Moroto.</p>	

Name	Nature	Actors	Causes	Local Peace Capacities	Outside Interventions	Overview/Other
			being killed. Unknown time lag between trigger and response. Both sides respond with major raids and attacks. Inflammatory public speeches by politicians and others.			

### SUGGESTED PROGRAM APPROACHES FOR THE POKOT - KARAMOJONG CONFLICT

Objective	Causal Factor/Peace Capacity Addressing	Possible Activities to Meet Objective	Possible Implementing Partners
Increase pastoralists' access to dry season and drought reserve grazing areas across international borders	Competition for Scarce Resources/ Patterns of Resource Sharing	Meetings of representatives of concerned communities for problem solving dialogues. Those attending need to include traditional leaders, women, and youth.	OAU/IBAR POKATUSA SNV All have experience in this activity. Situation in Uganda not clear; organizations there focus on other conflicts.
Same as above	Same as above	(a) Review existing knowledge on the subject; identify gaps where necessary. (b) Conduct applied research and identify possible solutions. (c) Advocacy to promote the solutions developed	Local consulting firm. Applied, not academic approach is needed. Involvement of a specialist in the field is essential. Will require working with governments and provincial administration.
Increase women's involvement in conflict reduction activities at various levels	Traditional pastoral cultural values and other causes/capacities	(a) Support women to enable them to become active members in community, division and district conflict reduction committees (b) Carry out Women's Peace Crusades pioneered by OAU/IBAR	OAU/IBAR SNV / CORDAID POKATUSA  (c) The support should include building capacity by training in relevant skills to enable capable women to play larger roles in conflict reduction.
Consistent, well-organized conflict reduction efforts with concerned communities	All	Meetings of representatives of concerned communities for problem solving dialogues. Those attending need to include traditional leaders, women, and youth. Promote capacity building of local organizations involved in CPMR activities.	Requires experienced organizations: OAU/IBAR POKATUSA SNV / CORDAID Unlike Turkana, there are few development or CPMR organizations working in Pokot areas.



Objective	Causal Factor/Peace Capacity Addressing	Possible Activities to Meet Objective	Possible Implementing Partners
			Requires effective involvement of local government.
Same	All	External review of cross-border CPMR activities carried out by OAU/IBAR and others to identify strengths and weaknesses, learn lessons of experience, improve performance	Well qualified consulting firm.
Promote <b>coordination</b> of CPMR activities of the organizations involved within districts and across international borders (to increase effectiveness and reduce duplication)	All	Mechanisms developed and supported to coordinate activities (a) within the specific districts, (b) across international borders. Should include funding for joint activities. Will require coordination efforts by donors themselves and/or national conflict reduction committees.	Establish and/or work with coordination committees. (a) Promote the establishment of district-level conflict reduction committees similar to that in Turkana (b) The national level conflict reduction committee in Kenya and (when established) in Uganda
Reduce poverty / increase opportunities for alternative livelihoods	Poverty, drought, government neglect, regional instability, increase in modern weapons, commercial raiding	Promote realistic alternatives to pastoralism, including: (a) provide appropriate organizational, technical and practical skills to young men and women, (b) provide scholarships to capable students (girls and boys) who would not otherwise be able to complete their education.	SNV & CORDAID.  Church groups could be helpful here. In regard to other activities recommended in this table, it needs to be recognized that church groups and leaders (even those of pastoral origin) often share the anti-pastoralist bias of mainstream society.
Promote effective, long-term peacebuilding activities <b>directly</b> linked to well planned socio-economic development efforts aimed at improved, sustainable natural resource management and increased food security	Competition for scarce resources, drought, poverty, government neglect, regional instability, increase in modern weapons, lack of effective government approach to conflict, “relief vs. development,” weakening of traditional authority structures, commercial raiding	Promote joint peacebuilding and development activities of the kind currently being pioneered by NCKK and SNV/SARDEP in the Kerio Valley	SNV / CORDAID  POKATUSA
Expand horizons of pastoralists regarding conflict issues, some of their traditional cultural practices (e.g. the possibility of reducing the currently very high bride price).  Provide livestock marketing and other relevant information	Traditional pastoral cultural values, poverty, increase in modern weapons, role of the media, defusing triggers  (It was reported to the assessment team that no radio programs in local languages were able to reach Pokot (and presumably Turkana) pastoralists in lowlands.	Promote the use of “Peace Radio” and Audio-Visual aids by funding the development of accurate, objective information for radio broadcast and/or AV regarding (a) conflict reduction activities and (b) possible alternatives to some current pastoral cultural practices.	The key actors in the districts (and neighboring districts) could develop suitable materials: OAU/IBAR, POKATUSA, SNV  Care needs to be taken that this activity is not misused for political, proselytizing and other purposes.

## 2. TURKANA - POKOT – CONFLICT (Kenya-Uganda)

## Conflict Description

Name	Nature	Actors	Causes	Local Peace Capacities	Outside Interventions	Overview/Other
Turkana - Pokot Conflict (Kenya and Uganda)	<p>The Turkana and Pokot consider one another traditional enemies with whom they are, in effect, at war. The Turkana and Pokot have long been in contact, and pastoral Pokot living on the plains have adopted much of the culture of the Turkana.</p> <p>The Turkana were brutally “pacified” by British colonial authorities in military expeditions that continued into the 1920s. In the view of some pastoralists today, the rationale for these harsh actions included the perception that Turkana leaders supported Ethiopia’s expansion efforts in the early decades of the 20th century and the Turkana people were therefore perceived as enemies of the British.</p> <p>A number of Turkana obtained (then) modern firearms from Ethiopia at that time, which gave them a tremendous advantage when raiding neighbors who had no access to modern weapons. The firearms also helped them battle the British. The Turkana lost very large numbers of livestock in these punitive expeditions, significantly weakening their pastoral production systems.</p> <p>On the other hand, some Pokot benefited from the pacification of the Turkana because they took part in the campaigns on the side of the</p>	<p>Turkana VS Pokot. The Turkana are probably the largest of the groups in the Karamoja Cluster. The 17 Turkana sections (sub-tribes) occupy the largest district in Kenya. The central part of this district is very dry. The Turkana are pastoralists, but they forage and grow crops where possible.</p> <p>Some Pokot live in Uganda (Nakapiririt District) while the majority live in Kenya (West Pokot and the northern part of Baringo districts). Pokot describe himself or herself as one people, in spite of the fact that they live in different countries and districts. Pokot are comprised of a highland group of settled agriculturalists with a culture similar to other Kalenjin, and a lowland group of pastoralists and agro-pastoralists that has assimilated much of the pastoral culture of the Karamojong and Turkana.</p>	<p><b>Structural:</b> conflict over good pastureland, particularly near the common border between the two groups. Both the Turkana and Pokot want access to and control over these excellent grazing areas.</p> <p>Much of Turkana District is very dry, and in many places lacks essential dry season grazing areas. Many Turkana are therefore eager to expand into better areas outside their district.</p> <p>In addition, Pokot claim that the Turkwell Gorge, its dam and power plant should be part of West Pokot District, not Turkana District as is the present situation. Pokot further claim that revenue from the power plant should go to West Pokot District, not Turkana District.</p> <p>Shared pastoral cultural values in which livestock raiding is accepted, even</p>	<p><b>Structural:</b> long history of relationships, inter-marriage, and negotiations by elders for access to pasture between the Turkana and Pokot.</p> <p>Shared pastoral culture. However, in spite of this shared culture, Pokot are not one of the Ateker peoples (who share the Karamojong language and culture). This distinction between the two peoples is widely recognized, and it is presented by some as a barrier to establishing lasting peaceful relations between Turkana and Pokot. Concerted efforts should be made to overcome this perceived problem.</p> <p>Women are playing an increasingly important role in peacebuilding in the KC. Because of their recognition that violent conflict has reached unacceptable levels, women are becoming more assertive in challenging</p>	<p>Previously, the Kenya Government has responded to conflict in this area by carrying out major military operations against Turkana (for example, @ 1979) and against Pokot (1984).</p> <p>The Uganda Government has often talked of disarming the Karamojong. In November 2001 the GOU Launched its long awaited disarmament program in Karamoja sub-region. The residents were to begin voluntarily handing in their illegal firearms on December 2, 2001. Under the plan, the Karamojong were given six months to turn in a hoped-for 40,000 weapons. After the initial period, anyone found to possess an illegal gun would be arrested. President Museveni has promised to commit development resources to the area in exchange for weapons. UPDF personnel were to be deployed along</p>	<p>The escalation and changed nature of violence is very disturbing to many in both communities, particularly to women. Since the 1980s, the traditional rules of raiding and warfare have been abandoned and women and children are now being killed. (The great increase in the use of modern firearms is said to be a major contributing factor to the increased levels and new kind of violence.) The killing of non-combatants and other atrocities have increased hatred, leading to a culture of revenge.</p> <p>There is significant development and conflict reduction activity taking place in Turkana district, and in relation to groups outside the district with whom the Turkana are in conflict.</p> <p>This is in sharp contrast to the situation in Pokot areas, where there is little socio-</p>

Name	Nature	Actors	Causes	Local Peace Capacities	Outside Interventions	Overview/Other
	<p>British and were rewarded with captured livestock. These factors increased the animosity of Turkana towards Pokot. There is a view that even today the Turkana people have not fully recovered from the colonial pacification campaigns. On the other hand, some Turkana explained to the assessment team that the colonial period was, compared to the past few years, almost a “golden era” of peace. They argued that the strong actions of the colonial government to prevent cattle raiding and inter-ethnic warfare had been necessary and effective.</p> <p>There has been an enormous increase in the availability and use of modern firearms in the KC. A key reason was the 1979 raid by Karamojong on the GOU armory in Moroto. Karamojong sold weapons to Pokot and Turkana, and this trade became an income generating activity for some pastoralists. Modern weapons are now obtained from Sudan.</p> <p>As a result of conflict between Pokot and Turkana, large areas of excellent grazing land near their common borders have been abandoned and remain empty today. Trading centers and schools stand empty. Socio-economic development has been “lost.”</p> <p>The final column notes that there has been (and is) much less peacebuilding and development activity in West Pokot district than</p>	<p>During a peaceful period prior to 1979, some Turkana moved into Pokot areas. In 1979, drought struck. A number of Pokot and Turkana formed an alliance and carried out a large raid on Karamojong living in Uganda, obtaining a large number of livestock - reportedly decimating the herds of many Karamojong. The Turkana involved in the raid continued to live in Pokot territory. They kept most of the stolen livestock because they had provided more of the firearms and had formed the front line in the raiding party.</p> <p>Later, some Karamojong induced Turkana to move into their territory and marry their girls. Some Karamojong then formed an alliance with the Turkana and carried out a massive raid on their old ally, the Pokot. Three years of heavy raiding ensued. The Pokot became so destitute that they required famine relief. There</p>	<p>encouraged, and killing an enemy in battle earns respect. Very high bride price required to get married. (Turkana say the bride price actually depends on the wealth of the specific families involved.)</p> <p>Decline in rainfall and increased frequency of drought since 1979.</p> <p>General, pervasive poverty with very limited opportunity for young people within and outside the pastoral system. The residents have extremely limited access to education, health services and safe water supplies compared to the majority of the populations of Kenya and Uganda.</p> <p><b>Proximate:</b> both Pokot and Turkana have a strong sense of being neglected and marginalized by colonial and independent governments. The Pokot of Uganda maintain that they were and are worse off than the neighboring</p>	<p>elders and warriors to cultivate peace. In this regard, they are fulfilling their traditional role as the conscience of the community. The evaluation team witnessed women give powerful speeches at the large workshop in Lokichar organized by OAU/IBAR and attended by Pokot, Turkana, Karamojong and Tepeth.</p> <p>Some elders are also at the forefront of peacebuilding efforts. After a raid by their own group they track the stolen livestock, identify those who stole the animals, and negotiate the return of some or all of the stolen stock, and sometimes punish the offenders.</p> <p>More attention needs to be paid to the youth, male and female, in peacebuilding and development activities. Given the extremely limited opportunities to earn income and gain wealth, stealing and raiding for livestock may be dangerous but it is very tempting to</p>	<p>the borders with Kenya and Sudan to protect the residents of Karamoja from cross border raids.</p> <p>Local Governments attempt to provide security in the districts, but are faced with well-armed pastoralists. They have supported the efforts of OAU/IBAR, POKATUSA and others to hold peace meetings.</p> <p>Church groups and church leaders are involved in peace efforts concerning the Turkana – Pokot conflict (Anglican Church of Kenya, NCCCK, Catholic Justice and Peace Programme) but not to the extent found with some other conflicts in Kenya or Uganda.</p> <p>Since 1999 OAU/IBAR has played a leading role in efforts to address cross-border pastoralist conflicts in the KC. OAU/IBAR recognized the importance of including the Pokot-</p>	<p>economic development and peacebuilding activities being carried out or are planned. In West Pokot district (in Kenya) there are few development and peacebuilding NGOS and CBOs operating.</p> <p>Unlike Turkana district, there is no conflict reduction sub-committee of the District Development Committee (DDC) that actively promotes and coordinates conflict reduction activities.</p> <p>Also unlike Turkana District, there is no combined presence of the GOK’s World Bank funded Arid lands Resource Management Project (ALRMP) that works closely with OXFAM GB’s Arid Lands Conflict Reduction Project.</p> <p>Unlike Marakwet District, there is no effort to deliberately combine peacebuilding activities with a socio-economic development project that aims to achieve long lasting peace. In Marakwet there are on-going</p>

Name	Nature	Actors	Causes	Local Peace Capacities	Outside Interventions	Overview/Other
	<p>in Turkana, Marakwet and other districts. An important reason has been past interference by Pokot political leaders in development activities. This has hampered socio-economic development, and it has reduced the willingness of donors and NGOS to invest resources in Pokot areas. A former Minister was prominent in the district and on the national political scene for many years. His reported interference in development projects is thought to be the main reason one donor closed down a major project in the district after many years, and is considered a key reason that some development NGOS avoided working in the district for several years. Current political leaders are said to be eager to change the situation (they are supporting Pokatusa), and the leaders in the district who met with the assessment team clearly stated their view that the district needed to receive more development assistance.</p> <p>Over half of what became Turkana District was transferred from Uganda to Kenya in 1926. Even a brief look at a relief map of this area immediately reveals one source of the problems related to conflict over natural resources in the KC: the international boundary between Uganda and Kenya quite closely follows the natural division between the drier plains to the east (Turkana District) and the wetter higher elevation areas to the west in what was then Karamoja District.</p>	<p>were also reported during this period to have been alliances between the Karamojong and Pokot who raided deep into Turkana District, taking huge numbers of livestock. Many Turkana were forced out of pastoralism as a result. Some became fisher-folk along the shores of Lake Turkana, or are today farmers on irrigation schemes. Others became destitute.</p> <p>Until the 1979 Karamojong raid on the GOU armory in Moroto, the Turkana had more firearms than Karamojong or Pokot. The bolt-action rifles of the Turkana, however, were no match for the AK-47s and similar weapons that have become so widespread in the KC since that time. The Turkana, Pokot and Karamojong now all possess very large numbers of modern firearms. Pastoralists insist that, as the governments of the KC do not provide security, they need the modern weapons to</p>	<p>Karamojong. Pokot say they were discriminated against during both the colonial and independent periods.</p> <p>The Pokot of Kenya also maintain that they have been neglected during the colonial and independent periods. They point to the very low levels of education among the pastoral Pokot.</p> <p>Since the famine of 1980, in Turkana District there has been considerable development activity and food relief from international agencies, bilateral donors, NGOS and church groups.</p> <p>The relief efforts in Turkana District have kept large numbers of people alive but there has not been the development of livelihoods for the great majority of these people who therefore have little opportunity of self-provisioning or “getting ahead” in life. This is one reason for the high incidence of road banditry.</p>	<p>the young men.</p> <p>It needs to be recognized that the current conflict is far beyond the capacity of traditional peace making and peacebuilding mechanisms alone to effectively cope with.</p> <p><b>Proximate:</b> Conflict continues.</p> <p>Media reports can exaggerate, understate, misrepresent and lead to misunderstanding of conflicts. Politicians and leaders of one group can use them in their efforts to urge their followers to raid another group.</p> <p>Some NGOS have organized seminars for media personnel to sensitize them to conflict issues, and to the importance of accurate and balanced reporting. Pokatusa staff reported that they noted improvements in reporting after training media staff.</p>	<p>Turkana conflict in their efforts to deal with the problems in the KC, even though (strictly speaking) the Pokot are outside the conventional definition of the KC. At the Lokichar Workshop attended by the assessment team, Pokot representatives were transported from Uganda and Kenya (West Pokot and Baringo districts) even though this required considerable logistic effort and expense. Representatives of Turkana, from Kenya, and Matheniko and Tepeth From Uganda were also transported to Lokichar for the Workshop.</p> <p>(See the descriptions of OAU/IBAR POKATUSA in the above discussion of the Pokot-Karamojong conflict.)</p> <p>The Turkana –Pokot conflict is a priority for POKATUSA. Political leaders said to be strongly supporting these World Vision efforts.</p>	<p>efforts to develop and carry out such a project in the Kerio Valley by the NCKK Development Programme, the Netherlands Development Organization (SNV) through the Semi-Arid Development Programme (SARDEP).</p> <p>Moreover, there is no parallel to the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative that operates in northeastern Uganda.</p> <p>The consequences in Kenya of the GOU’s Disarmament Campaign in the Karamoja sub-region might be cause for alarm.</p> <p>According to press reports, in November 2001 all of the large number of Turkana residents of Matheniko County of northeastern Uganda moved with their livestock back to Kenya, presumably to avoid GOU efforts to disarm them. At the beginning of the dry season, they drove 60,000 head of cattle</p>

Name	Nature	Actors	Causes	Local Peace Capacities	Outside Interventions	Overview/Other
		<p>provide for their own security.</p> <p>The efforts of colonial and Kenyan authorities to limit the expansion of Turkana from their resource poor district were unable to prevent large numbers of Turkana from moving southeast into Samburu district in Kenya. This situation has led to tensions and considerable conflict.</p> <p>In response, Pokot and Samburu have forged a traditional alliance against their common Turkana enemy.</p> <p>For many years, Pokot have been in conflict with the “Karamojong proper,” the Matheniko, Pian and Bokora (see previous conflict description). In 1973 Turkana and Matheniko forged a peace pact that has endured until the present. The main reason for this long enduring peace pact is that both groups benefited considerably. The Turkana desperately need the dry season grazing available in Matheniko</p>	<p>The Pokot are clearly envious of the development activity that has taken place in Turkana District (but see the first column).</p> <p>Politicization of conflict: it is widely believed in Kenya that the Pokot are favored by the current government in their conflicts with the Turkana and other groups. (This point has been explicitly stated and discussed in the national press, and it was clearly stated in the international press several years ago.)</p> <p>The Pokot vigorously disagree, stating that the current government also marginalizes them. Some Pokot argue that government security forces do not pursue Pokot raiders as vigorously as they do other groups because the security forces fear Pokot warriors. An alternative view is that, as a Kalenjin group, the Pokot are closer to the government than are the Turkana.</p> <p>Extraordinary increase in modern firearms in</p>		<p>Turkana District is a major site for the Arid Lands Resource Management Project (ALRMP: Office of the President of GOK, funded by the World Bank).</p> <p>The ALRMP works closely with OXFAM GB’s Arid Lands Conflict Reduction Project (funded by DFID).</p> <p>SNV, funded by CORDAID, is also involved in pastoral development and conflict reduction activities.</p> <p>Staff of ITDG, POKATUSA and SNV in Turkana District facilitated (and played key roles) at the large December Workshop in Lokichokio organized by OAU/IBAR.</p> <p><b>Turkana District has a conflict reduction sub-committee of the District Development Committee (DDC) that actively promotes and coordinates conflict reduction activities.</b></p> <p>The members of this</p>	<p>out of this valuable dry season grazing area in Uganda.</p> <p>Other press reports stated that, in November-December 2001, large numbers of Pokot resident in Uganda moved with their livestock to Kenya.</p> <p>Both the Turkana and Pokot have abandoned important dry season grazing areas rather than give up their firearms. This is a clear indication of the value placed on such weapons by these pastoralists in the absence of their governments’ capacity to provide effective security.</p> <p>This movement will put great pressure on existing grazing resources in Kenya, and can be expected to lead to deterioration in the condition (and death) of the livestock. Another result could be additional conflict as these pastoralists (a) seek alternative dry season grazing areas (b) raid other groups for livestock.</p>

Name	Nature	Actors	Causes	Local Peace Capacities	Outside Interventions	Overview/Other
		land, and the Matheniko desire the protection against their own enemies provided by the Turkana.	<p>recent years. The Karamojong looting of the large Government armory in Moroto in 1979 led to an enormous increase in the possession and use of modern weapons. Pokot obtained modern weapons, initially to defend themselves against their enemies who were so armed.</p> <p>Some Turkana got rifles long ago and enjoyed an advantage over neighboring groups. In recent years the Sudan has been the main source of modern firearms for Turkana, Pokot and other groups in the KC.</p> <p>The use of modern weapons has changed the nature of conflict, leading to much higher casualties, even among non-combatants who were protected by the traditional rules. This deepens hatred and leads to a culture of revenge.</p> <p>The GOU disarmament campaign led, in late 2001, large numbers of Turkana and Pokot to move from Uganda to Kenya. Loss of access</p>		sub-committee include: ITDG, POKATUSA, OAU/IBAR, OXFAM-GB, ALRMP.	<p>In regard to disarmament, pastoralists in the KC responded that (a) as long as other groups remain armed, and (b) as long as the Sudan remains unstable, it would be unwise and unsafe for them to give up their own weapons.</p> <p>In view of these factors, a valuable step would be to improve inter-state arrangements to enable pastoralists to move their livestock across national boundaries when the need exists. Current inter-state arrangements between Kenya and Uganda regarding the common border in the KC are very limited and ad hoc.</p>

Name	Nature	Actors	Causes	Local Peace Capacities	Outside Interventions	Overview/Other
			<p>to valuable dry season grazing areas could lead to many problems, including increased conflict (see final column).</p> <p>The governments' lack of an effective policy to deal with conflict of this nature was and is evident. The ad hoc nature of inter-state relations concerning the common border between Kenya and Uganda severely limits inter-state efforts to deal with problems.</p> <p>Introduction of commercial raiding said to be a serious and increasing problem in the KC. Non-Pokot claim Pokot are involved. Those interviewed during the assessment declined to discuss this issue regarding their own district.</p> <p><b>Triggers:</b> Single raid or series of raids, especially when people are killed. Inflammatory public speeches by politicians and others. After many years of peace, the killing of one man in 1957 triggered the</p>			

Name	Nature	Actors	Causes	Local Peace Capacities	Outside Interventions	Overview/Other
			present conflict between Pokot and Turkana.			

*(a) SUGGESTED PROGRAM APPROACHES FOR THE TURKANA-POKOT CONFLICT*

Objective	Causal Factor/Peace Capacity Addressing	Possible Activities to Meet Objective	Possible Implementing Partners
Increase pastoralists' access to dry season and drought reserve grazing areas across international borders (Would apply also to Turkana – Dodoth conflict)	Competition for Scarce Resources/ Patterns of Resource Sharing	Meetings of representatives of concerned communities for problem solving dialogues. Those attending need to include traditional leaders, women, youth.	OAU/IBAR ITDG POKATUSA OXFAM-GB ALRMP & SNV All are experienced in this activity.
Same as above	Same as above	(a) Review existing knowledge on the subject; identify gaps where necessary. (b) Conduct applied research and identify possible solutions. (c) Advocacy to promote the solutions developed	Local consulting firm. Applied, not academic approach is needed. Involvement of a specialist in the field is essential. Will require working with governments and provincial administration.
Increase women's involvement in conflict reduction activities at various levels	Traditional pastoral cultural values and other causes/capacities	(a) Support women to enable them to become active members in community, division and district conflict reduction committees (b) Carry out Women's Peace Crusades pioneered by OAU/IBAR	ITDG, POKATUSA, OXFAM-GB, SNV, OAU/IBAR, ALRMP, CORDAID  (c) The support should include building capacity by training in relevant skills to enable capable women to play larger roles in conflict reduction.
Consistent, well-organized conflict reduction efforts with concerned communities	All	Meetings of representatives of concerned communities for problem solving dialogues. Those attending need to include traditional leaders, women, youth. Promote capacity building of local organizations involved in CPMR activities.	Requires experienced organizations: OAU/IBAR, ITDG, POKATUSA, SNV, OXFAM-GB, ALRMP.  Requires effective involvement of local government.
Same	All	External review of cross-border CPMR activities carried out by OAU/IBAR and others to identify strengths and weaknesses, learn lessons of experience, improve performance	Well qualified consulting firm.



Objective	Causal Factor/Peace Capacity Addressing	Possible Activities to Meet Objective	Possible Implementing Partners
Promote coordination of CPMR activities of the organizations involved within districts and across international borders (to increase effectiveness and reduce duplication)	All	Mechanisms developed and supported to coordinate activities (a) within the specific districts, (b) across international borders. Should include funding for joint activities. Will require coordination efforts by donors themselves and/or national conflict reduction committees.	(a) For Turkana District: the district-level Conflict Reduction sub-committee of the District Development Committee (DDC). (b) The national level conflict reduction committee in Kenya. (c) Unknown for Sudan.
Reduce poverty / increase opportunities for alternative livelihoods	Poverty, drought, government neglect, regional instability, increase in modern weapons, commercial raiding	Promote realistic alternatives to pastoralism, including: (a) provide appropriate organizational, technical and practical skills to young men and women, (b) provide scholarships to capable students (girls and boys) who would not otherwise be able to complete their education.	SNV & CORDAID.  Church groups could be helpful here. In regard to other activities recommended in this table, it needs to be recognized that church groups and leaders (even those of pastoral origin) often share the anti-pastoralist bias of mainstream society.
Promote effective, long-term peacebuilding activities directly linked to well planned socio-economic development efforts aimed at improved, sustainable natural resource management and increased food security	Competition for scarce resources, drought, poverty, government neglect, regional instability, increase in modern weapons, lack of effective government approach to conflict, “relief vs. development,” weakening of traditional authority structures, commercial raiding	Promote joint peacebuilding and development activities of the kind currently being pioneered by NCKK and SNV/SARDEP in the Kerio Valley	ALRMP OXFAM-GB ITDG POKATUSA SNV CORDAID
Expand horizons of pastoralists regarding conflict issues and some of their traditional cultural practices (such as the possibility of reducing the currently very high bride price).  Provide livestock marketing and other relevant information	Traditional pastoral cultural values, poverty, increase in modern weapons, role of the media, defusing triggers  (It was reported to the assessment team that no radio programs in local languages were able to reach Pokot (and presumably Turkana) pastoralists in the lowlands.)	Promote the use of “Peace Radio” and Audio-Visual aids by funding the development of accurate, objective information for radio broadcast and/or AV regarding (a) conflict reduction activities and (b) possible alternatives to some current pastoral cultural practices.	The key actors in Turkana district could develop suitable materials: ITDG, OXFAM-GB, SNV, OAU/IBAR, POKATUSA.  Care needs to be taken that this activity is not misused for political, proselytizing and other purposes.

### 3. TURKANA - TOPOSA – CONFLICT (Kenya-Sudan)

#### Conflict Description

Name	Nature	Actors	Causes	Local Peace Capacities	Outside Interventions	Overview/Other
Turkana – Toposa Conflict	The Turkana and Toposa are both Ateker peoples, as they share the Karamojong language	Turkana VS Toposa. The Turkana of NW Kenya and the Toposa	<b>Structural:</b> conflict over access to good pastureland.	<b>Structural:</b> long history of relationships, inter-	Previously, the Kenya Government has responded to conflict	The escalation and changed nature of violence is very

Name	Nature	Actors	Causes	Local Peace Capacities	Outside Interventions	Overview/Other
(Kenya and Sudan)	<p>and pastoral culture. The two groups have long been in contact. There is currently serious conflict between the two groups, and the situation is very tense. In late December 2001, the international press reported fighting in which a total of 55 Toposa and Turkana were killed.</p> <p>The most important external factor affecting conflict and related issues in the KC is the existence of two major actors, the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the SPLA, competing for allies among the various ethnic groups in Southern Sudan. In the pursuit of their own objectives, these two actors forge alliances with members of certain ethnic groups and then arm and support these groups.</p> <p>In some cases, the GOS and SPLA arm and support different elements within, or different territorial sections of, the same ethnic groups (for example, the Toposa). The Toposa then use the ready supply of modern firearms and ammunition to raid their neighbors to acquire livestock. The results of the tactics of the GOS and SPLA have included an enormous increase in modern weapons, increased conflict, and very well armed groups raiding other groups for cattle.</p> <p>The raids may or may not have anything to do with the pursuit of</p>	<p>of SE Sudan are each large, very well armed pastoral groups. According to some observers, they are equally matched in their conflict.</p> <p>The Turkana may be the largest of the Karamoja Cluster groups, but there are said to be nearly as many Toposa. (The population of Turkana District was reported to be 482,000. No estimate of the Toposa population was available.) The 17 Turkana sections (sub-tribes) occupy the largest district in Kenya. The central part of this district is very dry. The Turkana are pastoralists, but they forage and grow crops where possible.</p> <p>The Toposa live near Kapoeta and Torit in southeastern Sudan. Agro-ecological conditions in Toposa territory are better than in much of Turkana District. The Toposa grow crops, particularly sorghum, to a much greater extent than do</p>	<p>Much of Turkana District is very dry, and in many places lacks essential dry season grazing areas. In dry years, and especially during periods of drought, Turkana require pasture and water outside their own district if their herds are to survive. This means moving with their livestock into Sudan and/or Uganda.</p> <p>However, Turkana, Toposa and Nyangatom have frequently shared dry season and drought reserve grazing areas and water points. They do not attack one another during such drought periods of peaceful co-existence.</p> <p>Shared pastoral cultural values in which livestock raiding is accepted, even encouraged, and killing an enemy in battle earns respect. Very high bride price required to get married. (Turkana say the bride price actually depends on the wealth of the specific families</p>	<p>marriage, and negotiations by elders for access to pasture between the Toposa and Turkana.</p> <p>It is very significant that Turkana, Toposa and Nyangatom have often shared key dry season grazing and drought reserve areas and water points, reportedly even during periods of conflict.</p> <p>The recent and current divisions within Toposa society caused by the support of different factions of Toposa by the GOS and SPLA are said to have destroyed the trust that existed in the traditional relations between Toposa and Turkana.</p> <p>Shared pastoral culture. Both the Toposa and Turkana are Ateker peoples with shared language and other aspects.</p> <p>Women are playing an increasingly important role in peacebuilding in the KC. Because of their recognition that violent conflict has reached unacceptable</p>	<p>in this area by carrying out major military operations against raiders.</p> <p>The Government of Sudan and the SPLA have supported and armed different factions of the Toposa in their efforts to promote their own interests in the civil war. These steps have encouraged raiding by Toposa of Turkana and others.</p> <p>These factors clearly complicate efforts to resolve conflict and promote peace between the Toposa and Turkana.</p> <p>As part of its Disarmament campaign in Karamoja sub-region, launched in December 2001, the Government of Uganda was to deploy UPDF personnel along the borders with Kenya and Sudan to protect the residents of Karamoja from cross border raids.</p> <p>Local Governments attempt to provide security in the districts, but are faced with</p>	<p>disturbing to many in both communities, particularly to women. Since the 1980s, the traditional rules of raiding and warfare have been abandoned and women and children are now being killed. (The great increase in the use of modern firearms is said to be a major contributing factor to the increased levels and new kind of violence.) The killing of non-combatants and other atrocities have increased hatred, leading to a culture of revenge.</p> <p>There is significant development and conflict reduction activity taking place in Turkana district, and in relation to groups outside the district with whom the Turkana are in conflict.</p> <p>This is in sharp contrast to the situation in Toposa areas of Southern Sudan.</p> <p>Unlike Turkana District, in Southern Sudan there is no conflict reduction sub-committee of the</p>

Name	Nature	Actors	Causes	Local Peace Capacities	Outside Interventions	Overview/Other
	<p>the objectives of the Government of Sudan or the SPLA, but they enormously increase and complicate efforts to resolve conflict and promote peace in the Karamoja Cluster. Certain elements of some groups, including the Toposa, seem to clearly benefit from the lack of effective administrative control in the area, as it allows them to organize and carry out livestock raids with relative impunity.</p> <p>The Turkana were brutally “pacified” by British colonial authorities in military expeditions that continued into the 1920s. In the view of some pastoralists today, the rationale for these harsh actions included the perception that Turkana leaders supported Ethiopia’s expansion efforts in the early decades of the 20th century and the Turkana people were therefore perceived as enemies of the British.</p> <p>A number of Turkana obtained (then) modern firearms from Ethiopia at that time, which gave them a tremendous advantage when raiding neighbors who had no access to modern weapons. The firearms also helped them battle the British. The Turkana lost very large numbers of livestock in these punitive expeditions, significantly weakening their pastoral production systems.</p>	<p>Turkana.</p> <p>Turkana and Toposa have been in contact for a very long time. They have shared grazing areas and water for long periods, punctuated by livestock raids and periods of conflict. According to legend, the very first Turkana raid for cattle was against Toposa.</p> <p>Turkana consider Toposa to be merely livestock thieves, whereas they consider themselves the more highly respected and skilled livestock raiders. When asked to comment on this Turkana view, the Toposa questioned did not agree.</p> <p>The Ilemi Triangle was the name of an area of the Sudan administered as part of Kenya’s Turkana District during the colonial period. The area enclosed by the Ilemi Triangle was reportedly intended to include the northern grazing areas of the Turkana people. In recent years, an enlarged version of the</p>	<p>involved.)</p> <p>Decline in rainfall and increased frequency of drought since 1979.</p> <p>General, pervasive poverty with very limited opportunity for young people within and outside the pastoral system. The residents have extremely limited access to education, health services and safe water supplies compared to the majority of the populations of Kenya and Uganda.</p> <p>The long running civil war in Southern Sudan has, in many cases, reduced the already very limited access to education, health services and safe water supplies. The war has led to great insecurity, violent conflicts, and destitution for many. The civil war has also greatly limited efforts at socio-economic development.</p> <p><b>Proximate:</b> both Toposa and Turkana have a strong sense of being neglected and marginalized by</p>	<p>levels, women are becoming more assertive in challenging elders and warriors to cultivate peace.</p> <p>In this regard, women are fulfilling their traditional role as the conscience of the community. The evaluation team witnessed women give powerful speeches at the large meeting in Lokichokio organized by OAU/IBAR and attended by Turkana and Toposa.</p> <p>Some elders are also at the forefront of peacebuilding efforts. After a raid by their own group they track the stolen livestock, identify those who stole the animals, and negotiate the return of some or all of the stolen stock, and sometimes punish the offenders.</p> <p>More attention needs to be paid to the youth, male and female, in peacebuilding and development activities. Given the extremely limited opportunities to earn income and gain wealth, stealing and</p>	<p>well-armed pastoralists. They have supported the efforts of OAU/IBAR, POKATUSA, ITDG, OXFAM and others to hold peace meetings.</p> <p>Information was not obtained regarding the activities in Southern Sudan of church groups, NGOS and others in peace efforts concerning the Turkana – Toposa conflict (the assessment team member who was to collect this information was unable to travel to Lokichokio as planned).</p> <p>The activities of church groups regarding the Turkana-Toposa conflict in general seem far less than the activities concerning some other conflicts in Kenya or Uganda.</p> <p>Since 1999 OAU/IBAR has played a leading role in efforts to address cross-border pastoralist conflicts in the KC. OAU/IBAR</p> <p>At the large meeting in Lokichokio organized</p>	<p>District Development Committee (DDC) that actively promotes and coordinates conflict reduction activities.</p> <p>Also unlike Turkana District, in Southern Sudan there is no combined presence of the GOK’s World Bank funded Arid lands Resource Management Project (ALRMP) that works closely with OXFAM GB’s Arid Lands Conflict Reduction Project.</p> <p>Unlike Marakwet District, in neither northern Turkana District nor Southern Sudan is there an effort to deliberately combine peacebuilding activities with a socio-economic development project that aims to achieve long lasting peace. In Marakwet there are on-going efforts to develop and carry out such a project in the Kerio Valley by the NCKK Development Programme, the Netherlands Development Organization (SNV) through the Semi-Arid</p>

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	<p>There is a view that even today the Turkana people have not fully recovered from the colonial pacification campaigns. On the other hand, some Turkana explained to the assessment team that the colonial period was, compared to the past few years, almost a “golden era” of peace.</p> <p>They argued that the strong actions of the colonial government to prevent cattle raiding and inter-ethnic warfare had been necessary and effective.</p> <p>The final column notes that there has been (and is) much less peacebuilding and development activity in Toposa areas of Southern Sudan than in Turkana District. The main reason is that the long running civil war in Southern Sudan makes development and conflict reduction activities very difficult.</p> <p>Even a brief look at a relief map of this area immediately reveals one source of the problems related to conflict over natural resources in the KC: the international boundary between Uganda and Kenya quite closely follows the natural division between the drier plains to the east (Turkana District) and the wetter higher elevation areas to the west in what was formerly Karamoja District of Uganda.</p> <p>Toposa land in Southern Sudan is</p>	<p>original Ilemi Triangle has in effect become part of Kenya.</p> <p>The Turkana people faced difficult problems beginning with the severe drought of 1979-1980. During this period there were reported to have been raids against Turkana by various groups of the Karamoja Cluster. For example, there are reports of alliances between the Karamojong and Pokot who raided deep into Turkana District, taking huge numbers of livestock. Many Turkana were forced out of pastoralism as a result. Some became fisher-folk along the shores of Lake Turkana, or are today farmers on irrigation schemes. Others became destitute.</p> <p>While the Turkana and Toposa are now in conflict, the Turkana and Didinga (a non-Ateker group living in SE Sudan) are allied. The Turkana have an “on-again, off-again” conflict-peace relationship with the Dodoth of Uganda.</p>	<p>colonial and independent governments.</p> <p>The warring factions in Sudan’s civil war have also deliberately divided the Toposa. A very important result is that this division, and other factors related to civil war based alliances, has changed the traditional relationship that formerly existed between Toposa and Turkana. The external factors have driven wedges of distrust between the Turkana and Toposa.</p> <p>Since the famine of 1980, in Turkana District there has been considerable development activity and food relief from international agencies, bilateral donors, NGOS and church groups. This is in stark contrast to the limited activity that has taken place in Toposa areas.</p> <p>The tiny center of Lokichokio in the extreme northwest of Kenya has boomed in recent years because it serves as the</p>	<p>raiding for livestock may be dangerous but it is very tempting to the young men.</p> <p>It needs to be recognized that the current conflict is far beyond the capacity of traditional peace making and peacebuilding mechanisms alone to effectively cope with.</p> <p>This point was very clear at the large meeting in Lokichokio of representatives of Turkana and Toposa organized by OAU/IBAR.</p> <p><b>Proximate:</b> Conflict continues.</p> <p>Media reports can exaggerate, understate, misrepresent and lead to misunderstanding of conflicts. Politicians and leaders of one group can use them in their efforts to urge their followers to raid another group.</p>	<p>by OAU/IBAR and attended the assessment team, pastoralists attending were transported from Sudan and Kenya even though this required considerable logistic effort and expense.</p> <p>(See the descriptions of OAU/IBAR POKATUSA in the above discussion of the Pokot-Karamojong conflict.)</p> <p>Toposa and Turkana representatives at the December OAU/IBAR meeting said that they were becoming tired of the repeated meetings in Lokichokio, and they urged the staff of the organizations facilitating the meeting to develop other strategies and approaches in efforts to cope with the complex issues involved. Local people suggested meetings be held in the grazing areas with key decision-makers and others.</p> <p>ITDG is playing a major role in conflict reduction efforts in Turkana District, particularly in the</p>	<p>Development Programme (SARDEP).</p> <p>Moreover, in the Toposa-Turkana conflict there is no parallel to the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative that operates in northeastern Uganda.</p> <p>In regard to disarmament, pastoralists in the KC responded that (a) as long as other groups remain armed, and (b) as long as the Sudan remains unstable, it would be unwise and unsafe for them to give up their own weapons.</p> <p>Pastoralists insist that, as the governments of the KC do not provide security, they need the modern weapons to provide for their own security.</p> <p>In view of these factors, a valuable step would be to improve inter-state arrangements to enable pastoralists to move their livestock across national boundaries when the need exists. Current inter-state</p>

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	better in agro-ecological terms. During severe or protracted drought, Turkana livestock need access to the pasture and water available in Toposa and/or Uganda.	<p>The Dodoth and Didinga are currently at peace.</p> <p>The Toposa are in conflict with both the Didinga and Dodoth.</p>	<p>headquarters of Operation Lifeline Sudan. This center is an important source of goods for Toposa, and serves as the headquarters of the Diocese of Torit and other church groups and NGOS working in Southern Sudan.</p> <p>The relief efforts in Turkana District have kept large numbers of people alive but there has not been the development of livelihoods for the great majority of these people who therefore have little opportunity of self-provisioning or “getting ahead” in life. This is one reason for the high incidence of road banditry in the district.</p> <p>In Sudan, the problem of road banditry is dwarfed by war related activities.</p> <p>The Toposa may well be envious of the development activity that has taken place in Turkana District, and of the relatively greater opportunities that exist for better educated Turkana compared to</p>		<p>northern part of the district.</p> <p>Both the ITDG and Pokatusa representatives in Turkana District facilitated at the large December meeting in Lokichokio organized by OAU/IBAR.</p> <p>Turkana District is a major site for the Arid Lands Resource Management Project (ALRMP: Office of the President of GOK, funded by the World Bank).</p> <p>The ALRMP works closely with OXFAM GB’s Arid Lands Conflict Reduction Project (funded by DFID).</p> <p>SNV, funded by CORDAID, is also involved in pastoral development and conflict reduction activities in Turkana district.</p> <p><b>Turkana District has a conflict reduction sub-committee of the District Development Committee (DDC) that actively promotes and</b></p>	<p>arrangements between Kenya and Sudan regarding the common border in the KC are very limited and ad hoc.</p> <p>Recognizing the valuable role of women in the Karamoja Cluster in regard to reducing conflict, in July 2001 OAU/IBAR sponsored a <b>Women’s Peace Crusade</b>, known as <i>Alokita</i> in the local language. For 12 days women from Turkana, Toposa, Didinga and Nyangatom traveled in Toposa and Nyangatom areas of Southern Sudan.</p> <p>The women carried their message to elders, warriors and other women. In doing so, they carry out their traditional role as the conscience of their communities. The women express their message through songs, poems, dances and speeches.</p> <p>ITDG staff in Turkana played a key facilitating role in this Women’s Peace Crusade.</p>

Name	Nature	Actors	Causes	Local Peace Capacities	Outside Interventions	Overview/Other
			<p>less educated Toposa.</p> <p>Politicization of conflict: The competition for allies between the Government of Sudan and the SPLA in Southern Sudan is a powerful cause of conflict in the KC in general and the Toposa-Turkana relationship in particular.</p> <p>The GOS and SPLA each support and arm a different faction of Toposa. This provides the different Toposa groups with the weapons and ammunition to raid their neighbors for livestock. The situation also provides some raiders with sanctuary for themselves and the raided livestock, beyond the reach of other authority.</p> <p>There has been an extraordinary increase in the availability and use of modern firearms in recent years. The Sudan has been the main source for the groups of the KC. The Toposa are provided with modern weapons</p>		<p><b>coordinates conflict reduction activities.</b> The members of this sub-committee include: ITDG, POKATUSA, OAU/IBAR, OXFAM-GB, ALRMP.</p>	<p>In August 2001 there was a second Women's Peace Crusade. Turkana women spent 10 days exchanging views with Jie, Tepeth, Dodoth and Matheniko groups in Kotido and Moroto districts of Uganda.</p> <p>In early December 2001 there was a large, two-day meeting organized by OAU/IBAR in Lokichokio to promote peace between the Toposa and Turkana. In addition to OAU/IBAR, the meeting was facilitated by senior district staff of ITDG and POKATUSA, and attended by senior district staff of ALRMP and OXFAM-GB. In addition, the Turkana District Officer, his Sudanese counterpart and the KC assessment team also attended this meeting.</p> <p>About three weeks after the meeting there was an outbreak of conflict in the Lokichokio area in which 55 Turkana and Toposa were killed.</p>

Name	Nature	Actors	Causes	Local Peace Capacities	Outside Interventions	Overview/Other
			<p>by the GOS and SPLA Long ago, some Turkana got rifles and enjoyed an advantage over neighboring groups. Today Turkana obtain modern weapons from Didinga, Toposa and others in the Sudan.</p> <p>The use of modern weapons has changed the nature of conflict, leading to much higher casualties, even among non-combatants who were protected by the traditional rules. This deepens hatred and leads to a culture of revenge. (Some young Toposa interviewed claimed that Toposa have always killed women during raids; this point was not confirmed.)</p> <p>There are no effective policies on the part of the Government of Kenya, Government of Sudan or the SPLA to successfully reduce the Toposa-Turkana conflict. Instead, the civil war in Sudan fuels the conflict and significantly restricts efforts to build peace between the two Ateker groups. The</p>			<p>Reports of this fighting in the international press referred to the then recent meeting aimed at promoting peace.</p> <p>There appears to be a pattern in some KC conflicts for raids to be deliberately carried out in efforts to disrupt other efforts being taken to reduce conflict and promote peacebuilding.</p>

Name	Nature	Actors	Causes	Local Peace Capacities	Outside Interventions	Overview/Other
			<p>complications regarding inter-state relations concerning the common border between Kenya and Sudan severely limits inter-state efforts to deal with this conflict.</p> <p><b>Triggers:</b> Single raid or series of raids, especially when people are killed. It was reported that in many cases, Toposa would carry out a series of raids and then Turkana would respond with massive retaliation. Inflammatory public speeches by politicians and others.</p>			

#### SUGGESTED PROGRAM APPROACHES FOR THE TURKANA-TOPOSA CONFLICT

Objective	Causal Factor/Peace Capacity Addressing	Possible Activities to Meet Objective	Possible Implementing Partners
Increase pastoralists' access to dry season and drought reserve grazing areas across international borders (Would apply also to Turkana – Dodoth conflict)	Competition for Scarce Resources/ Patterns of Resource Sharing	Meetings of representatives of concerned communities for problem solving dialogues. Those attending need to include traditional leaders, women, youth.	OAU/IBAR ITDG POKATUSA OXFAM-GB ALRMP & SNV All are experienced in this activity. Situation in Sudan not known.
Same as above	Same as above	(a) Review existing knowledge on the subject; identify gaps where necessary. (b) Conduct applied research and identify possible solutions. (c) Advocacy to promote the solutions developed	Local consulting firm. Applied, not academic approach is needed. Involvement of a specialist in the field is essential. Will require working with governments, SPLA and provincial administration.
Increase women's involvement in conflict	Traditional pastoral cultural values and	(a) Support women to enable them to	ITDG, POKATUSA, OXFAM-GB,



Objective	Causal Factor/Peace Capacity Addressing	Possible Activities to Meet Objective	Possible Implementing Partners
reduction activities at various levels	other causes/capacities	become active members in community, division and district conflict reduction committees (b) Carry out Women's Peace Crusades pioneered by OAU/IBAR	OAU/IBAR, ALRMP, SNV / CORDAID  (c) The support should include building capacity by training in relevant skills to enable capable women to play larger roles in conflict reduction.
Consistent, well-organized conflict reduction efforts with concerned communities	All	Meetings of representatives of concerned communities for problem solving dialogues. Those attending need to include traditional leaders, women, youth. Promote capacity building of local organizations involved in CPMR activities.	Requires experienced organizations: OAU/IBAR, ITDG, POKATUSA, SNV, OXFAM-GB, ALRMP.  Requires effective involvement of local government.
Same	All	External review of cross-border CPMR activities carried out by OAU/IBAR and others to identify strengths and weaknesses, learn lessons of experience, improve performance	Well qualified consulting firm.
Promote coordination of CPMR activities of the organizations involved within districts and across international borders (to increase effectiveness and reduce duplication)	All	Mechanisms developed and supported to coordinate activities (a) within the specific districts, (b) across international borders. Should include funding for joint activities. Will require coordination efforts by donors themselves and/or national conflict reduction committees.	(a) For Turkana District: the district-level Conflict Reduction sub-committee of the District Development Committee (DDC). (b) The national level conflict reduction committee in Kenya. (c) Unknown for Sudan.
Reduce poverty / increase opportunities for alternative livelihoods	Poverty, drought, government neglect, regional instability, increase in modern weapons, commercial raiding	Promote realistic alternatives to pastoralism, including: (a) provide appropriate organizational, technical and practical skills to young men and women, (b) provide scholarships to capable students (girls and boys) who would not otherwise be able to complete their education.	SNV & CORDAID.  Church groups could be helpful here. In regard to other activities recommended in this table, it needs to be recognized that church groups and leaders (even those of pastoral origin) often share the anti-pastoralist bias of mainstream society.
Promote effective, long-term peacebuilding activities directly linked to well planned socio-economic development efforts aimed at improved, sustainable natural resource management and increased food security	Competition for scarce resources, drought, poverty, government neglect, regional instability, increase in modern weapons, lack of effective government approach to conflict, "relief vs. development," weakening of traditional authority structures, commercial raiding	Promote joint peacebuilding and development activities of the kind currently being pioneered by NCCCK and SNV/SARDEP in the Kerio Valley	ALRMP OXFAM-GB ITDG POKATUSA SNV CORDAID
Expand horizons of pastoralists regarding	Traditional pastoral cultural values,	Promote the use of "Peace Radio" and	The key actors in Turkana district could

<b>Objective</b>	<b>Causal Factor/Peace Capacity Addressing</b>	<b>Possible Activities to Meet Objective</b>	<b>Possible Implementing Partners</b>
<p>conflict issues, some of their traditional cultural practices (such as the possibility of reducing the currently very high bride price).</p> <p>Provide livestock marketing and other relevant information</p>	<p>poverty, increase in modern weapons, role of the media, defusing triggers</p> <p>(It was reported to the assessment team that no radio programs in local languages were able to reach Pokot (and presumably Turkana) pastoralists in the lowlands.)</p>	<p>Audio-Visual aids by funding the development of accurate, objective information for radio broadcast and/or AV regarding (a) conflict reduction activities and (b) possible alternatives to some current pastoral cultural practices.</p>	<p>develop suitable materials: ITDG, OXFAM-GB, SNV, OAU/IBAR, POKATUSA.</p> <p>Care needs to be taken that this activity is not misused for political, proselytizing and other purposes.</p>

### 3. POKOT – MARAKWET CONFLICT (Kenya)

#### *(b) Description of Conflict*

Name	Nature	Actors	Causes	Local Peace Capacities	Outside Interventions	Overview/Other
Pokot-Marakwet Conflict (Kenya, North Rift)	<p>Long history of cattle thefts between the two ethnic groups. Some conflict in the past.</p> <p>Conflict escalated in 1970s, became serious in 1992 and even more serious in 1997-98.</p> <p>Major attack by Pokot (reportedly from Baringo district) on Marakwet in early 2001, with very heavy loss of life and property. Large areas on the floor of the Kerio Valley (including irrigated and other farms, schools, clinics) abandoned by Marakwet. No effective Government response to date. Situation remains serious and tense today.</p>	<p>Pokot and Marakwet, neighboring Kalenjin speaking groups. Long history of intermarriage. Both groups live in the Rift Valley highlands, escarpment and lowlands.</p> <p>Pokot are comprised of a highland group of settled agriculturalists with a culture similar to Marakwet and other Kalenjin, and a lowland group of pastoralists and agro-pastoralists that has assimilated much of the pastoral culture of the Karamojong and Turkana.</p> <p>Most Marakwet are farmers with smallholdings of livestock. They live in the highlands, along the Kerio Valley escarpment and on the valley floor. Irrigated agriculture is important for some Marakwet.</p> <p>One lowland group of</p>	<p><b>Structural:</b> conflict over dry season grazing area in the Kerio Valley within Marakwet district. Pastoral cultural values of Pokot and to lesser degree of Marakwet. General poverty.</p> <p><b>Proximate:</b> strong sense of being neglected and marginalized by colonial and independent governments, particularly on the part of the Pokot.</p> <p>Politicization of conflict: it is widely believed in Kenya that Pokot are favored by the current government in this conflict, and that the government did not respond effectively to Pokot attacks on Marakwet because many Marakwet had voted for the opposition in 1992 general elections.</p> <p>Extraordinary increase in modern firearms.</p>	<p><b>Structural:</b> long history of relationships, intermarriage, negotiations for access to pasture between the two groups. Similar language, although Pokot is quite different from other Kalenjin languages. Similar culture in highlands. To some degree, similar pastoral culture in lowlands.</p> <p><b>Proximate:</b> the Pokot and Marakwet living in the highlands were able to forge a traditional peace pact in 1998 so that conflict ceased in the highlands (this is very significant). Conflict continues in the lowlands of the Kerio Valley, and partially extends up the escarpment from the valley floor.</p>	<p>Previously, Government has carried out military operations against Pokot (with a major operation in 1984) primarily because of conflict between Pokot and other groups, not Marakwet.</p> <p>Church groups and church leaders are very involved in peace efforts, including the NCKK, ACK, and Catholic Justice and Peace Prog. Recently NCKK has established and supported MAPO (Marakwet –Pokot) peace committees that hold regular meetings. MAPO membership is primarily educated and Christian, and does not appear to include traditional leadership (a significant omission).</p> <p>A particularly appropriate outside intervention has been recently initiated. Recognizing that achieving long-lasting peace requires effective</p>	<p>The escalation and changed nature of violence is very disturbing to many in both communities, particularly to women. Since the 1990s, the traditional rules of raiding and warfare have been abandoned and women and children are now being killed. (The great increase in the use of modern firearms is said to be a major contributing factor to the increased levels and new kind of violence.) The killing of non-combatants and other atrocities have increased hatred, leading to a culture of revenge.</p> <p>In regard to obtaining modern weapons, Marakwet have been at a significant disadvantaging vis a vis Pokot, as Marakwet do not have access to an international border. Marakwet obtained modern firearms from</p>

Name	Nature	Actors	Causes	Local Peace Capacities	Outside Interventions	Overview/Other
		<p>Marakwet reportedly has adopted the pastoral culture of the Turkana and lowland Pokot.</p> <p>A far higher proportion of Marakwet are educated than are Pokot or Turkana.</p>	<p>Pokot acquired modern weapons before Marakwet because some Pokot live in Uganda and along the Kenya-Uganda border so they had easier access to firearms. Pokot believed they needed modern weapons to protect themselves from the Karamojong who obtained firearms in enormous numbers beginning in 1979.</p> <p>Pokot began attacking Marakwet with modern weapons in 1992, leading the Marakwet to rapidly obtain arms to defend themselves (from those with access to arms in Somalia, Uganda, Sudan). Once armed, Marakwet launched major counter raids on Pokot.</p> <p>Introduction of commercial raiding said to be a serious and increasing problem in the KC. Non-Pokot claim Pokot are involved. Those interviewed during the assessment declined to discuss this issue regarding their own district.</p>		<p>and sustainable development (and that peacebuilding and development are both necessary and complementary), two key organizations in the area have joined together to try to achieve long-term solutions: (1) the National Council of Churches of Kenya Development Programme (NCKK) and (2) the Netherlands Development Organization (SNV) through the existing Semi-Arid Development Programme (SARDEP).</p>	<p>those with access to such weapons in Somalia, Uganda and Sudan. One unusual feature in Marakwet is that reportedly many of the modern firearms are owned communally. This was not reported for other groups.</p>

Name	Nature	Actors	Causes	Local Peace Capacities	Outside Interventions	Overview/Other
			<p>The government's lack of an effective policy to deal with conflict of this nature was and is evident.</p> <p><b>Triggers:</b> Single raid or series of raids. Minor incidents of 1-2 people being killed. Long time lag between trigger and response. Both sides respond with major raids and attacks.</p>			

## 5. THE JIE, MATHENIKO AND PIAN (some sources indicate Turkana involvement) AGAINST THE BOKORA (UGANDA)

## 6. THE KARMAJONG-ITESO CONFLICT (UGANDA)

## 7. THE JIE-ACHOLI CONFLICT (UGANDA)<sup>54</sup>

### (c) Description of Conflict

Name	Nature	Actors	Causes	Local Peace Capacities	Outside Interventions	Overview/Other
<p>"Jie, Matheniko and Pian (Turkana) VS Bokora Battles/War"</p> <p>Place: Kalsarich and other areas in</p>	<p>History: Internal Karamajong groupings, longstanding grievances, contention over resources, revenge and escalation of violence</p>	<p>Jie, Matheniko and Pian, at least one source indicates that Turkana were also involved. These groups were allied against the Bokora. (UPDF/Army was not involved, nor was there any reported</p>	<p><b>Structural:</b> Erratic rainfall, seasonal resources /forage/water availability, traditional alliance between Turkana and Matheniko, Pian and Bokora are traditional enemies; historical</p>	<p><b>Structural:</b> common language, common history/origin myth (for Matheniko, Pian, Bokora), economically interdependent, a history of negotiated patterns of resource use, better rainfall in 2001</p>	<p>In important ways, these battles served as wake-up call and a watershed event. In the aftermath of this conflict, a number of both outside groups, and the communities involved have</p>	<p>No coordination of efforts events there remains a ver Women's involvement in this set of conflicts.</p> <p>The Kiramiran Women's Peace group (women from all the sub-valleys around Mt.</p>

<sup>54</sup> The team has not suggested specific programs to address conflict for these conflicts because they do not seem to fit REDSO's newly emerged criteria.

Name	Nature	Actors	Causes	Local Peace Capacities	Outside Interventions	Overview/Other
<p>Kotido, Moroto Districts</p> <p>Time: March-September 1999, and continues in 2000</p>		involvement of other security forces, police, etc.)	<p>neglect of Karamoja in terms of socio/economic development;</p> <p><b>Proximate:</b> Capture of resources (cows, forage, and water) and patterns of revenge, availability of arms and ammunition, inadequate response on the part of state institutions, and civil society, neglect on the part of the state, non-reporting or underreporting of violent incidents; cultural reinvigoration and unanimity supports violent responses</p> <p><b>Immediate Factors:</b> Speculate that the factors included revenge, and escalation from lower-level raiding practices and alliances</p>	<p>has meant more food and fodder</p> <p><b>Proximate:</b> it seems that to a large extent, the contending parties themselves reached a level of violence that they were unwilling or unable to sustain; the “peace” vigilantes (started by the Catholics) and then picked up by the state, served for a time, to protect some communities; Largely in response to this high level of violence, a number of CSOs, NGOS, and church groups began to mobilize a series of women’s peace crusades, dialogue and reconciliation activities</p> <p><b>Immediate Factors:</b> most of these activities and responses did not seem to be in evidence in immediate response to these events</p>	<p>recognized the need for and have begun to implement of dialogues, peace promotion activities, conflict mediation, etc. that had not been extent previous to this time. The disarmament initiative of the GOU has been recently taken up again with great enthusiasm and articulated commitment on the part of the GOU.</p>	<p>Moroto, primarily Tepeth) started a Peace Choir in Feb. 1999. “We were tired of our men dying. We cry. We moved as a group of women to the enemy, we sang songs, the cry for peace was pressing us.” The impact of this choir is hard to assess. Though one man said “we have peace now, because of the women”.</p>
<p>Karamajong/Iteso Conflict</p> <p>Place: Katakwi (also Soroti and Kumi)</p> <p>Time: Ongoing (50 + years, major conflicts over past 3</p>	<p>History: Long history of cattle removal from the Teso to the Karamajong. Grievances, including at least in part the lack of response by the government to cattle raiding, fueled the Teso Rebellion against GOU, only resolved as of 1993.</p>	<p>Pian/Bokoro against Iteso (Katakwi) (another source adds Jie, but according to Kotido Peace Initiative people, the Jie are “at peace” with the Teso.)</p>	<p><b>Structural:</b> Erratic rainfall, seasonal resources /forage/water availability force Karamajong to search for more fodder, more rain in the Teso area; historical neglect of Karamoja in terms of socio/economic development; Teso also</p>	<p><b>Structural:</b> Common language; history of negotiation and sharing of natural resources</p> <p><b>Proximate:</b> Intermediating role played by the church that provides grounds for seeking peace; common economic interests, many of the cattle traders are Teso;</p>	<p>Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative has sent more than one delegation to try to jump-start the process of dialogue, Church of Uganda, Mennonite Central Committee has some involvement, Christian International Peace Service,</p>	<p>MP Grace Akelo has been a leading voice for peace in this area as well as an advocate of Teso interests. Student organizations based at Makerere University have also recently hosted a peacebuilding conference on the university campus.</p>

Name	Nature	Actors	Causes	Local Peace Capacities	Outside Interventions	Overview/Other
years)			<p>feel ignored by the state and aggrieved by the Karamajong; at least a 50 year history of periodic conflict between these groups</p> <p><b>Proximate:</b> Rebellion of Teso against the central government, the GOU battles against the rebels resulted in IDPs, and created further opportunity for Karamajong to enter and use “depopulated” areas for grazing; moving in to these areas also increases opportunity for cattle theft; GOU now has been able to end the rebellion and is politically required to appease the Teso, particularly in regards to the incursions of the Karamajong (including disarmament); at the level of political elites, and general public discourse, the Karamajong are viewed as “savages”, uncultured, and lawless; easy availability of arms and ammunition; neglect on the part of the state of both the Teso and Karamoja; cultural reinvigoration and unanimity supports violent responses;</p> <p><b>Immediate Factors:</b></p>	<b>Immediate:</b> adaptation, planning, and initial implementation of an “Acholi-style” peacebuilding campaign;	One current challenge is to help heal the trauma and suffering of the aggrieved parties as recent events have brought these issues to the fore. This may be an important immediate and prior step to the implementation of reconciliation and peacebuilding activities that have found much success in the case of the Acholi/Jie conflicts.	

Name	Nature	Actors	Causes	Local Peace Capacities	Outside Interventions	Overview/Other
			theft of cattle, revenge EG Sept. 11, 01 cattle raid by Karamajong and retaliatory execution by Teso			
<p>Jie/Acholi Conflicts</p> <p>Place: Acholi/Karamoja border areas between formerly Kitgum now Padder and Kotido Districts</p> <p>Time: Ongoing, recent major outbreaks 99-2000 dry season (Dec. 99 – March 2000) currently tensions greatly reduced and peace treaty in effect</p>	<p>History: Similar to Teso conflict, the Acholi regions have been (and continue to be) the site for an armed rebellion against the central state. The broad themes of the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) rebellion have been northern underdevelopment. While the rebellion has gone on, there have been large numbers of IDPs and the vacating of large areas of land.</p> <p>The need for dry season grazing lands that the Jie have traditionally accessed by going west (towards water and forage) and into Acholi lands have thus served as an immediate source of conflict in a larger context of deprivation, violence and instability.</p> <p>Movement between southern Sudan and Acholi lands on the part of the LRA and refugees have also complicated the situation and the violence relationships. International politics thus come into play.</p> <p>Acholi perception that the GOU is purposely keeping the conflict from abating to keep the Acholi weak economically &amp; politically</p>	<p>Ugandan government and army, the Lord's Resistance Army, the Acholi, and the Jie in Kotido District.</p>	<p><b>Structure:</b> Erratic rainfall in Kotido district and seasonal resources /forage/water availability force Karamajong to search for more fodder, more rain in the Acholi areas; historical neglect of Karamoja in terms of socio/economic development; Acholi also feel ignored by the state and aggrieved by the Karamajong;</p> <p>Ongoing civil war in Southern Sudan, NIF govt. in Khartoum funds LRA, GOU in turn funds SPLA</p> <p>The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) active since 1987 has resulted in 400,000 (plus or minus 100,000) internally displace people.</p> <p><b>Proximate:</b> Hi level of instability, increased arms availability, and very high levels of trauma on the Acholi; level of Ids is even higher than in Teso, levels of violence</p>	<p><b>Proximate:</b> ARLPI pursues a holistic program of peacebuilding including peace walks, press for and gets passed the amnesty bill/law traditional cleansing and healing rituals; this results in a great deal of success in reconciling former LRA rebels and civilians as well as at least in part the GOU and army</p> <p><b>Immediate:</b> Kraal leaders and local Acholi leaders have met under the dialogues sponsored by Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (est. 1997) &amp; the Kotido Peace Initiative; cooperation from the above groups &amp; UPDF/ASTU; cooperation from Jie kraal leaders in returning stolen animals; agreement reached that the herdsmen themselves (Karamajong) have to be more responsible ensuring that animals do not trample or destroy crops in farmed</p>	<p>Mennonite Central Committee provided funds for various activities, funding also received from CARITAS, Catholic Missions. ARLPI and KOPEIN have been key leaders in the peacebuilding process.</p>	<p>Most coordination seems to have come via ARLPI and the churches in Kotido; note that there may be some need to further sensitize NGOS and others in regards to the potential contributions and participation of women. (The lack of a seat on the Pacatusa Local Peace Committee for any of the three local women's NGOS in Kotido comes to mind)</p> <p>The two principle intermediaries (ARLPI and church leaders in Kotido) have high local visibility and a great deal of on the ground credibility in the areas in which they work. As a result they were able to mobilize in a context where a national level or even a highly funded international project would not likely have been able to attain the same results. This type of local involvement seems crucial in the early and tentative trust building stages of any</p>



Name	Nature	Actors	Causes	Local Peace Capacities	Outside Interventions	Overview/Other
			<p>targeted at civilians is very brutal, child soldiers, kidnappings, rape, dismemberment, etc all form the context in which Karamajong raids are perceived as piling on...</p> <p>Like the Teso, the Acholi respond that the conflict is one-sided and that the GOU is purposefully not protecting the Acholi from the Karamajong as political punishment, the state wants to keep us underdeveloped</p> <p><b>Immediate:</b> Guns, opposition of certain politicians</p>	<p>lands; agreement reached that Jie can access specific fodder sources in Acholi if they turn in their arms before entry into Acholi; during the past dry season there was a dramatic decrease in violence, the current dry season will be an important acid test (particularly at the time that the rains begin again and the Karamajong move home)</p> <p>ARLPI turns attention to Jie problem and engages the Church.</p>		CPMR activity.

## **APPENDIX E: WORKSHOP DECISIONS OF THE “KARAMOJA FOR PEACEFUL AND EFFECTIVE DISARMAMENT”**

Mobilization Workshop Organized jointly by the Office of the LC5, the RDC, and Moroto District NGO Forum. Facilitated by the Uganda Human Rights Commission and The Human Rights and Democratization Program (Dander/EU)

Moroto, 18 – 20 November 2001

### **Workshop Decisions**

**Presented to H.E. President Yoweri Museveni on 19 November 2001**

We the participants in the above workshop, in all 200 kraal leaders, vigilantes men and women from Pian, Pokot, Bokora, Chekwi and Matheniko have resolved to make the following recommendations and decisions:

#### **To ourselves as Karamojong**

- We want peace and agree that in order to achieve this the gun in Karamoja must be removed and we need unity among ourselves as well as a common understanding with the Central Government; Local Government; UPDF and all our neighbors.
- We are determined and committed to broker internal peace processes and deal with bad elements within ourselves that threaten our peace.
- We support the enrolment of Karamojong into the Local Defense Units to be deployed at each sub-county to provide security for us.
- Our kraal leaders pledge to work together with LDUs for peaceful disarmament in Karamoja.
- Our kraal leaders pledge to work together with civil society organizations, local council leaders and UPDF for peaceful disarmament.
- We recognize the important role that Karamojong women can play in the peace process and agree to give them a lead role in both brokering peace and advancing the disarmament process.
- Karamojong women will play a key role in fostering dialogue with women in neighboring districts.

#### **To our neighbors in Teso, Longo and Acholi**

- We call upon the leadership from Karamoja and those from the neighboring districts to come together as role models for unity, trust building to sincerely promote peaceful coexistence.
- We call upon our neighbors to work closely together with our opinion leaders, kraal leaders, religious leaders and Local Government leaders in Karamoja.
- We recognize the fact that women have suffered most in the conflict. We call upon the leaders in the neighboring districts to strongly involve women in peacebuilding and disarmament process.

**To the UPDF**

- We expect that the UPDF shall exercise a high level of discipline, recognize and respect the important role of kraal leaders as allies for the success of the disarmament process.
- We expect that the UPDF shall ensure our security by guarding the border with Kenya and Sudan.
- We expect that the UPDF shall work closely with the LDUs and Kraal, opinion leaders and civil society organizations in order to make peaceful disarmament a reality on the ground.
- We expect that our neighboring districts, especially Teso and Kapchorwa shall also be disarmed.
- We expect that the UPDF units in Karamoja shall be fully facilitated to handle the security situation in the region professionally and effectively.

**To the District Local Government**

- We expect that the District Local Government work closely with elders, Kraal leaders and opinion leaders.
- We expect that the District Local Government jointly with civil society and the UPDF shall plan and initiate a comprehensive sensitization program to promote voluntary and peaceful disarmament.
- We expect that the District Local Government urgently develops a comprehensive development program including immediate and tangible activities to follow on the disarmament process.
- We expect that the District Local Government makes all efforts to secure the necessary funds from the central Government and the donor community to support the sensitization exercise.
- We expect that the District Local Government ensures that special attention is given to women both during the sensitization for disarmament and the follow-up development programs.

**To the Central Government**

- We expect that the Central Government through the office of the RDC closely collaborate with local secular and religious leaders, civil society and kraal leaders in decision-making.
- We expect that the UPDF units in Karamoja be trained in conflict resolution and community sensitization and mobilization.
- We expect the Central Government to provide support and facilitation to local governments for the disarmament process.
- We expect that the Central Government through permanent deployment of the UPDF provide massive security at the borders with Kenya and Sudan.
- We expect the Central Government to push for disarmament in the East African region and to call for and collaborate with international efforts to stop the trafficking in small arms.
- We insist that the Central Government restarts broadcasts on the Karamoja FM Radio in order to provide regular information on disarmament, security and development in Karamoja, its neighboring districts and across our international borders.
- We expect urgent and concrete steps that aim at economical empowerment of the Karamoja region.
- We expect that development funds be directed to priority areas such as water, education, roads, human health and the health of our cattle.

- We expect that the Central Government contact and lobby donors to elicit support for a comprehensive development plan for Karamoja.
- We expect that the Central Government provides an incentive for voluntary disarmament.
- We acknowledge the positive efforts of the UPDF in strengthening the LDUs and expect that the LDUs be fully facilitated in order to build trust and confidence in the communities.
- We expect that in Karamoja an independent monitoring body be put in place under the responsibility of the Uganda Human Rights Commission.

#### **To the Uganda Human Rights Commission**

- We expect the Uganda Human Rights Commission together with civil society organizations from the outset of the disarmament exercise to monitor human rights issues.
- We expect the Uganda Human Rights Commission collaborates with civil society, in particular the Moroto NGO Forum to establish a presence in Karamoja through resident liaison personnel.
- We expect the Uganda Human Rights Commission to keep the general population and parliament informed on our efforts to promote peaceful disarmament and security in Karamoja.

#### **To Danida and EU (and other donors)**

- We expect the donor community and in particular the Danida/EU Human Rights and Democratization Program to support the Uganda Human Rights Commission, the Moroto NGO Forum and the Moroto NGO Forum in monitoring disarmament and in sensitization of the people of Karamoja.
- We expect the donor community at large to provide funds to the Government to effect its development programs for Karamoja and expect that these funds be directed to our priorities such as water for humans and cattle, education, roads and communication infrastructure and human and cattle health.
- We expect the donor community at large to also provide funds directly to NGOS already working in Karamoja in order to enable them to implement their programs more effectively.

## **APPENDIX F: INDIVIDUALS CONSULTED BY THE TEAM**

### **In Kenya:**

Fatuma Abdikadir	Community Development Coordinator, ALRMP
Jecinta Abenyo	Project Coordinator, ITDG, Turkana Pastoralists Project
Mohmud Sheikh Adan	Conflict Resolution Project Coordinator, ITDG
Abdullahi Yussuf Ahmed	Turkana Pastoralist Project Officer, ITDG
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Father Bruno Novelli  
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(Contact c/o LWF, an alternative)

Moses Mudong  
Karamoja Initiative for Sustainable Peace  
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John Abingwa, Resident District Commissioner  
Stephen Worioga, DISO  
Moroto, UGANDA

P. D. Joshi (Indian businessman, buying marble in Moroto for lime works in Tororo)  
Tororo, UGANDA

Father Pietro Ciaponi (known as “Apayamakwang” among the Jie)  
Kanawat Parish  
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Kampala, UGANDA

Romano Longole, Coordinator  
Kotido Peace Initiative  
Justice and Peace Department, Kanawat Parish  
PO Box 3872  
Kampala, UGANDA

Dr. Frederick Eladu, District Veterinary Officer  
PO Kotido  
UGANDA

A gathering of youth, Nakapelimoru village (reportedly the largest village in East Africa, some 6000 – 10,000 people), outside Kotido, UGANDA

Alice Purkol, Natalina Lukol, Rukia Moru, Maria Nagiro Kiramiran, Women’s Peace Group  
c/o Tepeth Agro-Pastoral Programme, LWF

Helen Achila, Chair  
Women’s Peace Group by the airstrip  
c/o Mataniko Development Forum

Hon. Malinga Johnson  
MP Kafelebyoy  
Kampala, UGANDA

Julius Okello  
Student, Makerere University  
Representing and coordinating the youth of Soroti, Palisa, and Katakwi  
Kampala, UGANDA

Hon. Isaiah Imumet  
MP Katakwi  
Kampala, UGANDA

Hon. Ogwel Loote Sammy  
MP Moroto  
Kampala, UGANDA

Hon. Aachilla John Rex  
MP Jie  
Kampala, UGANDA

Hon. Lubbo Christine Nauwang  
MP Kotido  
Kampala, UGANDA

Hon. Lochiam Miligan Rose  
MP Moroto  
Kampala, UGANDA

Andrew Kostrowski  
Advisor, Karamoja Parliamentary Group  
Kampala, UGANDA

Hon. Lorika Rose  
MP Nakapiripirit  
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Derek Wright  
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Graham Carrington  
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Joyce Nima  
Uganda Joint Christian Council  
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George Oumamube  
Alternative Basic Education Karamoja  
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Bruno Ochaya and Darlington Lorika  
Action for Development of Local Communities (ADOL)  
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Mr. Mugwagwa  
World Bank  
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Jean Marc Ruiz  
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## APPENDIX G: SELECTED LIST OF DOCUMENTS

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